The case for public support of innovation: at the sector, technology and challenge area levels by unknown
  
 
 
  
 
 
THE CASE FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT 
OF INNOVATION 
At the sector, technology and 
challenge area levels 
JULY 2014 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by Technopolis Ltd for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. This 
study was co-funded by the Technology Strategy Board (TSB). 
Authors: Erik Arnold, Kristine Farla, Peter Kolarz, Xavier Potau 
Further contributors: Neil Brown, Andrej Horvath, Paula Knee, Brian MacAulay, Tammy 
Sharp, Paul Simmonds 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this report are that of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills or any other Government Department.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Case for Public Support of 
Innovation 
 
At the sector, technology and challenge area levels 
 
July 2014 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
 
 
Contents 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. i 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
Outline of the study ..................................................................................................................... 1 
A typology of market and system failures ................................................................................ 1 
Barriers to innovation in 24 selected areas .............................................................................. 2 
Comparing barriers ................................................................................................................. 3 
Observations ............................................................................................................................... 4 
The big picture ........................................................................................................................ 4 
Key trends and tendencies ...................................................................................................... 5 
The importance of networks .................................................................................................... 6 
Credit constraints and skills shortages .................................................................................... 6 
Connections between the innovation areas ............................................................................. 7 
The role of the state ................................................................................................................ 8 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 9 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 10 
Objectives ................................................................................................................................. 10 
This report ................................................................................................................................. 10 
Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 11 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 11 
Where does the idea of ‘failure’ come from? ............................................................................. 11 
Market failure ........................................................................................................................ 11 
  
 
Systems failures .................................................................................................................... 14 
Failures described in the literature ............................................................................................ 20 
Market failure – Character of science and technology ........................................................... 20 
Market failure – Market power ............................................................................................... 20 
Market failure – Externalities ................................................................................................. 21 
Market failure – Information asymmetry ................................................................................ 22 
Systems failure – Capability failure ........................................................................................ 22 
Systems failure – Network failure .......................................................................................... 23 
Systems failure – Institutional failure ..................................................................................... 23 
Systems failure – Infrastructural ............................................................................................ 24 
Evidence of failures in each of the innovation areas ............................................................... 27 
Barriers, scale, innovation areas and evidence ......................................................................... 27 
Scale ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
Innovation areas .................................................................................................................... 28 
Evidence ............................................................................................................................... 31 
Energy ...................................................................................................................................... 33 
Nuclear Energy ..................................................................................................................... 34 
Renewable Energy ................................................................................................................ 37 
Oil and gas ............................................................................................................................ 40 
Electricity distribution and storage ......................................................................................... 45 
Built Environment ...................................................................................................................... 51 
Future Cities .......................................................................................................................... 52 
Low Impact buildings ............................................................................................................. 55 
Food.......................................................................................................................................... 59 
Agri-science .......................................................................................................................... 59 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
 
‘Farm to fork’ value chain ...................................................................................................... 65 
Transport .................................................................................................................................. 72 
Low carbon car manufacturing .............................................................................................. 73 
Intelligent Transport Systems ................................................................................................ 77 
Civil aviation .......................................................................................................................... 81 
Health and Care ........................................................................................................................ 85 
Regenerative Medicine .......................................................................................................... 85 
Assisted living ....................................................................................................................... 88 
Stratified medicine ................................................................................................................. 92 
Creative Industries .................................................................................................................... 96 
Note on a sub-sector: Design .............................................................................................. 100 
Financial Services ................................................................................................................... 103 
Satellites and Space ............................................................................................................... 107 
Nanotechnology and Advanced Materials ............................................................................... 112 
ICT .......................................................................................................................................... 119 
Big Data .............................................................................................................................. 119 
Cyber security ..................................................................................................................... 126 
Robotics and Autonomous Systems .................................................................................... 132 
Electronics, Photonics and Electrical Systems ........................................................................ 136 
Biosciences ............................................................................................................................. 140 
Industrial Biotechnology ...................................................................................................... 140 
Synthetic Biology ................................................................................................................. 143 
Summary of results .................................................................................................................. 149 
Overall Results ........................................................................................................................ 149 
Most and least significant failures ............................................................................................ 154 
  
 
Relationships between different innovation areas.................................................................... 157 
Credit constraints .................................................................................................................... 158 
Skills shortages ....................................................................................................................... 162 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 165 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
i 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Summary of failures identified in the literature ................................................................................... 25 
Table 2 Scale and descriptions for categorising barriers to innovation ........................................................... 27 
Table 3 Innovation areas ................................................................................................................................. 28 
Table 4 Sub-division of challenge-led areas.................................................................................................... 29 
Table 5 Sub-division of broad technology sectors ........................................................................................... 30 
Table 6 Innovation areas: original and revised structure ................................................................................. 31 
Table 7 Failures in the Nuclear energy market................................................................................................ 36 
Table 8 Failures in the Renewable energy market .......................................................................................... 39 
Table 9 Failures in the oil and gas energy market .......................................................................................... 43 
Table 10 Purposes of energy storage in today’s power system ...................................................................... 46 
Table 11 Failures in the electricity distribution and storage market ................................................................ 49 
Table 12 Failures in the Future Cities market.................................................................................................. 54 
Table 13 Failures in the low impact buildings market ...................................................................................... 57 
Table 14 Failures in the Agri-science market .................................................................................................. 61 
Table 15 Failures in the farm-to-fork value chain market ................................................................................ 68 
Table 16 Failures in the low carbon vehicle market ........................................................................................ 74 
Table 17 Failures in the intelligent transport systems market ......................................................................... 78 
Table 18 Failures in the civil aviation market................................................................................................... 82 
Table 19 Failures in Regenerative Medicine ................................................................................................... 87 
Table 20 Failures in the Assisted Living market .............................................................................................. 91 
Table 21 Failures in the Future Cities market.................................................................................................. 94 
Table 22 Failures in the Creative Industries .................................................................................................... 98 
Table 23 Failures in financial services ........................................................................................................... 106 
Table 24 Failures in the Space industry ........................................................................................................ 110 
Table 25 Failures in nanotechnology and advanced materials ..................................................................... 116 
Table 26 Failures in Big Data ........................................................................................................................ 124 
Table 27 Barriers and opportunities in cyber security innovation .................................................................. 128 
Table 28 Failures in the cyber security market .............................................................................................. 129 
Table 29 Failures in Robotics (in the EU) ...................................................................................................... 135 
Table 30 Failures in the Electronics, Photonics and electrical systems (EPES) market ............................... 137 
Table 31 Failures in the biotechnology industry ............................................................................................ 142 
Table 32 Failures in the synthetic biology industry ........................................................................................ 145 
Table 33 Summary of failure types ................................................................................................................ 149 
Table 34 Innovation areas scored by the effect of innovation failures .......................................................... 151 
Table 35 Distribution of failures’ score and frequency count......................................................................... 153 
Table 36 Overall severity of each innovation barrier ..................................................................................... 154 
 
List of Figures 
 
ii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 A National Innovation System Heuristic ............................................................................................ 14 
Figure 2 Traditional (Linear) Models of Innovation .......................................................................................... 16 
Figure 3 Modern ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation ............................................................................................. 17 
Figure 4 Evolutionary View of Innovation in Innovation Systems .................................................................... 19 
Figure 5 Generation of electricity in the UK in 2012 by all generating companies .......................................... 34 
Figure 6 Technical and economic features of power storage technologies .................................................... 48 
Figure 7 Main UK’s food and beverage research organisations ..................................................................... 67 
Figure 8 Research, curation and publication process of e-Science .............................................................. 122 
Figure 9 Failures in the RAS market ............................................................................................................. 134 
Figure 10 Frequency of the different impacts of failures on innovation, by innovation area ......................... 156 
Figure 11 Frequency of the different impact of failures on innovation, by market failure .............................. 157 
Figure 12 Two sets of innovation barriers ..................................................................................................... 158 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
1 
 
Executive Summary 
Introduction 
This study sets out the barriers to innovation in 24 areas of economic interest, and in doing 
so outlines the rationale for public support for innovation at the sectoral level. The study 
was carried out by Technopolis and commissioned by the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS), and co-funded by the Technology Strategy Board (TSB). 
Outline of the study 
A typology of market and system failures 
The first part of the study constitutes a review of the literature on different categories of 
issues that have been identified as inhibiting innovation in the absence of public support. 
Generally falling into two groups – market failures and system failures – the review found a 
considerable degree of variation in terms of the number and scope of categories identified 
by various authors. The range of categories outlined in the literature, stretching from those 
rooted in neoclassical economic theory (indivisibility, externalities, etc.) to much more 
socially and culturally grounded obstacles (capability failures, image problems, skills 
shortages, etc.), was ultimately condensed into a set of eight categories to be used for the 
remainder of the study: 
 Character of science and technology: The size of scientific or technological problems is 
too great for individual private actors to tackle if markets are competitive, and may be 
accompanied by uncertainty, making it hard for the private sector to invest. It may be 
that innovation only yields return in the long run, hampering investment 
 Market power: This can lead to, or be caused by, for example, the first supplier or user 
building insurmountable advantage, and may lead to consumer lock-in. More generally, 
high cost of market entry/exit 
 Externalities: It is too hard to appropriate enough of the results of research or innovation 
to make private investment worthwhile. Innovation may depend upon the presence of 
external networks, which are beyond the means of innovators to create; innovation is 
easy for competitors to copy and there are limited opportunities to protect new ideas 
 Information asymmetry: High levels of specialised technical and/ or market knowledge 
mean that not all the economic actors involved have the basis for making informed 
decisions 
 Capability Failure: These failures result from the difference between the capabilities of 
real firms and those assumed in the idealised economic model, so that firms lack 
needed skills, resources, ability to learn, absorptive and analytic capacity or otherwise 
to capture innovation opportunities 
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 Network Failure: Networks are fragmented and/or broad; communication and 
cooperation within networks are poor. Networks may be locked in to technological 
regimes, markets or products by their history and capabilities and find themselves 
unable to transition into new technologies or businesses 
 Institutional Failure: Institutions (whether in the sense of ‘organisations’ or ‘rules and 
conventions’) operate in ways that impede innovation. Rules and regulation are not 
conducive to innovation and technological development. Government policy has the 
same effect 
 Infrastructural Failure: Insufficient human and capital investment in infrastructures 
critical to innovation performance by the state 
Barriers to innovation in 24 selected areas 
 
These eight categories of issues were then used in the 
analysis of 24 substantive contexts, in order to categorise 
and classify the barriers to innovation highlighted in each of 
them. The 24 ‘innovation areas’ were chosen, as they reflect 
priorities of a number of key bodies, most notably BIS, the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and the European 
Commission (EC). More specifically, the selected areas are 
of importance for one of three key reasons: 
 Challenge-led areas: these are sectors that are relevant 
to several social, political and economic needs of a society. 
Successful innovation in these areas therefore has the 
capacity to generate a broad range of positive knock-on 
effects and contribute directly to a society’s overall 
wellbeing. 
 Development areas: These are areas where the UK is 
already acknowledged to have exceptional strength. As 
particularly likely sources of future economic growth, 
removing barriers to innovation is of exceptional importance 
here. 
 Enabling Technology capabilities: These are areas 
centred on general-purpose technologies, which have been 
identified as promising and may find application in any 
number of important sectors. As such, successful innovation 
in these areas has the potential to spawn further innovation 
and growth across all sectors where application might be 
possible. 
It was additionally ensured that the ‘Eight Great Technologies’, highlighted on several 
occasions by David Willets and the Policy Exchange think tank, all feature among the 
selected innovation areas. In large part, the Eight Great Technologies fall under the 
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heading of Enabling Technology Capabilities, though where possible, they have been used 
to illustrate problems encountered in Challenge-led and Development areas. 
For each of the 24 areas, a review was then conducted, drawing on a range of sources 
including academic research, government reports (national and EU level), and reports 
from the sectors / industries themselves. Barriers to innovation identified in the literature 
on each area were then compiled into a template, placing descriptions of each barrier 
under one of the eight categories identified in the first part of this study. 
In some of the innovation areas, sophisticated efforts had already been made to collect 
and describe all the main barriers to innovation existing within them. In the energy sector, 
the Technology Innovation Needs Assessment (TINA) reports are examples of such 
efforts. Where such prior work existed, use of further literature was used mainly to verify 
the existing compiled findings, and to check if any further barriers might have been 
identified elsewhere. In other areas, no such prior efforts existed, meaning that the range 
of barriers to innovation needed to be drawn from across the full range of literature found. 
The literature used to identify and describe barriers to innovation draws on diverse types of 
evidence, ranging from quantitative surveys and numerical sector analysis to interviews, 
focus groups, workshops, case studies, collected expert opinions and historical analysis. 
This diverse range of evidence types reflects the differences that exist between the eight 
types of innovation failure identified through the literature review in the first part of this 
report: some types of failure can be quantified (e.g. size of market players, numbers of 
skilled graduates), others are better explained in qualitative terms, through historical 
narrative, expert opinion and, occasionally, through common sense. 
Comparing barriers 
In order to move beyond highlighting a range of barriers, each identified barrier was 
ranked on a 5-point scale, in order to go some way to distinguish the more significant 
barriers from the less significant ones. In order to avoid subjective judgement of barriers, 
the scale used in this report is based not on qualitative but on descriptive criteria, where 
factors considered are limited to prevalence of each barrier in the literature, as well as 
each barrier’s conceptual capacity to slow down the innovation process as opposed to 
stopping it entirely: 
 ‘No evidence found’: Used if the literature/ reports on the sector contain nothing of 
relevance to a particular category of failure 
 ‘Slowing down (a little)’: If there is a barrier that is explicitly noted as being of minor 
significance in contrast to others in a sector, or if a particular barrier is noted as being 
only applicable to very specific types of products within a sub-sector, this caveat is 
added 
 ‘Slowing down’: Used if a barrier does not prevent successful innovation altogether, but 
nevertheless noticeably hinders it in some form 
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 ‘Slowing down (a lot)’: If there is a barrier, which, though not a showstopper, is explicitly 
acknowledged in the literature as being an especially severe barrier, or is mentioned by 
all or almost all reports on the sector, the ‘a lot’ caveat is added to indicate heightened 
significance 
 ‘Showstopper’: Used if the nature of a barrier is such that it effectively makes successful 
innovation completely or almost completely impossible 
There are several caveats associated with the approach of this study, and especially with 
implementation of such scales. Though the approach used here has yielded many 
important findings, the following limitations should be kept in mind: 
 Not having identified a given type of failure (categorized as ‘No evidence found’) does 
not provide a guarantee that a failure does not exist in a given area or sector. This 
study, as well as the overall literature, may have failed to document certain failures. A 
lack of evidence of failures may also be an indication that some innovation areas are 
more dynamic and fast-growing than others and, as a result, we identify fewer failures. 
 There are several failures in various areas that currently slow down innovation but, as a 
result of technological change, it is expected that some of these barriers to innovation 
will disappear within the coming years. Though impossible to predict with certainty, the 
potentially temporary nature of some barriers needs to be kept in mind 
 Despite emphasizing a descriptive approach, ratings of the significance of different 
failures are to an extent subjective, and the scale by which we propose to measure the 
failures is imperfect. The effect of the failure (showstopper vs. slowing down) does not 
reflect the degree to which a failure is critical to the innovative development of the 
industry. Specifically, failures that block the value chain of innovative processes that are 
key to further advancement in the industry can be considered more critical failures. 
 In many of the innovation areas we found multiple failures within a single failure 
category. Both the total score and frequency count only reflect whether a type of failure 
was identified and does not reflect the (number of) way(s) by which one type failure 
restrains innovation.  
Despite these caveats associated with implementing a numeric scale we are still interested 
in learning whether this exercise will reveal any interesting patterns. 
Observations 
The big picture 
Overall, the study succeeded in compiling evidence of a range of barriers to innovation in 
each of the 24 selected areas, categorising them according to the eight types of barriers 
identified through the literature review, and ranking them on the 5-point scale, in order to 
highlight those barriers that are identified within the evidence-base as being of particular 
importance. 
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Having done so, the initial general observation is that most of the eight types of barrier 
feature in most of the areas. However, far from signalling that all areas have broad and 
comparable sets of factors inhibiting innovation, the study instead highlighted with clarity 
that each sector, sub-sector or technological area has a unique mix and character of 
barriers, with little scope for grand theorising and catch-all explanations for lack of 
innovation. 
As such, this study puts into question the use of grand theories to explain why innovation 
does not happen as much as is desired. It highlights that analysis at the level of specific 
areas is much more fruitful, both in terms of describing the exact character and cause of 
barriers, but also, due to the yielded detail and specificity, in terms of giving clearer 
indications of what kind of public support and policy intervention might help to lessen these 
barriers. 
Key trends and tendencies 
The 24 areas were divided into several different types of categories, in order to search for 
any broad types of areas that might have more significant barriers to innovation than other. 
The distinction between ‘Challenge-led areas’, ‘Development areas’ and Enabling 
technology capabilities’ were used as an initial distinction, though no clear trends of areas 
with greater or fewer barriers could be identified along these lines. Additional categories 
were assigned to each area: 
 Whether or not it has been subject to significant and substantive state involvement 
 Whether or not it has been heavily regulated 
 Whether it has a strong high-street / consumer goods orientation 
 Whether it is a new industry (i.e. non-existent before approx. 1980) 
However, none of these features could be identified as a determinant of whether an area 
would have either especially high or especially low levels of barriers to innovation. This 
lack of clear, overarching patterns further highlights that barriers to innovation are strongly 
dependent on the particularities of each area or sector in question, and that grand 
overarching theories are for the most part too blunt to act as convincing and demonstrably 
applicable explanations. Some minor trends were observed, though they only ever 
contribute to understanding particular facets of the subject-matter in question, and never to 
better understanding the overall picture: 
 Barriers were less significant in areas around the competency of digital services than 
elsewhere (e.g. Big Data, Financial services, Cyber security). All of these innovation 
areas score relatively low on the ranking and frequency count, indicating that barriers to 
innovation in the digital services are generally lower than elsewhere. Specifically, we 
found no evidence of failures of the character of science on digital services 
 Infrastructural failures are most likely to be ‘Showstoppers’ 
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 In sectors with heavy state involvement, we usually identify showstoppers or factors 
slowing-down innovation as a result of information asymmetry. We also find that 
infrastructural failures play a prominent role in sectors with heavy state involvement 
 Infrastructural failures do not play a prominent role in the 8 great technologies 
 Network failures are less frequently identified in sectors relying on newer technologies 
 The ‘Eight Great Technologies’ have higher instances of failure than other areas relating 
to ‘Character of Science and Technology’, indicating that this ‘market failure’ from 
neoclassical economic literature – though overall to be of relatively low significance – 
still has purchase in sectors aligned more closely to basic research. 
The importance of networks 
Out of the eight categories of barriers to innovation, seven appeared with broadly similar 
frequency and overall severity. However, one type of barrier, ‘Character of Science and 
Technology’ was overall considerably less significant, appearing in far fewer of the 24 
areas than other barriers and never constituting a ‘Showstopper’. The relatively low 
apparent significance of the character of the science and technology as a barrier to 
successful innovation is initially especially surprising, given that size, scope and risk 
attached to technology (‘indivisibility’) has been used as one of the fundamental arguments 
for public support of innovation throughout neoclassical literature and discourse. 
This study found that whilst in all 24 areas there are elements of technological complexity, 
requiring extensive scientific expertise, some degree of unknown outcomes and large, 
sophisticated scientific efforts, this in itself is rarely acknowledged as a problem. Instead, 
the character of the technology often provided the rationale for requiring more skilled 
workers, better demonstration facilities, or, most often, better coordinated networks. 
Across the case studies of large-scale, research-intensive manufacturing – satellites and 
space, energy, civil aviation, robotics, food production and agri-science – there is frequent 
reference to the importance of supply-chains and coordination between manufacturers of 
various constituent parts and sub-components. There is therefore a strong suggestion that 
sectors where indivisibility might once have been problematic, specialisation and 
fragmentation have had a mitigating role, lowering the minimum scale required for 
successful innovation. Put simply, there is a sense in the analysis that in many cases the 
indivisible has become divisible, but at the expense of splitting up technologies into 
networks of sub-components, which may easily become fragmented or un-coordinated. In 
the context of this argument, it is unsurprising that ‘Network Failure’ was the overall most 
common and significant type of barrier identified in the study. 
Credit constraints and skills shortages 
Credit constraints and skills shortages were two issues that received particular attention, 
given that they feature heavily in public and political debates on innovation, business 
growth and the future of the UK’s economy. The study found that both of these issues 
feature strongly in many of the 24 selected innovation areas. However, there is ample 
evidence to show that neither of these issues are a uniform problem with uniform causes 
and explanations. Credit constraints, the study found, can occur for a host of different 
reasons: 
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 They can result to the early stage of development of a technology, leading to risk in 
terms of whether successful products will in fact materialise 
 They can likewise result from information asymmetry, where lenders do not have the 
expertise to understand a new technology and its application 
 In some areas moreover, there is lack of awareness and expertise on the part of firms 
about the existing and available sources of credit 
 The long-term perspective for development required in some areas was seen to clash 
with the short-termism characterising many investors and lenders 
 In some cases, credit constraints are genuinely a temporary result of the overall 
financial crisis and not especially related to particularities of the innovation area 
Skills shortages likewise were a considerable problem in most areas, but once again, the 
story is more complex: 
 Skills shortages might simply be a direct result of the overall lack of STEM graduates 
and researchers in the UK 
 However, in some areas there is also lack of knowledge in the part of the firms 
regarding what kind of skills are best suited to enhance commercial innovation 
 Sectors with higher profit margins are in some cases able and willing to pay higher 
salaries to researchers and developers, leaving other sectors unable to attract the ‘best 
in the business’ without considerable expense 
 The danger of ‘poaching’ sometimes acts as a disincentive, where researchers and 
developers are likely to change jobs upon receiving training from a business 
 Some sectors, moreover, have an image-problem, leaving few graduates with relevant 
and useful skills showing any prior interest and being far more likely to work in other, 
more enticing sectors 
Connections between the innovation areas 
Though this study for the most part focuses on the level of the individual innovation areas, 
connection between the areas was a further important finding that emerged throughout the 
analysis. This research showed that each innovation area has a range of barriers inhibiting 
innovation to greater or lesser degrees. These barriers are consequences of the 
economic, political, social and cultural context in which each area exists, as well as of the 
particularities of the area itself. Innovation, put simply, does not occur in isolation from 
wider circumstances. And likewise, the 24 selected innovation areas do not occur in 
isolation from each other. 
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This was most noticeable when contrasting the ‘Enabling technology capabilities’ with the 
more substantive and sectoral ‘Challenge’ and ‘Development’ areas. Often, innovation in 
these more substantive areas constitutes the application of general-purpose technologies 
to specific sectoral contexts (e.g. photonics applied in the health sector, big data applied to 
create intelligent transport systems, etc.). At this level, a particular innovation, when 
viewed start-to-finish, is in fact subject to two sets of barriers before a successful, 
marketable product exists. 
The role of the state 
Maligned as the antithesis of creativity and private enterprise in some strands of thought, 
and viewed as a facilitator and entrepreneurial agent in others, this study found the role of 
the state to be varied and diverse across the 24 innovation areas considered here. The 
state’s capacity to create demand, especially in challenge-led areas (health & care, 
transport, etc.), often presented an important opportunity to bring innovations to market, 
whilst the stringent need for demonstrable utility and value for money required in many 
state-run arenas (e.g. the NHS) simultaneously presented challenges. In some areas, 
heavy regulation hampered successful research and innovation, yet at times this was a 
genuine result of outdated and poorly conceived rules, whilst in other cases regulation had 
to give consideration to important concerns beyond the topic of innovation itself (e.g. 
ethical/ moral issues in synthetic biology). Echoing the overall conclusions of this study, 
findings show that the state has many forms of involvement in innovation, as a customer, 
as a regulator, as a provider of skills and facilities, and that each of these roles at times 
enable, and at times stifle. A normative verdict on the state’s role in innovation is thus not 
contained here, but the extent of its multifaceted involvement and significance is 
documented here with ample examples. 
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Conclusion 
The findings of this study in no way undermine existing and established rationales for 
public funding of basic research. Long established ‘market failures’ are still prevalent 
across the spectrum, and especially in new science and technology, where risks are 
substantial and knowledge and understanding of a technology’s potential are limited, the 
old rationales are as valid as ever. Likewise, this study supports much of the literature of 
innovation systems, where capability failures on the part of firms, as well as institutional, 
infrastructural and network weaknesses can decisively hamper the potential for innovation. 
Chiefly, this study has demonstrated that even within these categories, barriers to 
innovation take many different shapes, with different causes, consequences and degrees 
of severity. In-depth engagement with individual sectors, sub-sectors and types of 
technology yields a far more detailed and precise picture of why innovation does not 
happen as much as would be desirable. Additionally, understanding barriers to innovation 
at this substantive level also yields much clearer indications not just of whether or not 
public support is necessary, but also of what form that support needs to take. 
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Introduction 
Objectives 
The present project assesses the evidence of the rationales for public support for 
innovation with a particular focus at a more granular level than has traditionally been 
applied. The different aspects of the innovation environment assessed include challenge 
areas, enabling technologies and cross-sectoral competencies. In order to do that, this 
project has three differentiated objectives, divided in two parts. 
The first section will provide a high level framework/taxonomy, to codify market and 
system failures relevant to innovation. Subsequently, we will provide evidence about the 
extent to which the market and system failures exist for a number of challenge areas, 
enabling technologies and cross sectoral competencies and for the UK context in 
particular. 
This report 
During the kick-off meeting, we reviewed the objectives and methodology of the project 
and confirmed the innovation areas (challenge areas, enabling technologies and cross-
sectoral competencies) that are the focus of the analysis. 
This report contains a compilation of all the material that we have worked on and will 
discuss the taxonomy and findings of the two key constituent sections. 
The structure of the rest of this report is as follows: 
 Summary of the literature review and key findings 
 Presentation of a taxonomy of market/system failures 
 Presentation of an analytical framework for analysing market/system failures and 
identifying rationales for public interventions in innovation (that can be re-used in future) 
 Presentation of the evidence of market/system failures and corresponding rationales for 
a number of innovation areas as selected by the Technology Strategy Board  
 Summary and discussion of the market/system failures identified across the group of 
innovation areas 
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Literature review 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, we review literature about the justifications for public intervention in 
research and innovation. Most of the literature deals in one or both of two categories of 
‘failure’ – in markets or in the wider ‘system of innovation’. Here, we first trace how these 
ideas developed. Second, we classify the instances we have identified in the literature and 
propose a condensed set of definitions for use in describing failures that may justify 
government intervention in research and innovation related to sectors, technologies and 
challenge areas. These definitions provide the framework we use to analyse failures in the 
subsequent chapters of this report.   
Where does the idea of ‘failure’ come from? 
A central tenet of mainstream economics is that, other things being equal, the unfettered 
operation of markets will produce the greatest amount of social ‘welfare’ (in the sense of 
maximising the amount of goods and services available for consumption). While a great 
many requirements lurk among those ‘other things’, this implies that the main economic 
role of government is to ensure the operation of free markets and, broadly, that any 
intervention to counter the operation of markets will reduce welfare. The idea of ‘market 
failure’ is an acknowledgement that there are circumstances where markets produce sub-
optimal outcomes. Environment and research are well-known cases. Markets fail in 
relation to the environment because they do not price in the costs of environmental 
damage. We return to research below.   
The idea of ‘systems failure’ is an argument by analogy, where it is claimed that the 
imperfect operation of the wider system of innovation (the set of actors and institutions in 
society that are involved in research and innovation) can also lead to socially undesirable 
outcomes.   
Market failure 
Mainstream ‘neoclassical’ microeconomics works with a small number of very simple ideas 
about economic production, consumption and the way markets mediate these activities. 
Key assumptions include the idea that producers and consumers are rational, that they 
know everything (not least that they know all the prices operating in a market), that 
producers can choose from a range of production technologies and that it costs nothing to 
move from using one technology to using another. Goods are homogenous and producers 
and consumers are small relative to the market so nobody can exert market power. (The 
archetype behind the model is the production and sale of corn in rural marketplaces under 
‘perfect competition’.) While these assumptions are sufficiently unrealistic to make 
neoclassical economists easy to tease, in reality no one believes in them literally. Rather 
they provide a framework for analysing what happens when certain of these assumptions 
do not hold, as where there is monopoly, imperfect information or costly technologies. The 
most difficult assumption to relax is probably that of rationality. Without that, it is difficult to 
predict or mathematically to describe how markets behave.  
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In the context of a discipline founded on the analysis of physical goods, knowledge is a bit 
awkward. Yet, since innovation is based on knowledge, it needs to be understood. In 
economic terms, knowledge is a ‘non-rival’ good – meaning that many people can 
consume it at the same time. (Most goods, for example cake, are ‘rival’. If I eat the cake, 
then you cannot. Knowledge is one of the special cases where you can have your cake 
and eat it.) Knowledge is also ‘non-excludable’ – it is hard to stop people getting access to 
it. Non-excludable, non-rival goods are ‘public goods’. In economic theory, the results of 
basic research are such public goods (though there are also other categories of public 
goods). In theory the market cannot produce these, so since society needs or benefits 
from them the state must pay.  
The idea of ‘market failure’ leading to under-investment in research has been the principal 
rationale for state funding of R&D1 in the post-War period. Of course, governments had 
been funding research long before the economics profession produced a reason. Arrow is 
generally credited with describing the three major sources of market failure which – from a 
neo-classical perspective – make it useful for government to fund research 
 Indivisibility, because of the existence of minimum efficient scale. This applies to 
knowledge as much as it does to investments more widely  
 Inappropriability of the profit stream from research, leading to a divergence between 
public and private returns on investment. This results from two essential (and 
economically efficient) freedoms that researchers have: namely to publish and to 
change jobs 
 Uncertainty, namely divergences in the riskiness of research respectively for private 
and public actors 
Arrow’s argument is particularly relevant to more ‘basic’ (and, by implication, generally 
applicable) forms of knowledge because capitalists’ inability to monopolise the results of 
such research means they would be least likely to invest in it. His argument is, however, 
conceptually flawed. It simply assumes that there is under-investment in basic research 
compared to an imagined welfare-economic optimum. In fact, no one has observed or 
calculated what such an optimum would look like. It makes this assumption because it 
implicitly accepts the ‘linear model’ account of the role of science in economics and 
development, which is the idea that ‘basic’ research somehow causes applied research, 
which in turn drives innovation (the introduction of new products, processes and services). 
The linear model has largely been rejected as inaccurate2 or as a special case that applies 
only in some industries.3  
                                            
1  Ken Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,’ in Richard Nelson 
(Ed.) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962; see also Richard 
Nelson, ‘The simple economics of basic scientific research,’ Journal of Political Economy, 1959, vol 67, pp 
297-306 
2 Mowery, D.C. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A Critical Review of 
Some Recent Empirical Studies’, Research Policy, April 1978 
3 Pavitt, K. (1984) Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a theory, Research Policy, 
Vol. 13,  pp.343-373 
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The recognition that there are varying degrees of market failure in different types of 
research and innovation related activity underpins the fact that there is a ‘slope’ in the 
degree to which governments subsidise them. Thus, basic research in universities is fully 
funded while work intended to lead more directly to industrial application is typically funded 
privately or may be cost-shared between the state and industry where risks and potential 
spillovers are high.  
The treatment of R&D costs by the state is also affected by the fact that these are mostly 
‘sunk costs’, namely costs that do not necessarily produce re-usable values. While 
investment in equipment, for example, tends to deliver equipment that has alternative uses 
or that can be re-sold if it turns out to be irrelevant to its owner, an investment in producing 
knowledge may produce nothing or may produce knowledge that is not relevant to the 
investor’s purposes. In that case, it is difficult to sell (except in the special case of 
patentable knowledge). For this reason, companies tend to fund R&D out of cash rather 
than through debt4 and tax codes – including that in the UK – tend to treat R&D in a 
generous way. Even though R&D costs are in principle investments, companies are 
typically allowed to treat them as operating expenses precisely because they are sunk 
costs that may well be unrecoverable.  
As Smith points out,5 newer growth theory has incorporated more sophisticated thinking 
about knowledge into the neoclassical tradition. In particular, knowledge spillovers or 
externalities are seen not only as an inhibitor for investment in knowledge but also as a 
source of inputs into the firm’s innovation processes. Thus the firm benefits not only from 
its own investments in knowledge (for example, through R&D) but also from externalities 
or ‘leakage’ of knowledge produced elsewhere. The presence of spillovers implies that 
social rates of return to R&D will exceed private rates.6 Based on this thinking, models of 
the social returns to R&D have been developed which treat past R&D as a capital stock 
(with an assumed useful lifetime, after which it is aged off) and estimate the value of the 
spillovers.7 However, despite such attempts to take better account of knowledge within 
mainstream economics, its production remains essentially exogenous to the economic 
system. By assumption  
 It is generic. That is to say, an item of knowledge, or a particular advance in knowledge, 
can be applied widely among firms and perhaps among industries  
 It is codified. The ability to transmit implies that knowledge is written or otherwise 
recorded in fairly complete useable form  
                                            
4 Gerben Bakker, ’Money for nothing: How firms have financed R&D-projects since the industrial revolution’, 
Research Policy, 42 (10), 2013, 1793-1814 
5 Keith Smith, ‘Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: Rethinking the role of policy’, Enterprise and 
Innovation Management Studies, Vol 1 No 1, 2000, 73-102 
6 The private rate of return is the annualised income (by implication, in perpetuity) deriving from R&D 
investment accruing to the investing organisation itself, as a proportion of that investment. The social rate of 
return comprises both benefits to the innovator and those to the wider community, potentially including, for 
example, benefits to the consumer and environmental benefits. The latter can be identified as the overall 
contribution to GDP from the R&D 
7 See for a good overview of the literature Ben Martin and Puay Tang, The Benefits from Publicly Funded 
Research, SPEU Electronic Working Paper Series No 161, Brighton: SPRU, 2007  
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 It is accessible without cost. On the one hand this can involve the idea that transmission 
costs are negligible, but it can also mean that firms do not face differential cost barriers 
in accessing knowledge or bringing it into production  
 It is context independent. That is firms have equal capabilities in transforming such 
knowledge into production capability8  
Combined with the rationality assumption and the corresponding focus on individual 
decision-making, this means that many of the systemic characteristics of the innovation 
process are not treated in the mainstream economic view.  
Systems failures 
The seminal literature in the innovation systems tradition comprises a study by Chris 
Freeman of the Japanese organisations that organise the state’s role in innovation, and 
studies of national innovation systems by Nelson and Lundvall.9 Nelson followed 
Freeman’s narrow focus on state institutions, while Lundvall broadened the idea of an 
innovation system to encompass all the actors in society involved in innovation, including 
important framework conditions such as regulation, the effectiveness of the banking 
system and so on. Figure 1 has been extensively used as shorthand, and summarises 
what this means in practice.  
Figure 1 A National Innovation System Heuristic  
 
                                            
8 Keith Smith, ‘Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: Rethinking the role of policy’, Enterprise and 
Innovation Management Studies, Vol 1 No 1, 2000, 73-102 
9 See Christopher Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, London: 
Frances Pinter, 1987; Bengt-Åke Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter, 1992; RR Nelson, National Innovation Systems, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993 
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Source: Stefan Kuhlman and Erik Arnold, RCN in the Norwegian Research and Innovation System, Background Report No 12 in the 
Evaluation of the Research Council of Norway, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry for Education, Research and Church Affairs, 2001. Also 
available at www.technopolis-group.com  
The ‘innovation systems’ tradition can fairly be said to have grown up in deliberate 
opposition to the neoclassical view of knowledge, research and innovation and particularly 
to the linear model. However, its intellectual roots are in classical economics, especially in 
Marx’s view of technological change as endogenous to firms and as a driving force not 
only in competition but also in development and growth. Joseph Schumpeter tends to 
function as the iconic ‘touchstone’ for the innovation systems tradition – perhaps because 
in his later years he incorporated many of Marx’s economic views into his own but without 
adopting Marx’s inconvenient politics. While the neoclassical tradition sees economies as 
tending towards static equilibria, the Schumpeterian view is that capitalism brings a “gale 
of creative destruction” and therefore constant change, manifest in the form of innovation 
and the diffusion of innovations through the economy. This is what makes capitalism so 
robust and dynamic.  
The innovation system tradition tends not only to see innovation as economically 
embedded but also as socially constructed – both in the sense that innovations tend to 
serve not only the economic but also the wider social purposes of innovators and in that 
innovation processes are seen as complex and non-linear. If innovation processes are 
endogenous to the economy then there is scope for research, science and innovation 
policy to affect them. Key figures in the innovations systems tradition such as Chris 
Freeman were also active in the OECD’s drive to establish science policy and R&D 
statistics during the 1960s.  
The shorter-term origins of systems thinking about innovation are diverse. One important 
strand is the development of evolutionary economics,10 which in effect puts people and 
behaviour into the economic idea of the firm. This throws out the neoclassical rationality 
assumption and implies that at the level of the individual firm, there is not perfect 
information; nor is available information always completely understood or interpreted; but 
the firm can learn. Such learning is based on experience and is cumulative. What a 
company or institution can do today depends upon what it could do yesterday11 and what it 
has learnt in the meantime. Learning may be tacit and therefore difficult to access. Unlike 
in the neoclassical view, knowledge may be firm-specific, sector-specific or general.12  
“Often, the elements of the system of innovation either reinforce each other in promoting 
processes of learning and innovation or, conversely, combine into blocking such 
processes. Cumulative causation, and virtuous and vicious circles, are characteristics of 
systems and sub-systems of innovation.”13 This ‘bounded rationality’ not only implies that 
firms can take decisions that are sub-optimal for themselves and for others but also that 
their development is path-dependent. They can become ‘locked in’ or stuck in particular 
                                            
10 Richard M Cyert and James G March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963; 
Richard R Nelson and Sydney G Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1982 
11 Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge University Press, 1976 
12 WEG Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, Cambridge University Press, 1969 
13 Bengt Åke Lundvall (ed), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive 
Learning, London: Pinter, 1992 
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ruts, even when perhaps they should be changing direction. Their ‘search trajectory’ is 
likely to be limited.14  
Lock-ins can exist only at the level of the individual firm but also at the level of 
technologies and the institutions that surround them. The idea of ‘technological 
trajectories’ in innovation15 extends the product life cycle idea to consider the development 
trajectories of individual technologies and the firms and markets with which they become 
associated. The more recent idea of ‘technological regimes’ extends this notion to the 
surrounding institutions. As with product cycles, these technological concepts reduce 
uncertainty for producers and consumers, entail learning – and run the risk of being 
knocked brutally out of the way if and when a new paradigm emerges.  
Another important strand is innovation research. During the 1950s, the linear, science-
push model of innovation dominated.16 While there was some limited research support for 
this view in the 1950s, in its crude form it does not stand up to much scientific scrutiny. It is 
perhaps better thought of as part of the ideological superstructure of the post War 
expansion of science, rather than as a theory of innovation. In the 1960s, the empirical 
work of people such as Carter and Williams,17 Schmookler18 and Myers and Marquis19 
placed more emphasis on the role of the marketplace in innovation. This led to market-pull 
or need-pull models of the innovation process.  
Figure 2 is a schematic of the two linear models.  
Figure 2 Traditional (Linear) Models of Innovation 
 
 
A key weakness of the linear models is a failure to conceptualise how the links between 
successive stages of innovation are supposed to work. Such links are, in fact, very difficult 
                                            
14 Stepjen J Kline and Nathan Rosenberg, ‘An overview of innovation’ in Ralph Landau and Nathan 
Rosenberg (eds), The Positive Sum Strategy, Washington; National Academy Press, 1986 
15 Giovanni Dosi, ‘Technological paradigms and technological trajectories’, Research Policy, 11(3), 1982, 
147-162 
16 This account of successive generations of innovation model is partly based on Roy Rothwell, ‘Successful 
Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the 1990s’, R&D Management,:3 , p 221-239, 1992 
17 Carter, C. and Williams, B., Industry and Technical Progress, Oxford University Press, 1957 
18 Schmookler, J., Invention and economic growth, Harvard University  press, 1966 
19 Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G., Successful Industrial Innovation, National Science Foundation, 1969 
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to achieve in a managed way, even inside a single company. Typically, different people do 
the activities conducted at each stage in different places and often in different institutions. 
They tend to have different motivations and incentives and to operate in different 
interpersonal networks. A priori, one would expect it to be very hard to create the kind of 
chain-links between them, which are depicted in the linear models. Empirical studies such 
as SAPPHO20 – which analysed matched pairs of successful and unsuccessful innovations 
– and the work of Daniel Shimshoni, Morris Teubal, Eric von Hippel and others21 
increasingly emphasised the role of producer-user relations in innovation. Often, 
innovation was not a heroic act undertaken by an isolated but inspired entrepreneur but 
was co-produced in relationships between suppliers and users. Correspondingly, new 
knowledge used was often generated in response to an identified knowledge gap, as 
opposed to the linear serendipity envisaged in the linear model.  
By the late 1970s, Mowery and Rosenberg22 largely laid the intellectual argument between 
push and pull to rest by stressing the importance of coupling between science, 
technology and the marketplace. Their coupling model constituted a more or less 
sequential process linking science with the marketplace (via engineering, technological 
development, manufacturing, marketing and sales), but with the addition of a number of 
feedback loops and variations over time in the primacy of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms. 
This is shown schematically in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 Modern ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation 
 
Source: Modified from Roy Rothwell (1994). Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process. International Marketing Review, 11(1), 
7–31.  
                                            
20 Roy Rothwell (1994). Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process. International Marketing Review, 11(1), 7–31 
21  Morris Teubal, Innovation Performance, Learning and Government Policy. Selected Essays, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press; Eric von Hippel, ‘The Dominant Role of Users in the Scientific Instrument 
Innovation Process,’ Research Policy (5)3 (1976) 212-39; Daniel Shimshoni, ‘The mobile scientist in the 
American instrument industry’, Minerva, 8, 1970, 59-89 
22 Mowery, D.C. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A Critical Review of 
Some Recent Empirical Studies’, Research Policy, April 1978 
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The preoccupation of the earlier generations of innovation model is with the link between 
the flow of new knowledge and economic innovation. However, this ignores the huge 
importance of the stock of existing knowledge indicated at the bottom of Figure 3. The 
vast majority of the knowledge used in any innovation comes out of this stock, and is not 
created afresh in the project that gives rise to the innovation. Important parts of the 
knowledge stock could be very old, as had been shown in the HINDSIGHT and TRACES23 
projects, which tracked the movement of knowledge elements respectively from applied 
and basic research into industrial practice across very long periods of time.  
A third systemic strand is the idea of ‘clusters’ of economic activity as being important in 
innovation. Marshall’s idea of ‘industrial districts’24 points to the clustering of related 
economic activity, where competitors work side by side because of the benefits of a 
shared labour market, shared access to inputs, shared infrastructures and educational 
facilities and often the attractiveness of a cluster of alternative suppliers to customers. By 
implication, these benefits combined with the intensification of competition promote the 
competitiveness of firms located in such districts. Porter has famously developed the 
concept further, so that ‘cluster policy’ has become a feature in many countries. To the 
Marshallian benefits of co-location for the supply side he adds the importance of producer-
user relations along supply chains (or, in the French tradition, ‘filières’). The current focus 
in regional development policy on ‘smart specialisation’ extends this analysis better to 
consider the connections between cluster activities and the ‘infrastructural’ role of the state 
and other institutions – in effect aiming to generate a more complete innovation system.  
A further, if not well recognised, input into the idea of innovation systems is the systems 
thinking that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, stimulated by the potential of emerging 
computer technology that had been spectacularly demonstrated in theory and practice 
(such as code breaking) by Turing and others. Norbert Wiener25 (Cybernetics) and von 
Bertalanffy26 (the idea of a General Systems Theory) were leading figures in this 
movement. As Ingelstam27 points out, they have important ideas in common. One is the 
principle of non-reductionism: the idea that the behaviour of systems cannot be explained 
only by reference to their components, but that it is also determined by phenomena at 
higher levels. Another is the idea of interdisciplinarity or ‘borrowing tools’ among 
disciplines. The third is that they envisage a core of systems theory emerging as a new 
and viable discipline or meta-discipline in its own right. ‘Innovation systems’ remains more 
of a heuristic than a theory. The need to abandon perfect actor rationality complicates any 
attempt to emulate the mathematical dimensions of mainstream economics. However, the 
collection of ideas associated with innovation systems remains a powerful way to 
understand events.  
Figure 4 attempts to summarise the way the innovation systems tradition considers 
innovation itself. Innovation drives growth because there is constant competition to 
                                            
23 Illinois Institute of Technology, 1969, Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science (TRACES: A 
report to the National Science Foundation), NSF Contract C535; Office of the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering, Project Hindsight - Final Report, National Technical Information Service, 1967 
24 Alfred Marshall, The Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan, 1890 
25 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics – Control and Communications in the Animal and the Machine. New York: 
John Wiley, 1948 
26 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, New York: George Braziller, 1968 
27 Lars Ingelstam, System – att tänka över samhälle och teknik, Eskilstuna: Statens Energimyndighet, 2002 
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improve. Unlike in the neo-classical economic models, where technological change is seen 
as external to the economic system so that equilibria tend to develop, the innovation 
systems approach sees the constant evolution of technology as internal to the system. 
Because there are no optima, each change in technology creates a new set of economic 
and technical opportunities, under which economic actors compete to create advantage, 
so that innovation constantly triggers new innovation (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 Evolutionary View of Innovation in Innovation Systems 
 
Source: While the diagram is our own, it was inspired by JS Metcalfe, ‘Co-Evolution of Systems of Innovation,’ paper presented at the 
Volkswagen Foundation Conference, Prospects and Challenges for Research and Innovation, Berlin, 8-9 June 2000, CRIC, Manchester 
University 2000 
A key aspect of the innovation systems approach is therefore to understand that 
innovation is not only about technical change but its interplay with other factors. It is not 
only about new knowledge but also about the re-use of old knowledge. And it often 
involves other things than those we think of as ‘technical’. The characteristics of 
knowledge and learning in firms are quite different from those assumed in the neoclassical 
tradition. 
 They are differentiated, multi-layered, involving the systemic integration of many 
different types of knowledge 
 They are highly specific, organised around a relatively limited set of functions, which 
firms understand well, and the system is thus characterized by boundedness, bounded 
rationality and `bounded vision’  
 They involve significant tacit components embodied in the skills of engineers and R&D 
staff, workers and managers  
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 They are cumulative, developing through times as firms build up experience with 
particular technologies; this in turn implies that technological knowledge is path 
dependent  
 They are developed through costly processes of search, through processes of learning 
and adaptation. 
 They are internally systemic in the sense of being part of an overall production and 
marketing system which has many components  
 They are externally systemic, relying on interactions between firms and other agents 
and relying also on infrastructural support28 
 
Failures described in the literature 
In order to explore the way market and systems failures are being described in the 
literature and to provide a basis for classifying failures in the areas identified by BIS for 
analysis, we reviewed 43 documents (see Appendix), spanning both BIS studies and the 
wider academic and ‘grey’ literatures, extracting relevant discussions and definitions to 
individual fiches. Not surprisingly, this literature contains massive overlaps, so in this 
section we try to cook it down to a comparatively short list of failures, which we 
subsequently use to analyse literature about the industries and technologies tackled in this 
report.  
Market failure – Character of science and technology 
Innovations, especially more radical ones, can depend upon the generation of knowledge 
that can be produced only over long periods of time or with major commitments of 
resources, which are often beyond the financial means or willingness to invest of individual 
firms. Because they depend on knowledge that has not yet been generated, such 
innovations can also involve not risk but uncertainty, i.e. risks that cannot be calculated.29 
A handy example is the seemingly endless search for viable fusion power. Not only 
research itself but also the equipment needed to do it may be very expensive or ‘lumpy’. 
For example, it is not easy to build a ‘small’ particle accelerator.  
The apparently increasing importance of complex technical systems presents a new kind 
of challenge to innovation, in the sense that radical innovation may require the 
reconfiguration or replacement of the results of substantial past investment.30  
Market failure – Market power 
A central tenet of modern economics is that where competition is constrained, resources 
are allocated inefficiently. Typically one part is able to extract ‘rents’ over and above the 
                                            
28 Keith Smith, ‘Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: Rethinking the role of policy’, Enterprise and 
Innovation Management Studies, Vol 1 No 1, 2000, 73-102 
29 BIS, Innovation and Research Strategy for growth, BIS Economics Paper No 15, London: BIS, 2011 
30 Stephen Martin and John T Scott, ‘The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support 
for innovation’, Research Policy, 29(2000): 437-447 
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level of income that would have been available under more competitive circumstances. 
Market power can be generated by (otherwise desirable) economies of scale and scope. A 
key policy issue is then whether the tendency towards monopoly can be made benign 
through regulation (notably of prices) or whether market power becomes a brake on 
technological change and innovation. 
‘Dynamic market failure’ involves a particular kind of monopolisation, where first-over 
advantages and the ability to build economies of scale and scope ahead of the competition 
are so important as to become a block on innovation.31  
The effect of market power on innovation is ambiguous. Market power can increase the 
likelihood that a firm can capture the benefits from investing in innovation (positive effect) 
and, at the same time, too much market power can stifle innovation (negative effect). The 
related theory, as explored by Aghion et al. (2005)32 and Peneder (2012),33 is that at low 
levels of competition, the relation between competition and innovation is positive but at 
higher levels of competition the relation between competition and innovation turns 
negative. 
Market failure – Externalities 
Externalities arise where technical characteristics of a good or service prevent property 
rights from being established or enforced, most commonly in relation to knowledge 
production. Where businesses cannot appropriate the full benefits of innovation, the 
incentive to innovate is reduced and this tends to reduce investment below the optimum 
level. Policy options include public funding and the creation of tradable property rights, as 
in the case of carbon pricing or the patent system.34  
A common form of externality is spillover, which can involve both knowledge and market 
spillovers.35 Knowledge spillovers are generated by publication, labour mobility, education 
and training, reverse engineering and are built into the patent system, which trades the 
deliberate generation of knowledge spillover for a temporary monopoly on the part of the 
inventor. Market spillovers occur where the sale of goods and services bring benefits to 
customers that are not fully reflected in the price paid. A traditional example is increases in 
quality over time. Ultimately these spillovers can be reflected at the level of final 
consumption in so-called consumer surplus. A related distinction is between horizontal 
spillovers among firms in the same industry (which are typically knowledge based) and 
vertical spillovers, which are more likely to be market spillovers and to operate along 
                                            
31 Karl Aiginger, ‘Industrial policy: A dying breed or a re-emerging phoenix?’ Journal of Industry, Competition 
and Trade, (2007) 7:297–323 
32 Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and Innovation: an 
Inverted-U-Relationship. The Quarterly Journl of Economics, 120(2): 701-728 
33 Peneder, M. (2012) Competition and innovation: Revisiting the Inverted-U-Relationship. Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade, 12(1): 1-5 
34 BIS, Innovation and Research Strategy for growth, BIS Economics Paper No 15, London: BIS, 2011 
35 Jaffe, Adam B. Economic Analysis of Research Spillovers: Implications for the Advanced Technology 
Program. Economic Assessment Office, The Advanced Technology Program, National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce. 1996 
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supply chains. Spillovers can be international, with open economies benefiting more from 
them than more closed ones.36  
The processes of innovation adoption can also involve externalities. In some cases, (e.g. a 
communications network) the value of adoption increases as the number of other adopters 
goes up. (This is also known as ‘dynamic increasing returns’ or ‘network externalities.) 
Both learning by using and learning by producing involve generating information, which 
then spills over to others users and producers, so that later innovators benefit from the 
experience of the earlier ones.37 I parallel fashion, early investors acquire information that 
tends to leak to others – with later investors effectively free riding on the information the 
first generation of investors acquired at greater risk.38  
Market failure – Information asymmetry 
Here we can distinguish between situations where a lack of information on the part of 
some market actors causes inefficient allocation of resources and those where inequality 
of access to knowledge enables one party to make gains at the expense of another.  
The fundamental idea here is that a ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ will not necessarily have the same 
information on which to base their trading decisions, as a result of which markets can 
become severely distorted. 
The issue of information asymmetry has received considerable attention in the economic 
literature in the last 30-40 years. This was initially prompted by Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons’ 
paper on the second-hand car market, which led directly to an award of the Nobel Prize for 
Economics in 200118. The key assumption is that sellers will typically know much more 
about the quality of the vehicle in question than prospective buyers. As a result, sellers of 
good cars will be unwilling to enter the market, since buyers will demand low prices, 
expecting that the market will be dominated by ‘lemons’ – poor cars whose owners 
conceal their inferiority for personal gain. Mutually beneficial sales of good cars are 
therefore constrained, and the analysis suggests that the market could collapse entirely. 
Information asymmetry may be particularly acute in financial markets, where sources of 
finance for innovative activity lack the capacity to verify ex-ante the claims of the 
entrepreneur-innovator, and ‘excessively’ discount expected revenue flows from the 
innovation. This may be particularly true for early-stage technological development. 
Systems failure – Capability failure 
Capability failures are, in effect, inadequacies in the resources and performance of real 
firms compared with textbook models as a result, for example, of managerial deficits, lack 
of technological understanding or learning ability. Inadequate ‘absorptive capacity’ – i.e. 
the ability to understand and make use of external knowledge, often through doing R&D39 
                                            
36 Coe, D. T., & Helpman, E. (1995). International R&D spillovers. European Economic Review, 39(5), 859–887 
37 Jaffe, A. B., Newell, R. G., & Stavins, R. N. (2005). A tale of two market failures: Technology and environmental policy. Ecological 
Economics, 54(2-3), 164–174 
38 Howard Pack and Kamal Saggi, The case for industrial policy: a critical survey, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3839, February 2006 
39 Wesley M Cohen and Daniel A Levinthal, ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation,’ Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 35 (1), March 1990, pp128-152 
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– is a key capability failure. The neoclassical policy recommendation for tackling such 
failures would be non-intervention, on the grounds that underperformers will simply be 
driven from the marketplace. An evolutionary or innovation systems based approach would 
be to attempt to rectify at least some such failures, especially via information, training and 
access to support infrastructures such as technology transfer organisations.40 Measures 
taken to address capability failure typically involve various types of learning and aim to 
generate .behavioural additionality’.  
There is a difficult boundary between capability and infrastructural failure (below) in 
relation to skills. Capability failure may manifest as skill shortage, where the individual firm 
fails to understand the importance, and make use, of skills that are externally available. 
However, a skill shortage that arises at the level of the firm because a relevant category of 
skilled labour does not exist (or exists only in insufficient numbers) represents a failure in 
the provision of education and training by the state.  
Systems failure – Network failure 
Coordination failures occur where there is inadequate organisation for collecting, analysing 
and sharing information about innovation opportunities. The coordination mechanisms 
needed may range from loose ways of spreading information to close partnerships that 
overcome barriers between different parts of the system, such as along supply chains.  
Another kind of network failure is excessive linkage among parts of the innovation system, 
resulting in lock-ins41 or transition failures42 where clusters or innovation systems fail to 
take on new technological opportunities or to shift from one generation of standards to a 
more appropriate one. Lock-ins or path dependency43 have many origins, including 
embeddedness in a certain set of social, business and institutional arrangements but they 
can also result from the inflexibility of internal capabilities, or external infrastructures. 
According to Smith, “This means that technological alternatives must not only compete 
with components of an existing technology, but with the overall system in which it is 
embedded. Technological regimes or paradigms persist because they are a complex of 
scientific knowledge, engineering practices, process technologies, infrastructure, product 
characteristics, skills and procedures which make up the totality of a technology and which 
are exceptionally difficult to change in their entirety.”44 
A further variety would be a ‘lack of weak ties’ in the sense of Granovetter,45 who points 
out that it is often the weak links at the periphery of a social network that provide impulses 
and opportunities for innovation.  
Systems failure – Institutional failure 
                                            
40 Arnold, E., & Thuriaux, B. (1997). Developing firms’ technological capabilities. Technopolis Ltd 
41 BIS, Innovation and Research Strategy for growth, BIS Economics Paper No 15, London: BIS, 2011 
42 Keith Smith, ‘Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: Rethinking the role of policy’, Enterprise and 
Innovation Managament Studies, 1(1), 2000, 73-1022000 
43 Douglass C North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990 
44 Smith, Keith (1997): Economic Infrastructures and Innovation Systems, In: Edquist, Charles (Ed.): Systems 
of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations, London: Pinter , 86-103 
45 Mark S Granovetter, ‘The strength of weak ties’, American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1973, 1360-80 
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Institutional failure may be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. Hard institutional failure involves formal 
institutions such as legal systems or organisations that do their job inadequately. These 
may be a part of the framework of regulation, which consists of  
 Technical standards, labour law, risk management rules, health and safety regulations, 
etc. 
 The general legal system relating to contracts, employment, IPR within which the actors 
(not only firms, but also knowledge institutes and e.g. the government) operate46 
Soft institutional failure involves deficiencies in ‘soft institutions’ such as culture and may 
be manifested in factors such as the level of trust in business relationships.47 Soft or 
informal institutional failures include social norms and values, the willingness to share 
resources with other actors,48 the entrepreneurial spirit within organisations, industries, 
regions or countries,49 tendencies to trust, risk averseness etc.50 and form the implicit rules 
of the game that can stimulate or hinder innovation. 
Systems failure – Infrastructural 
Infrastructural failure, as we use the idea here, is a kind of government failure, where there 
has not been an adequate policy response to another kind of failure. For example, under-
investment in basic research would be an infrastructural failure that hampers innovation 
not only by producing too little new knowledge but also by failing to generate research-
trained people able to absorb and use new knowledge generated by others.  
Another kind of infrastructural failure is framework failure, where regulatory frameworks 
and other kinds of background conditions like the character of consumer demand or 
culture and not conducive to innovation.51 The creation of standards is subject to market 
failure – there is an assumption that markets under-provide standards, owing to their 
character as public goods.52  
At its broadest, the idea of infrastructural failure can be connected to failures in the 
performance of the state in its roles relating to the national innovation system. In this 
respect, Borrás identifies five generic functions: to reduce uncertainty; to manage conflict 
and cooperation; to provide incentives, to build competences and to define the boundaries 
of the system. She goes on to list ten specific functions in the system of innovation are 
listed: 1. production of knowledge 2. diffusion of knowledge 3. appropriation of knowledge 
4. regulation of labour markets 5. financing innovation 6. alignment of actors 7. guidance of 
                                            
46 Keith Smith, Innovation as a systemic phenomenon: rethinking the role of policy, in K. Bryant and A Wells 
(eds), A New Economic Paradigm? Innovation-based Evolutionary Systems (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Science and Technology Policy Branch) pp. 10-47, 1999 
47
 Carlsson B. and Jacobsson, S., 1997, In search of useful public policies: Key lessons and issues for policy makers, in: Carlsson B. 
(Editor), 1997. Technological systems and industrial dynamics, Kluwer Academic Publishers 
48 Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994 
49 Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997 , Ibid 
50 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity, New York: Free Press, 1995  
51
 Keith Smith, ‘Economic infrastructures and innovation systems’, in Charles Edquist (ed), Systems of innovation: Technologies, 
institutions and organisations, London: Pinter, 1997 
52 Department of Trade and Industry, The Empirical Economics of Standards, DTI Economics Paper No 12, 
London: DTI, 2005 
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innovators 8. reduction of technological diversity 9. reduction of risk 10. control of 
knowledge use.53 
Providing the needed infrastructure involves addressing large scale, indivisibilities and 
long-time scales for operation, all of which make investment appraisal difficult.54 This is a 
problem because the effectiveness of the innovation system is crucially dependent upon 
the provision of such infrastructure.  
Table 1 summarises this discussion and aggregates the different types of failure to a level 
that enables us to proceed with the empirical part of the study. The first three failures we 
propose are by and large a mix of market and systems failures, though with a heavy 
market component. The next three are essentially systemic: they relate to the ways 
institutions, rather than markets, work. The final category – Infrastructural failure – is 
strictly a sub-set of government or institutional failure, where there is a gap in policy or 
investment that causes innovation-critical infrastructures (whether hard or soft) to be 
missing. In the next chapter, we put this framework into practice in a few test cases, to see 
whether it is sufficiently robust for use in the full-scale analysis.  
Table 1 Summary of failures identified in the literature 
Barrier Key features 
Failure described in the 
literature 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
The size of scientific or technological 
problems is too great for individual private 
actors to tackle if markets are competitive, 
and may be accompanied by uncertainty, 
making it hard for the private sector to invest. 
It may be that innovation only yields return in 
the long run, hampering investment. 
Indivisibility 
Technological complexity 
Uncertainty  
 
Market power 
This can lead to, or be caused by, market 
power (for example, through the first supplier 
or user building insurmountable advantage) 
and may lead to consumer lock-in.  
High cost of market entry/exit. 
Market power 
Economies of scale and scope 
Dynamic market failure 
Adoption externalities 
Externalities 
It is too hard to appropriate enough of the 
results of research or innovation to make 
private investment worthwhile. Innovation 
may depend upon the presence of external 
networks, which are beyond the means of 
innovators to create.  
Innovation is easy for competitors to copy 
and there are limited opportunities to protect 
new ideas 
Externalities 
Spillovers (Horizontal, vertical, 
international) 
Inappropriability 
Network externalities 
Informational externalities 
Information 
asymmetry 
High levels of specialised technical and/ or 
market knowledge mean that not all the 
economic actors involve have the basis for 
Information asymmetry 
Imperfect information 
                                            
53 Borrás, S. (2004): “Systems of innovation theory and the European Union” in Science and Public Policy 
vol. 31, No. 6, Pp. 425 – 433 
54 Keith Smith, ‘Economic infrastructures and innovation systems’, in Charles Edquist (ed), Systems of 
innovation: Technologies, institutions and organisations, London: Pinter, 1997 
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Barrier Key features 
Failure described in the 
literature 
making informed decisions Incomplete information 
Capabilities 
These failures result from the difference 
between the capabilities of real firms and 
those assumed in the idealised economic 
model, so that firms lack needed skills, 
resources, ability to learn, absorptive and 
analytic capacity or otherwise to capture 
innovation opportunities  
Capability failures 
Learning failures 
 
Network 
Networks are fragmented and/or broad; 
communication and cooperation within 
networks are poor. Networks may be locked 
in to technological regimes, markets or 
products by their history and capabilities and 
find themselves unable to transition into new 
technologies or businesses 
Network failures 
Interaction failures 
Transition failures 
Lock-in/path dependency 
failures 
Lack of weak ties 
 
Institutional 
Institutions (whether in the sense of 
‘organisations’ or ‘rules and conventions’) 
operate in ways that impede innovation. 
Rules and regulation are not conducive to 
innovation and technological development. 
Government policy has the same effect 
Institutional deficiencies/failures 
(hard and soft) 
Coordination failures 
Government failures  
Failure to standardise 
Infra-
structural 
Insufficient human and capital investment in 
infrastructures critical to innovation 
performance by the state 
Missing aspects of physical 
infrastructure or state provision 
(e.g. education) 
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Evidence of failures in each of the 
innovation areas 
Barriers, scale, innovation areas and evidence 
In this section we present the evidence of market/system failures and corresponding 
rationales for public investment in innovation for a number of innovation areas selected by 
BIS. We apply the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter to each of the 
areas, collecting study-evidence about the existence or applicability of the key features of 
each failure. This exercise has been conducted using a range of secondary sources, which 
are cited in the text and is based upon the categories of failure identified in Table 1, at the 
end of the previous chapter.  
Scale 
In order to move beyond highlighting a range of barriers in each innovation area, each 
identified barrier is ranked on a scale. This approach has been taken in other studies, in 
order to go some way to distinguish the more significant barriers from the less significant 
ones. Such scales are subjective, especially if already qualitative and subjective 
categories such as ‘critical’, ‘moderate’, ‘marginal’ etc. are used.55 In order to circumvent 
this problem, the scale used in this report is based not on qualitative but on descriptive 
criteria, where factors considered are limited to prevalence of each barrier in the literature, 
as well as each barrier’s conceptual capacity to slow down the innovation process as 
opposed to stopping it entirely.  
Table 2 Scale and descriptions for categorising barriers to innovation 
Scale Description 
‘No evidence found’ 
Used if the literature/ reports on the sector contain nothing of 
relevance to a particular category of failure 
‘Slowing down (a little)’ 
If there is a barrier that is explicitly noted as being of minor 
significance in contrast to others in a sector, or if a particular barrier 
is noted as being only applicable to very specific types of products 
within a sub-sector, this caveat is added 
‘Slowing down’ 
Used if a barrier does not prevent successful innovation altogether, 
but nevertheless noticeably hinders it in some form 
‘Slowing down (a lot)’ 
If there is a barrier, which, though not a showstopper, is explicitly 
acknowledged in the literature as being an especially severe barrier, 
or is mentioned by all or almost all reports on the sector, the ‘a lot’ 
caveat is added to indicate heightened significance 
‘Showstopper’ 
Used if the nature of a barrier is such that it effectively makes 
successful innovation completely or almost completely impossible 
 
                                            
55 see eg The Technology Innovation Needs Assessment (TINA) reports. Overview available: 
http://www.carbontrust.com/resources/reports/technology/tinas-marine-energy,-carbon-capture,-heat,-
bioenergy,-electricity-networks-and-storage  
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Where evidence of a barrier is found and cannot be classed as a ‘showstopper, ‘slowing 
down’ will be the default. The additional caveats, ‘slowing down (a lot)’ or ‘slowing down (a 
little) will only be used if the literature and reports explicitly allow it in accordance with the 
criteria set out in the table above. Adding these additional caveats may not always be 
possible, but by using them in this sparing way it can be ensured that the influence of 
subjective judgement in the classification of barriers to innovation is kept to a minimum. 
Innovation areas 
The 22 innovation areas BIS defined to be dealt with in this study fall into four distinct 
categories. First, there are challenge led areas. These constitute substantive societal 
themes, where innovations from any number of different technological fields could yield 
substantial social and economic benefits. Second, there are competencies: namely high 
value manufacturing on one hand and digital services on the other. The third category, 
development areas, is made up of areas where there is especially significant existing and 
emerging strength and expertise in the UK. For the most part, areas in this category are 
conceptually close to the ‘challenge-led areas’ in the sense that they relate not so much to 
specific technologies as they do to specific areas of social and economic life (e.g. creative 
industries, financial services). However, this category also contains areas of technological 
expertise and promise that may find applications across a number of different sectors. 
Specifically, these are the much-publicised ‘8 Great Technologies’.56 The final category, 
‘Enabling technologies’ contains innovation areas that are explicitly non-sectoral, i.e. 
general purpose technologies that have an especially wide range of potential applications 
across a range of sectors: Advanced materials, ICT, Electronics, photonics and electrical 
systems, and biosciences. Many of the ‘8 Great Technologies’ simultaneously fit into this 
category, as well as constituting ‘development areas’. 
Table 3 Innovation areas 
Challenge led 
areas 
Competencies Development areas 
Enabling technology 
capabilities 
 Energy 
 Built 
Environment 
 Food 
 Transport 
 Healthcare 
 High Value 
manufacturing 
 Digital 
Services 
 Creative industries 
 Financial services 
 Design 
 Emerging technologies, such 
as the ‘eight great 
technologies’:  
Big Data 
Satellites and Space 
Robotics & Autonomous systems 
 Advanced Materials 
 ICT 
 Electronics, 
Photonics and 
Electrical Systems 
 Biosciences  
                                            
56 See eg Willets D (2013) Eight Great Technologies. Policy Exchange; available: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/eight%20great%20technologies.pdf; BIS (2013) Eight Great 
Technologies: infographics Homepage. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eight-great-technologies-
infographics 
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Challenge led 
areas 
Competencies Development areas 
Enabling technology 
capabilities 
Life sciences, Genomics and 
Synthetic Biology 
Regenerative Medicine 
Agri-Science 
Advanced materials and 
Nanotechnology 
Energy and its storage 
 
Though it is initially helpful to divide various innovation areas into substantive/sectoral and 
technological/scientific categories, and to additionally distinguish between challenge led 
areas attached to pressing societal needs on one hand and areas of particular 
competence on the other, there are a number of problems with the scale, scope and 
structure of these 22 innovation areas in terms of conducting an analysis with sufficient 
focus and depth to yield meaningful results: 
Firstly, each of the five challenge-led areas has considerable breadth, with multiple 
possible types of innovation in each area, ranging from advanced manufacturing to digital 
products, innovations relating to the transformation of entire infrastructures as well as 
small-scale development in no need of extensive coordination. A brief initial overview of 
some of these sectors highlighted that, if taken as a whole, each one of the innovation 
failures highlighted by the literature review and included in the template could be pointed 
out multiple times in each challenge-led area. This would not result in useful information, 
save for the relatively obvious conclusion that if a sector is defined widely enough, every 
imaginable barrier to innovation could most likely be pointed out within it. In order to 
produce more focused and nuanced results, each challenge-led area was therefore sub-
divided into sub-sectors or sample-technologies that are prominent within it.  
Table 4 Sub-division of challenge-led areas 
Challenge-led area 
Sub-sector / sample 
technology 
Energy 
Nuclear energy 
Renewable energy 
Oil and gas 
Energy distribution and storage 
Built Environment 
Future cities 
Low impact buildings 
Food 
Agri-science 
Farm-to-fork 
Transport 
Low carbon vehicles 
Intelligent transport systems 
Civil aviation 
Health & Care Regenerative medicine 
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Challenge-led area 
Sub-sector / sample 
technology 
Assisted living 
Stratified medicine 
 
This sub-division has enabled results that give an overview of barriers that are especially 
prominent in each sector along with explanations for their prominence, whilst also 
highlighting the variation of barriers to innovation within each sector. Second, as with the 
challenge-led areas previously, two of the sectors to be assessed in the category of 
‘enabling technologies’ required division into sub-sectors or sample-technologies in order 
to avoid overly general statements about broadly defined sectors: 
Table 5 Sub-division of broad technology sectors 
Sector Sub-sector/ sample technology 
ICT 
Big Data 
Cyber Security 
Robotics and autonomous systems 
Biosciences 
Industrial biotechnology 
Synthetic biology 
 
Third, whilst the challenge-led areas and specific enabling technologies could be assessed 
in suitable depth by subdivision into a few specific sub-sectors or sample-technologies, the 
‘competencies’, high value manufacturing and digital services, are too broad even for this 
solution. Instead, these two terms will therefore be treated not as distinct innovation areas, 
but instead as descriptors that can be applied where appropriate to all other innovation 
areas to be assessed in this study. More than half of all the innovation areas to be 
considered here were found to fit squarely into either the ‘high value manufacturing’ or the 
‘digital services’ competency. The value of these two areas is therefore not as a source of 
specific assessment of barriers to innovation, but rather as a tool to categorise and assess 
results across all the sectors. Drawing conclusions on the overall differences in the types 
of barriers to innovation in high value manufacturing and digital services, respectively 
evidenced by a range of more focused innovation areas, will be a key element of 
discussion and analysis in the latter stages of this report. 
The fourth challenge with the existing structure concerns the ‘8 Great Technologies’. As 
already noted, these only partially fit into the category of ‘development areas’. In part, they 
also constitute enabling technologies, while some of them also make for particularly useful 
sample-technologies within the challenge-led areas (specifically regenerative medicine for 
‘health and care’, agri-science for ‘food’ and energy storage for ‘energy’. The ‘8 Great 
Technologies’ have therefore not been treated as a comprehensive block, but are instead 
broken up and spread across the analysis as sub-sectors and sample-technologies where 
appropriate. 
Based on these four considerations, the initial 22 innovation areas have been expanded to 
24 and re-arranged into a suitable structure covering all areas in required depth, whilst 
simultaneously having thematic and conceptual divisions that will allow clearer and more 
sophisticated analysis at the conclusion of the study. For reference, each innovation area 
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is marked at its heading, indicating whether it falls under one or more of the categories 
‘challenge-led area’, ‘enabling technology’, ‘8 Great Technologies’, ‘high value 
manufacturing’ and ‘digital services’. 
Table 6 Innovation areas: original and revised structure 
 
 
Evidence 
To generate evidence of barriers to innovation in each of the 24 areas, we conducted desk 
research to compile a selection of key reports on each area. For each area, several 
reports were ultimately drawn on directly for use as template evidence, with further reports 
used to backup additional points in the accompanying text. It was a key requirement that 
for each area, the nature of reports used stemmed from several different sources. In 
general terms this meant that where possible there were reports giving an international or 
EU, as well as a UK perspective, reports authored or commissioned by government as 
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well as reports unconnected to government, reports commissioned or compiled within the 
relevant sector and independent academic research published in peer-reviewed journals. 
For each innovation area, several of these different groups of sources have been drawn 
on, in order to compile a broad and representative evidence-base. Overall, around 150 
reports were drawn on to provide the evidence base across the 24 innovation areas. 
The evidence base used to describe barriers to innovation draws on diverse types of 
evidence, ranging from quantitative surveys, numerical sector analysis to interviews, focus 
groups, workshops, case studies, collected expert opinions and historical analysis. This 
diverse range of evidence types reflects the differences that exist between the eight types 
of innovation failure identified through the literature review in the first part of this report: 
some types of failure can be quantified (e.g. size of market players, numbers of skilled 
graduates), others are better explained in qualitative terms, through historical narrative, 
expert opinion and, occasionally, through common sense. 
In the template evidence as such, the existence of each barrier is therefore highlighted by 
cited quotes from the reports, with additional references where several reports make 
strongly similar statements. Quotes can therefore be read as summarising the various 
types of evidence on which the reports on each innovation area are based. Where 
possible, easily presentable numerical/ statistical evidence features in the accompanying 
text for each innovation area. 
Sectors and subsectors 
We begin by assessing barriers to innovation at the level of sectors. These sectors are a 
combination of challenge-led areas, i.e. areas with considerable social and economic 
externalities and implications, as well as key development areas, where the UK already 
has considerable strength. The challenge areas to be covered here are energy, the built 
environment, food, transport and healthcare, with creative industries, financial services 
and satellites/ space identified as additional development areas. 
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Energy 
The energy market is widely recognized as a key challenge-led area of core concern for 
UK industrial development and welfare. Following the rationale of the development view, 
there is a need for public intervention in the energy sector because a lack of financial 
support, and a lack of investors’ and consumers’ trust in the self-organizing capacity of the 
market would result in sizable underinvestment in the energy sector.  
Three features are of major importance to understand the (lack of) development in the 
energy market. First, private entities lack incentives to invest in renewable energy sources 
because (i) given current prices, investment in renewable energy is more costly than 
investment in more traditional forms of energy and (ii), given these prices, the demand for 
renewable energy is relatively lower than the demand for other types of energy. Second, 
private entities may not find it profitable to supply energy to more remote areas and as a 
result some consumers are vulnerable to energy access. Third, underinvestment in the 
energy market has a detrimental effect on overall industrial development and welfare 
because of the degree of dependency on energy supply. These reasons were sufficient for 
the UK government to keep the energy market state-led for much of the 20th century.  
However, in the 1980’s, there was an increased recognition of the problems associated 
with a lack of competition in state-led markets and of government failure. This resulted in 
increased debate on the type of government intervention that is most appropriate for the 
energy market. As an alternative to a heavily interventionist state, there is a possibility for 
government intervention by means of regulation and contracting. The basic premise is that 
if energy supply can be contracted to private suppliers on the basic of predefined 
conditions there is no real need for the energy market to be state-led. 
In the 1980’s, part of the UK energy market gradually became privatized, i.e. electricity and 
gas. Along with the privatization process, the energy market became heavily regulated 
addressing several of the abovementioned concerns. The 2003 energy white paper set out 
a national energy policy. In response to growing concerns regarding energy security and 
climate change, this energy white paper was followed by the 2006 energy review report, 
and subsequently also by the energy white paper of 2007 (“meeting the energy 
challenge”), the climate change act of 2008, the UK low carbon transition plan of 2009 and 
the 2012-2013 energy bill.  
One additional change is that the UK energy market has become increasingly regulated at 
the EU level. UK policy and regulation has been reformed in line with the commitments to 
the EC. For example, following the Europe 2020 agenda, the UK aims to source 15% of 
energy from renewable sources by 2020 and aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
80% by 2050.57 These UK targets are in line with that of the EC’s 2020 objectives.58 One 
outcome is that the UK energy market is becoming more integrated with the EU energy 
market. 
Today, broadly speaking, these UK energy strategy includes the following objectives: 
generate a large-scale renewable energy market, generate a competitive energy market, 
                                            
57 The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (2012) UK renewable energy roadmap update 2012  
58 COM (2010) Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. 2020 final 
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ensure the overall competitiveness of the UK energy market, generate an integrated 
energy market, minimize health risks, expand knowledge and industry take-up, and reduce 
energy consumption in domestic buildings.  
In this section we provide an overview of the current challenges and failures in the UK 
energy market. This analysis is divided into three sections. Section one covers failures in 
nuclear energy and section two covers failures in the renewable energy sector, such as 
wind and solar energy. In the third section, we analyse the failures that undermine the 
development of the electricity market and the challenges of energy storage. 
It is important to note that the generation of electricity involves many sources. As 
illustrated in Figure 5, electricity is generated via nuclear energy (19%), renewable energy 
(roughly 14%), and fossil fuel energy i.e. oil gas, and coal which amounts to the largest 
component (67%). 
Figure 5 Generation of electricity in the UK in 2012 by all generating companies 
 
Source: UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Nuclear Energy 
Challenge led area 
 
The first part of the analysis focuses on the nuclear energy sector. Since 2011, the Office 
for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is responsible for regulating regulation on the nuclear 
sector. An overview of these regulations is set out in the ONR guide59 accessible via the 
ONR website. Despite safety regulations and precautions, it is often argued that investing 
in nuclear energy involves high risk and can be extremely hazardous.  
Table 7 summarizes some of the market failures associated with investing in nuclear 
energy. We evaluate the degree to which a given example of market failure is a 
showstopper to innovation or whether it slows down the innovative process. As indicated 
                                            
59  ONR (2013) A Guide to Nuclear Regulation in the UK. Office of Nuclear regulation; available: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/documents/a-guide-to-nuclear-regulation-in-the-uk.pdf  
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by the sources, most of these failures are identified in the TINA report on nuclear fission.60 
According to this TINA report, the degree to which a given type of failure is critical is 
identified on the basis of consultation of nuclear experts.  
At a first glance, it is possible to identify all types of market failures within the nuclear 
energy market. Some of the market failures–externalities and institutional failure–are 
identified as relatively more critical (see TINA). 
Market power is identified as a significant failure because the sector lacks new entrants in 
the market. Albeit the UK energy market has become gradually more privatized, the bulk of 
nuclear energy supply remains controlled by a few large players. The main reasons are 
that entry in the energy market involves high sunk costs and, overall given market 
conditions, economies of scale are only achievable in the long run and on the basis of a 
large consumer base. Because the nuclear energy market is relatively protected against 
competitors, innovative development is dependent on the innovative capacity of the 
dominant players. As a result, there is a danger that the market will fail to invest in 
innovation. And, for this reason we indicate that this type of market failure is a 
showstopper to innovation. 
Externalities can be identified as a critical failure. As a result of the hazards, the cost of 
investing in nuclear energy is high. In particular, following Sovacool,61 the ‘true cost’ of 
investing in nuclear energy is substantially higher than the ‘true cost’ of investing in 
renewable energy. The concept of true cost refers to the cost of operations as well as the 
cost of industry on public health, environment and other factors that are not accounted for 
by the industry. The true cost of investment in the energy market, is difficult to estimate.62 
If investment decisions were to be made in the true cost of investment, it is possible that 
different investment decisions would be made. As a result, alternative energy markets 
made be underinvested which is slowing down the innovative capacity in these areas. For 
this reason, we classify this type of failure as slowing-down innovation. 
One type of information asymmetry failure related to the nuclear energy sector is that of 
lack of monitoring. According to the TINA, this results on a coordination failure. However, 
lack of monitoring, for example in relation to nuclear safety, consists of an information 
asymmetry problem especially when some actors have more information about the degree 
of safety and hazard but lack incentive to fully disclose the risks. This type of information 
asymmetry is also referred to as moral hazard. A priori, it is not clear what the effect of 
moral hazard is on innovation but it is likely that it slows down innovative capacity. 
According to the TINA on nuclear fission, capabilities are identified as a moderate failure 
for the nuclear energy sector. The identified obstacle is that of ensuring a skilled workforce 
                                            
60 TINA (2013) Nuclear Fission. Summary Report 
61 B. K. Sovacool (2011) Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power. Chapter: The Self-Limiting Future of 
Nuclear Power. World Scientific Publishing Co. pte. Ltd.  Singapore. 
62 If the so-called true cost of investing in nuclear energy is relatively higher what are the rationales for 
investing in nuclear energy? It was argued by the private company British Energy in 2001, one of the 
rationales for government financial support of the nuclear energy market is that nuclear energy can 
contribute to address climate change issues and that investing is this market helps ensure energy diversity 
and security. see OECD (2004) Government and Nuclear Energy. OECD Observer, available: 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1310/Government_and_nuclear_energy_.html 
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over long-term horizons. Possibly, this type of failure is considered ‘moderate’ instead of 
more critical because labour market mobility can help solve bottlenecks in the UK energy 
market. In any case, this type of failure slows-down the innovative capacity. 
Network failures are identified as significant: investors lack incentives to share information 
with (potential) competitions. Because different actors have to undertake similar types of 
investment instead of pooling knowledge, this type of failure slows down aggregate levels 
of innovation. 
One of the major failures in the nuclear energy market is institutional failure. The 
regulations in this energy market have been reformed substantially over the past years 
and reform is still on-going. Because private sector investment decisions are dependent on 
these regulations, much investment is currently deterred. The market failure acts as a 
showstopper to innovation in nuclear energy.  
Similarly, changes in the energy infrastructure are deterring investment. One specific 
example of a deterrent is that advanced manufacturing capabilities are restricted limiting 
efficient and effective advancements. According to the TINA report on nuclear fission, this 
type of failure is ‘significant’. The market failure likewise acts as a showstopper to 
innovation in nuclear energy.  
It is clear that identifying the market failure as either a showstopper or as slowing-down 
innovation is not alike to identifying the degree of failure as e.g. critical, significant, 
moderate. For example, both the example of network failure and the example if market 
power failure given are identifies as ‘significant failures’. However, we identified the market 
power example as a showstopper and the network failure as slowing-down innovation. 
Table 7 Failures in the Nuclear energy market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
TINA, 
nuclear 
fission 
Show-
stopper 
The high capital cost in the nuclear energy market 
act as a market entry barrier to new innovative 
players.  
Externalities 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
fission; 
Sovaco
ol, 
2011 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
Costs related to health and environmental damage 
and catastrophic damage such as nuclear accidents 
are difficult to capture and therefore are not (fully) 
borne by nuclear energy suppliers. One reason such 
cost are not accounted for is that the event of e.g. 
catastrophic damages occurring is uncertain. 
Information 
asymmetry 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
fission 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Lack of monitoring 
Capabilities 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
fission 
Slowing 
down  
“The necessary skilled workforce requires a long 
time to reach maturity and is vulnerable to high 
turnover rates and obsolescence, requiring constant 
investment even during lossmaking periods” 
Network 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
Slowing 
down (a 
“Insufficient sharing of array performance data due 
to perceived risks of losing competitive advantage” 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
fission lot) 
Institutional 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
fission 
Show-
stopper 
“Until government policy on waste management and 
reprocessing is clear the market does not have a 
strong incentive to innovate” 
Infrastructural 
TINA, 
Nuclear 
fission 
Show-
stopper 
“Limited number of nuclear vendors with advanced 
manufacturing capabilities, low competition and high 
barriers to entry due to the need for costly testing 
facilities such as particle accelerators” 
Renewable Energy 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
Investment in renewable energy, i.e. offshore wind energy, biomass energy, solar thermal 
electricity, hydro, geothermal, ocean has become a priority for the UK. One criterion that 
distinguishes the renewable energy sector from the other energy sectors it the 
overwhelming lack of knowledge about the future value of investment in renewable energy, 
e.g. new technologies and energy storage, and this creates a barrier to the deployment of 
new possibilities in the field of energy and to innovation in the field. In particular, 
consumers lack knowledge on the current possibilities in the field.  
UK targets for renewable energy are in line with those of the Directive 2009/28/EC of the 
European parliament and of the Council. Several advances have been made since the 
enforcement of this directive. For example, according to the UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (2012), during the period 2011-2012, the cost of photovoltaic installations 
decreased by 50%. At the same time, market failures undermine a rapid uptake of 
innovation in the field of renewable energy. In this section we discuss some of these 
challenges. 
Large and powerful players dominate the renewable energy sector. One example, as 
noted in the TINA report on offshore wind energy,63 is the case in both the switchgear and 
cabling market. As noted in Table 8, big players dominate the turbine market but this 
situation is expected to change in the future. In the meantime, the lack of competition in 
the market is slowing-down innovation. 
Externalities have a substantial influence on the renewable energy market. From an 
economic, social and environmental point of view it is desirable to have a large-scale 
renewable energy market. However, the renewable energy market remains underinvested 
because this type of energy is relatively more expensive and it is challenging to pass these 
higher costs on to the consumer. One assumption is that if an energy supplier chooses to 
invest relatively more expensive source of energy or if this supplier would restrict its supply 
to green/renewable energy it would become less profitable and hence the company would 
be driven out of the market. For example, the renewable obligation seeks to address this 
type of challenge within the market. Externalities also play a role in guiding the behaviour 
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of consumers and or entrepreneurs, for example, in situation when they risk not being able 
to appropriate the returns from an investment such as that of the instalment of low-carbon 
electricity generation systems. 
One type of information asymmetry failure identified in the market is the reluctance of 
manufacturers to share information. This results in some manufacturers with a competitive 
advantage and other manufacturers making similar investment in order to catch-up 
creating large inefficiencies in the market. According to the TINA report this type of failure 
is ‘important’. We identify it a slowing-down innovation rather than blocking innovation 
altogether. An additional type of information asymmetry that we identify is in the case 
where consumers lack information about the benefits of investing in renewable energy and 
for this reason refrain from doing so (see also Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010).64 
According to Soete,65 consumers’ take-up of green technologies is lagging behind the 
industry capabilities. This gap between innovative capacity and commercialization can 
have a negative effect on industries’ incentives to innovate. 
Regarding the failure of the type capability we have not elaborated a specific example. 
Still, it is likely that a lack of technical knowledge and skills available on the labour market 
will constrain the deployment of new energy possibilities. Moreover, the development of 
future possibilities in the energy market is dependent on the level of investment in 
research and innovation and investment in human capital. The cost of education, training, 
R&D and innovation is only partially captured by the private sector and public investment 
in education and training remain of high importance. 
Network failures are pertinent to the development of renewable energy: the uptake and 
commercialization of future innovation and development in energy technology is 
dependent on the coordination with early stage research initiatives as well as the 
regulatory development. Also, as noted in the example in the Table, simultaneous 
developments are needed to ensure innovation uptake. As indicated in the TINA on bio-
energy, the cost associated with supporting the process of innovation in bio-energy, e.g. 
runs in the 100 millions. Critical coordination failures are argued to undermine the 
development of a large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) market, e.g. to coordinate and 
integrate project investment. Network failures may block some innovation; however 
overall, we suggest that network failures slow down the overall process of development. 
Some rules and regulations that steer the interactions between different agents may hinder 
the innovation and development in the energy sector. Institutional rules (social and formal) 
likewise contribute the dynamics in the energy sector and create a lock-in to relatively less 
efficient sources of energy. According to the EREC66 report, administrative barriers inhibit 
renewable energy development. Examples of such administrative and regulatory barriers 
includes, but are not limited to, the implementation of one-step authorization procedures 
and the certification of engineers via accredited training programmes. The formation of 
                                            
64 Gillingham, K. and Sweeney, J. (2010) Market Failure and the Structure of Externalities. in: A. J. Padilla 
and R. Schmalensee (eds.) Harnessing Renewable Energy. Available: 
http://www.yale.edu/gillingham/Market%20Failure%20and%20the%20Structure%20of%20Externalities.pdf  
65 Soete, L (2007) From Industrial to Innovation Policy. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 7(3): 273-
284 
66 EREC (2008) Renewable Energy Technology Roadmap 20% by 2020. European Renewable Energy 
Council 
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new institutional rules can contribute to the uptake of renewable energy. One example is 
that of the renewable obligation that requires energy producers located in the UK to offer a 
proportion of their energy supply that is generated using renewable energy sources. The 
state also plays an important role in regulating the energy market by ensuring the 
protection of (intellectual) property rights and respect for law and contracts. Additionally, as 
explained in the previous section, the regulatory structure of the electricity grid can also 
misalign incentives in the energy market. Because institutional failures create barriers that 
individual innovating firms cannot overcome, we argue that these types of failures have a 
significant showstopper effect in unleashing innovative potential. 
According to the TINA report on offshore wind energy, infrastructural failures create critical 
failures in the market. In this case, the report particularly refers to the lacking ability of 
turbine manufacturers to develop their own test sites, and thus reliance on public support 
in this area. The House of Lords European Union Committee67 has identified similar supply 
chain bottlenecks. Again, we denote these types of (critical) failures as showstoppers. 
Table 8 Failures in the Renewable energy market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
TINA, 
off-
shore 
wind 
Slowing 
down 
“Lack of competition may hinder turbine innovation 
(i.e. imperfect competition and high barriers to 
entry). The OSW turbine market is currently 
dominated by a limited number of firms; however, 
entry by other players are expected soon” 
Externalities 
TINA 
reports 
Show-
stopper 
Challenge to create a large-scale renewable energy 
market 
Information 
asymmetry 
TINA, 
Off-
shore 
wind 
 
Gillingh
am and 
Sween
ey 
(2010) 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
“There are barriers for companies to collaborate as 
turbine manufacturers do not want to share product 
warranty data” 
 
 
“If households have limited information about the 
effectiveness and benefits of distributed generation 
renewable energy, there may be an information 
market failure”  
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Network 
TINA, 
Bioener
gy 
68
 
(pp. 26) 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
“Innovations from both crop production and crop 
development are necessary to unlock the potential 
of bioenergy. Achieving this requires the bioenergy 
markets for feedstock production, transport and 
conversion to develop symbiotically. New, 
                                            
67 House of Lords (2008) European Union Committee. The EU’s target for Renewable Energy 20% by 2012 
68 TINA (2013) Bioenergy. Summary Report 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TINA; 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
sustainable feedstocks and the conversion 
technologies that utilise them have to be developed 
hand in hand, to create an integrated, functioning, 
market. Due to high transaction costs across the 
diverse bioenergy supply chain, this does not 
happen sufficiently, restricting the extent and 
effectiveness of R&D activity” 
 
“High level of coordination (and transaction costs) 
required for consolidated EV integration makes it 
hard for individual players in the market to drive 
demand” 
Institutional 
EREC 
(2008, 
pp. 3), 
 
Gillingh
am and 
Sween
ey 
(2010) 
 Administrative barriers are still a major problem for 
renewable energy development. 
 
 
Regulation of electricity prices creates perverse 
incentives. 
Infrastructural 
EREC 
(2008) 
(pp. 3) 
 
TINA, 
offshor
e wind 
 
House 
of 
Lords 
pp.30 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
“Infrastructure development and priority access for 
renewables to the grid are key for a large-scale 
penetration of renewables” 
 
“Turbine manufacturers lack the capability to 
develop their own test sites, and so rely on national 
centres or developers to provide sites.” 
 
“A further barrier to meeting the target was the 
industrial supply chain (…). We were told that 
suitable specialist vessels available for hire in 
Europe to build and maintain offshore wind farms 
are in short supply, that the market for turbine 
manufacture is limited and that the prices of copper 
and steel were making new offshore wind farms 
more expensive.” 
 
Oil and gas 
Challenge led area 
 
Oil and Gas together fuel about 28 % of total UK electricity generation (UK department of 
energy and climate change data from 2012). However, most of this energy, 27% out of the 
28%, is derived from gas. In terms of primary energy, the value of UK oil and gas is close 
to 50% of the total energy value,69 The operating volume of the UK industry in 2009 was 
2.48 million barrels of oil and gas per day, capital investments of £4.7 billion, and operating 
                                            
69 HM Government (2012) UK Government Oil and Gas Sector Strategy 
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costs of £6.6 billion.70 The industry employs roughly 440,000 people. Following HM 
Government (2013, pp. 17), "the development and implementation of new technology is of 
vital importance to maximising recovery from the challenging UKCS environment, yet 
overall R&D spend of the sector in the UK is reported to be 0.3% of sales; far lower than 
Norway’s proportion of 4%".71 
The UK oil and gas market is regulated by the 1934 petroleum production act, the 1998 
petroleum act, the 1886 gas act, and several environmental and health and safety 
legislation. Operators require several permits and approvals prior to exploration. Following 
the 1934 petroleum production act, the UK government has the exclusive right to grant 
licences to operators to explore and extract oil and gas resources. Operators that have 
been granted licences pay an annual rent and remain liable for any costs arising from the 
exploration of oil and gas, even when such operators no longer have commercial interests.  
Despite its relative size and economic value there are several barriers in the industry that 
impede the development of the industry and have shifted some of the energy focus to 
alternative energy sources. First, the industry outlook faces significant uncertainty due to 
high price volatility of both oil and gas; in 2009, for example, gas prices dropped 
significantly below oil prices. In addition to the uncertainty over prices and price trends 
some argue that the UK government has underestimated the importance of the gas 
industry to the economy. POYRY (2010)72 are specifically sceptical of the degree to which 
the electricity market will yield the expected results because of high uncertainty of 
technological development in this industry. One argument is that the smart grid concept 
has not been tested. If the government has underestimated the costs associated with 
technological development, this may have resulted in underinvestment in the gas industry 
due to '"not sending the correct investment signals to the market, as evident in continuing 
delays in new investments". 
One issue that is currently debated is that of pursuing shale gas drilling. As also noted by 
'Practical Law' (2013), the UK shale gas industry is in early stages of development and has 
been limited to explorative drilling that had been temporarily suspended in 2011 for 
environmental and health concerns. According to IoD Big Picture73 planning and issuing 
permits is still a major barrier to drilling and fracturing in the field. As additionally noted in 
the report, skills to shale gas extraction are a moderate barrier. In particular, reference is 
made to the aging workforce offshore which arguably hinders development. At a more 
generic level, the industry is also found to lack adequate skills and training such as project 
management experience, senior managerial and specialist engineers, subsea and drilling 
experience. 
Oil and Gas UK74 estimates that, over a period of roughly 40 years, the UK has invested 
more than £283 billion in offshore facilities, on transportation infrastructure and on onshore 
processing of oil and gas from the North Sea. However, the decommissioning of these 
                                            
70 Oil and Gas UK (2010) Oil and Gas UK Activity Survey 
71 HM Government (2013) UK Oil and Gas Business and Government Action. Industrial Strategy: 
Government and Industry in Partnership, March 2013 
72 POYRY (2010) Gas: at the center of a low carbon future. Review for Oil and Gas UK 
73 IoD Big Picture (2013) Shale gas: overcoming the barriers 
74 Oil and Gas UK (2010) Decommissioning Insight 
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structures (installations, infrastructure, pipeline, wells) has been limited. The costs 
associated with decommissioning are estimated to be ten per cent of the total investment 
(Oil and Gas UK, 2010). Practical Law (2013) estimates that the cost of decommissioning 
oil and gas installations and pipelines is around £33 billion. 
The UK state can require operators to submit a decommissioning programme, including a 
cost projection even when operators no longer have a commercial interest in the field. 
Upon approval, the operators are required to carry out the decommissioning programme 
and maintain liability (Practical Law, 2013). The cost of decommissioning are subject to tax 
relief at the time the costs are incurred. Following additional estimation of HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC), the £33 billion estimation implies a net cost of £13 billion after tax for 
the operators in charge. Because these costs are so high – and are difficult to predict – a 
major concern for operators is that of obtaining tax relief. Oil and Gas UK specifically 
mention the difficulty in determining scale, timing and value of the various technical 
activities related to decommissioning project and the effect of efficiency improvements and 
new technologies. 
Decommissioning regulations put pressure on operators’ financing structure, influencing 
investors’ confidence in the industry. In response to the uncertainty around tax relief and 
the high decommissioning costs of oil and gas installations, the UK introduced a 
decommissioning relief deed regime in April, 2013.75 "The basic principle behind the 
decommissioning relief deed is that it sets a reference amount as a benchmark amount of 
relief against which the deed holder can determine whether or not it has actually achieved 
the appropriate amount of relief through the tax system. Where it has not, then a shortfall 
claim can be made under the deed, with a payment due from the government. Such 
payments are not taxable". 
The fiscal regime regulations in the field likewise influence the investment decisions, when 
these impact the returns on investment. Moreover, according to HM Government (2013, 
pp.15), "some supply chain companies are required to post sizeable performance bonds 
after being awarded large contract''. When this negatively influences the financial status of 
the company, this regulation lowers the demand for such large contracts. Likewise, smaller 
companies working in the field find it difficult to implement new technology because if the 
high costs and long time frame involved with technological development. Additional 
barriers in the industry include that of acquiring financing. Especially since the financial 
crisis operators find it more difficult to acquire bank loans. HM Government also argues 
that some companies do not know how to access funding. 
The types of network failures that are referred to are lack of cooperation between 
operators that work on different part so of the supply chain, e.g. drilling rigs, intervention 
vessels, and frac boats. This is argued to overheat the supply chain and generates 
additional pressure on prices. According to HM government, more cooperation could 
improve the fit between demand and supply. 
 
 
                                            
75 Practical Law (2013) Decommissioning UK oil and gas installations: driving down the cost 
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Table 9 Failures in the oil and gas energy market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
Oil and 
Gas 
UK 
2010, 
pp. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pp. 25 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
"The industry currently lacks an insight into the 
scale, timing and value of the various technical 
activities which are needed to carry out a 
decommissioning project. Oil & Gas UK has made 
its own assessment based on total projected 
decommissioning expenditure throughout the UKCS. 
This assessment has been derived by combining 
actual data from a range of on-going projects with 
planned expenditure submitted in our most recent 
activity survey. Inevitably it is an approximation 
which will vary by area (southern, central and 
northern North Sea and West of Shetland) and by 
field. Nor can it capture the impact of efficiency 
improvements or new technologies which will 
inevitably emerge with time." 
 
"Technical innovations – which will further enhance 
oil and gas recovery, extend the life of many existing 
facilities and ultimately reduce the costs of 
decommissioning." 
Market power 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Externalities 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
"The issue of accessing finance is one shared by 
many companies in the oil and gas industry – and 
not just smaller members of the supply chain. Multi-
national operators choose where to best allocate 
their capital internationally by ranking their portfolio 
and selecting the projects that deliver the best 
returns. The fiscal regime is an important 
component in these company decisions". 
 
"Some supply chain companies are required to post 
sizeable performance bonds after being awarded 
large contracts. This makes them financially weaker 
in spite of winning a contract; a potential barrier to 
that company’s growth".  
 
"It is suggested that there is a “race to be second” in 
terms of technology implementation in the UKCS, 
with end users wanting to implement technology 
with a proven benefit, but not wanting to be the first 
to trial a new technology in situ. Anecdotal evidence 
from discussions with the industry has suggested 
that some SMEs go out of business before their 
product is trialled."  
Information 
asymmetry 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 39 
 
 
 
 
"The 2008 financial downturn has made banks more 
risk averse to financing companies through debt. 
There are many financial instruments currently 
available to the oil and gas industry, but at present 
there is an incomplete understanding on the 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
Oil and 
Gas 
UK 
2010, 
pp. 24 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
industry’s side of how to access them". 
 
"Uncertainty around costs, and also 
decommissioning timings as will be shown in the 
next section, have made companies within the 
decommissioning supply chain hesitant to invest 
despite the scale of the forecast expenditure. 
Greater transparency and access to operators’ 
timelines would act as a potential catalyst for 
investment". 
 
"The 2008 financial downturn has made banks more 
risk averse to financing companies through debt. 
There are many financial instruments currently 
available to the oil and gas industry, but at present 
there is an incomplete understanding on the 
industry’s side of how to access them". 
Capabilities 
IoD Big 
Picture 
(2013) 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Skills to shale gas extraction are a moderate barrier. 
Network 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 39 
Slowing 
down 
"High activity levels can lead to an ‘overheating’ of 
the UK supply chain and increased demand for cost-
competitive options overseas. Collaboration would 
work to smooth out demand and supply." 
Institutional 
Oil and 
Gas 
UK 
2010, 
pp. 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil and 
Gas 
UK 
2010, 
pp. 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
"Decommissioning of offshore oil and gas 
installations and pipelines is regulated by the 
Petroleum Act 1998. The current owners of the 
assets are jointly and severally liable for 
decommissioning and its costs. Whilst companies 
make full and proper provision for the costs in their 
accounts, currently there are no dedicated 
decommissioning funds, nor does the fiscal regime 
encourage such an approach. Liability for 
decommissioning costs is not however restricted to 
the current owners of an asset. Under the Petroleum 
Act, previous parties may also be held liable in the 
event that the current owners are unable to meet 
their obligations. This is achieved through Section 
29 of the Act which places these decommissioning 
obligations on previous licensees, except where the 
Secretary of State has chosen to release them from 
their liabilities". 
"Certainty/uncertainty about the future fiscal and 
regulatory regimes – which will influence the 
investment environment (...)" 
Infrastructural 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2012, 
pp. 4 
 
 
 
 
“Skills continue to be a major issue for a number of 
sectors, including the oil and gas sector. Shortages 
are reported in project management, senior 
managerial and specialist engineering positions.” 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 19 
 
 
 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013, 
pp. 20 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
"High levels of activity and global competition have 
resulted in skills shortages; the availability of 
sufficient numbers of skilled workers is seen as one 
of the biggest challenges the industry faces. The 
supply/demand mismatch is impacting project 
schedules and driving up costs; a major threat to the 
overall competitiveness of the sector". 
 
"Current demand for experienced engineers and 
geoscientists in the UK (and globally) outstrips 
supply. The industry expects it will require an 
additional 15 thousand staff over the next 4-5 years 
across a range of disciplines, including design 
engineers (all disciplines), subsea and drilling". 
Electricity distribution and storage 
Challenge led area 
‘8 great’ technology 
 
The development of energy storage capacity is a key requirement in order to meet the 
current objectives for energy efficiency and emissions targets. Energy storage is important 
for the stability and flexibility of the grid and is critical to ensure that peaks of demand are 
satisfied. The transition towards more renewable energy generation, mainly from wind and 
solar sources, creates additional challenges in matching the supply and demand of 
energy. According to the IEA, global electricity storage capacities from 189 GW to 305 GW 
will be needed by the year 2050 to mitigate grid imbalances attributable to variable energy 
resources. The uptake of energy storage is very important in order to make possible the 
transition to smart grids and cities in the near future. The total available market for energy 
storage has been estimated at more than $600b in the period 2009 to 202076 even if just 
1% of the total worldwide stationary energy generation market were to adopt some form of 
energy storage.  
Energy storage can serve many different purposes in today’s power system. Table 10 
shows the different ways in which energy storage can provide value across different 
application scales and functionality domains. As it can be observed, the dynamic 
behaviour of storage is usually more important than its long-term capacity. 
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Table 10 Purposes of energy storage in today’s power system 
 
 
Transmission grid- 
central storage 
(national and European 
level) 
Distribution grid 
storage (city level) 
End-user Storage 
(household level) 
Balancing 
demand and 
supply 
 Seasonal / weekly 
fluctuations 
 Large geographical 
unbalances 
 Strong variability of wind 
and solar 
 (Electricity and gas 
storage need to be 
integrated) 
 Daily / hourly 
variations 
 Peak shaving 
 (electricity and 
heat/cold storage 
need to be 
integrated) 
 Daily variations 
 (electricity and 
heat/cold storage 
need to be 
integrated) 
Grid 
management 
 Voltage and frequency 
regulation 
 Complement to classic 
power plants for peak 
generation 
 Participate in balancing 
markets 
 Cross-border trading 
 Voltage and 
frequency 
regulation 
 Substitute existing 
ancillary services 
(at lower CO2) 
 Participate in 
balancing markets 
 Aggregation of small 
storage systems 
providing grid 
services 
Energy 
Efficiency 
 Better efficiency of the 
global mix, with time- 
shift of off-peak into peak 
energy 
 Demand side 
management 
 Interactions grid- 
end user 
 Local production 
and consumption 
 Behaviour change 
 Increase value of PV 
and local wind 
 Efficient buildings 
 Integration with 
district heating 
/cooling and CHP 
Source: European Commission. DG ENER Working Paper. The future role and challenges of Energy Storage. 2013 
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Energy storage technologies are diverse and are at different stages in their commercial 
readiness. In Europe, Pumped Hydro Storage Systems (PHS) for large-scale electricity 
storage has been used for decades and represents almost 99 % of current worldwide 
storage capacity. However, by 2030 over half of this installed capacity in Europe will need 
to be refurbished because of ageing.77 Nowadays, technologies are available across large-
scale (GW), medium-sized (MW) or micro, local systems (kW) applications. The 
technological challenges of energy storage revolve around increasing the capacities and 
efficiencies of existing technologies, and developing new technologies for local (domestic), 
distributed or large centralised applications. A summary of the available technologies and 
their main characteristics can be seen in Figure 6.  
Apart from pumped hydropower, most of the other technologies still need R&D efforts to 
reduce costs and improve performance. Specifically, pilot initiatives are needed in order to 
bring alternative storage technologies to a stage of commercial maturity and to accelerate 
the transition to mass commercialisation. In addition to technological challenges, the 
development and uptake of energy storage technologies will depend on the presence of 
appropriate market signals to incentivise the building of storage capacity and the provision 
of storage services. 
One of the underpinning uncertainties in the field of energy storage is that it is unclear how 
much storage capacity is needed in the future and which types of energy storage systems 
will be most dominant. In addition to this type of uncertainty, Table 11 outlines three 
additional barriers to the mass deployment of energy storage: market regulation, current 
electricity and commodity prices, and performance of storage technologies. Uncertainty of 
the profitability of investing in energy storage is also related to the concept of ‘self-
cannibalisation’.78 The basic idea is that overinvesting in storage capacity could have a 
negative effect on its value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
77 EC Joint Research Centre (2013) Assessing Storage Value in Electricity Markets – A literature review. 
Institute for Energy and Transport, Joint Research Centre, European Commission 
78 Philipp Grünewald (2012) Electricity storage in future GB networks— a market failure? Centre for Energy 
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Figure 6 Technical and economic features of power storage technologies 
 
Source: 2011 Technology Map of the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan). Technology Descriptions. 
Network failures may also be regarded as significant.79 One identified in the literature is 
that the lack of central coordination fails to stimulate distribution network operators (DNOs) 
to make the associated investments. The role of DNOs in the energy market is that of 
ensuring the operation of the network of towers and cables connecting the national 
transmission network and energy consumers. It is possible to regard network failures as 
showstoppers where improved coordination is needed to advance the development of 
energy storage technologies. As identified in several of the TINA, within the energy 
market, there is a high level of dependency on policy. In particular, policy dependent 
demand is identified as a critical constraint and failure because of the high uncertainty 
about the level of public support and development of future infrastructure planning. As a 
result of reliance of the private sector on public initiative and the uncertainty of public 
investment, private investment in the industry (e.g. electric vehicles, heat pumps) is 
lagging. Similarly, Pew (2011) argues that investor uncertainty -ahead of new policy 
announcements by a new government- may have contributed to the UK’s low investment 
in green projects in 2010. 
Regulation in the electricity market may also be inhibiting the optimal functioning of the 
market. It is possible that the regulations in place create sub-optimal conditions for private 
sector functioning and pricing mechanisms. As also explained by Gillingham and Sweeney 
(2010, pp. 11), the average cost pricing of electricity implies that consumers often face a 
price of electricity that does not reflect the marginal cost of providing electricity at any 
given time”. Albeit, the relation between this type of market failure and innovation may not 
be evident, it is clear that the degree to which electricity supply is priced and distributed in 
                                            
79 TINA (2013) Electricity, Networks & Storage. Summary Report. pp.15 
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the grid (peak time and off-peak) has a significant impact on the sustainability and 
profitability of the energy market. 
The type of infrastructural failures identified in the text are those where substantial 
government investment is needed to advance and trigger the take-off of private sector 
investment in the fossil energy market. These failures are critical and apparent 
showstoppers. 
From the cited list of relevant literature, Table 11 summarises the failures identified and 
barriers with a particular impact in the electricity distribution and storage market. 
Table 11 Failures in the electricity distribution and storage market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
TINA, 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
 
Slowing 
down 
“All parties – including regulators, network 
operators, and technology providers – are unsure of 
the value and the extent of the role storage will play 
in the future energy system, creating a barrier to 
innovation and deployment” 
Market power 
TINA, 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
Show-
stopper 
“The scale of investment required to integrate 
telecommunications in new equipment is a barrier to 
DNOs investment.” 
Externalities 
TINA, 
electri-
city, 
net-
works 
& sto-
rage 
 
Grüne
wald
80
 
2012 
Show-
stopper 
 “Network savings are not accounted for in the 
techno-economic model, since wholesale prices do 
not explicitly reflect local or regional network 
constraints.” 
 
 
 
“The range of sources of value that storage 
potentially has to aggregate poses a challenge for 
its uptake in present markets. The discrepancy 
between market and system values within similar 
scenarios supports the suggestion that the private 
value of storage in electricity markets does not 
necessarily reflect the full system value.” 
 
“Aggregation of a number of value streams accruing 
for different stakeholders across these regimes 
poses a commercial challenge for storage operators. 
Cross sectoral and strategic planning may be 
necessary if the long term aggregate value is to be 
captured in the common interest. Failure to do so 
                                            
80 Philipp Grünewald (2012) Electricity storage in future GB networks— a market failure? Centre for Energy 
Policy and Technology, Imperial College London 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
could inhibit the uptake of storage and may lead to a 
welfare loss.” 
 
“Storage is often said to suffer from ‘self-
cannibalisation’: the more storage is installed the 
less it is worth.” 
 
First mover disadvantage: novel technologies entail 
learning costs borne by the first mover but shared, 
as a positive externality, with followers 
Information 
asymmetry 
ERP
81
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
EC 
2013
82
 
 
 
 
 
 
TINA; 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
Asymmetric or incomplete information: energy 
efficiency opportunities are one example, whereby 
energy users do not realise the potential savings 
they could make and invest less as a result. “The 
value of some of the services that storage can 
provide, such as voltage support or T&D investment 
deferral, cannot be easily captured under existing 
market arrangements” 
 
Risk aversion resulting from a lack of information, 
the absence of a track record and the incapability of 
evaluating projects fully.  
High (perceived or real) transaction costs: While 
transaction and learning are real costs, they may be 
exaggerated for novel technologies without a track 
record 
 
“The lack of hard analysis of the role of energy 
storage in general means that reform proposals are 
likely not to recognise any potential system benefits 
from storage.” 
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Network 
TINA; 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
Show-
stopper 
“High coordination required for full ―smart grid 
infrastructure makes it difficult for individual players 
(e.g. DNOs) to push forward in absence of central 
coordination” 
 
“Lack of clarity about infrastructure planning, 
particularly development of infrastructure that could 
substitute for storage technologies, does not give 
parties sufficient confidence to invest in R&D or 
deployment”. 
 
                                            
81 Energy Research Partnership (2011) The future role for energy storage in the UK. Technology Report, 
June 2011. 
82 European Commission (2013) The future role and challenges of Energy Storage. DG ENER Working 
Paper. 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
“No current national coordination or roll out plan or 
developed roadmap for these technologies also 
creates demand uncertainty” (in reference to 
telecommunications). 
Institutional 
ERP 
2011 
EC, 
2013 
TINA; 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
 
BIS
83
 
2011 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
Policy uncertainty: green investments such as 
energy storage rely on government policies, which 
must be in place long-term; the lack of track record 
in long-term green policies is a risk to investors (but 
internal to policy makers). For example, investor 
uncertainty ahead of new policy announcements by 
a new government may have contributed to the UK’s 
low investment in green projects in 2010 (Pew, 
2011) 
 
 
“From a regulatory point of view, energy storage is 
not recognised as an asset class. By default it is 
viewed as generation and therefore cannot be 
controlled by a system operator under EU 
competition rules, despite there being a potential 
economic, environmental and security of supply 
case for such integration.” 
 
“Regulation doesn’t allow sufficiently dynamic tariffs 
to incentivise peak demand reductions, reducing a 
major underlying source of value for home hub – 
optimal regulation complicated by fairness issues, 
windfalls for inherently off-peak users, and potential 
switching to gas.” 
Infrastructural 
TINA; 
electrici
ty, 
networ
ks & 
storage 
Show-
stopper 
Novel technologies without a track record need 
successful pilot testing at scale and available large-
scale research infrastructures in which to test new 
storage solutions. 
 
“Broader energy infrastructure plans are uncertain, 
including the extent of the role of renewables, 
energy efficiency improvements, electric vehicles, 
and deployment of heat pumps”  
Built Environment 
The built environment reflects an interdisciplinary area that refers to the man-made 
environment within which human activity – economic, social and cultural – occurs. The 
built environment presents both a challenge and an opportunity to address the challenges 
of climate change. The government has set ambitious targets to cut UK carbon emissions 
                                            
83 BIS (2011) The economics of the Green Investment Bank: costs and benefits, rationale and value for 
money. Vivid Economics in association with McKinsey & Co. Report prepared for The Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills, October 2011 
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by 80% by 2050. With estimates of 25-27% of the UK’s CO2 coming from domestic 
homes,84 with a further 18% coming from non-domestic building 
Urban centres are more economically productive and the environmental footprint is lower 
than the national average. However, they face increasing pressures from a rapid growth in 
populations, changing demographics, network congestion and pressures on key 
resources. 
Population estimates for the UK show that 80% of the total population live in urban areas. 
This is projected to rise by 0.7% per year to 2015. The 2011 census reveals some of the 
important demographic characteristics of the urban population, which will impact on 
delivery to meet carbon targets: 
A prevalence of social housing and the transitory nature of net migration to urban areas 
present key barriers to innovation. The co-evolution of people, property and the inter-
connecting networks present further challenges and barriers.  
Future Cities 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
Disconnected and parochial approaches to urban design will only heighten the challenges 
of increased urban living while denying a significant opportunity for integrated and 
innovative thinking in delivering sustainable solutions for a low carbon future. 
A major barrier to effective introduction of low carbon innovations is the issue of 
externalities, arising from differences in incentives between individual actors and the wider 
group. This is the widely understood market failure problem where there is a divergence 
between marginal private and social costs and benefits.  
In sustainable development the idea is more widely discussed in terms of Hardin’s theory 
of ‘tragedy of the commons’. In this theory individual agents who are acting independently 
and rationally according to their own self-interest, end up acting in contrary to the group’s 
long-term best interests. This leads potentially to a rapid depletion of shared resources. 
In terms of efforts to mitigate against climate change the view ‘think global, act local’ 
reflects the idea that the measures and actions taken locally may not benefit individuals 
directly, but in aggregate go towards addressing the global or common challenge of 
climate change. The alignment of marginal private benefits with marginal social benefits, 
stimulate positive externalities.  
The issue is compounded by the institutional failure arising from the non-alignment of 
decision making cycles. Politicians who legislate and can enforce regulations and long 
term strategic plans are often subject to shorter cycles due to electoral processes. They 
                                            
84 Estimate from Federation of Master Builders 27% (Building a Greener Britain 2008), 25% from TINA 
Domestic Buildings Summary Report (November 2012) 
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may therefore delay or fail to develop actions that may only yield impacts after they have 
left office.85 
While positive externalities can be identified within the incentives for actors to align private 
and social benefits, negative externalities, where the marginal social costs exceed the 
marginal private costs are also a major barrier. Price distortions cause the failure of the 
market to align incentives. Energy prices do not reflect the actual costs or are kept 
artificially low as a consequence of subsidies. 
The suppression of prices also impacts on the incentives to invest in low carbon 
technologies. The combination of high upfront costs, longer payback periods and the 
higher risks from new innovative technologies or uncertainties around future policy 
regimes, make investments less attractive. Failures arising from split incentives also 
contribute to a slowdown in innovation and adoption. This occurs when there is a 
divergence in the incentives for investment and appropriation of returns and benefits from 
this investment. The issue of split incentives is considered in the review of buildings below; 
however, at the built environment level there is also a potential misalignment between 
micro generators of energy and the systems operators regarding the connection of micro 
generation sites to distribution networks 
In addition a lack of supply of trained professionals and the reputational risks associated 
with poor quality implementation presents a barrier to innovation as there is insufficient 
capability to fully deliver effective installation and maintenance.  
Within the built environment there is a tendency for organisations to centralise expertise 
around sustainability, which creates a major network failure. Network failures occur where 
there are significant costs in facilitating the flows of information between actors within the 
system. Sustainable development is a multi-disciplinary area, drawing on experts from 
many different fields such as planning, ecology, economics and other social and physical 
sciences. The tendency to create mutually exclusive departmental structures within 
organisations generates ‘silo thinking’, undermining the potential for effective flows of 
information between actors and increasing the costs of coordination. 
Furthermore, most innovation occurs within specific city sub-systems with little effort or 
incentive to integrate. The diversity and individuality in the evolution of urban areas places 
constraints on the opportunities to transfer knowledge and experience between different 
projects. There is insufficient capacity within individual firms to build up enough 
collaboration so opportunities are lost. The absence of a central source for knowledge 
transfer or collaboration is thus a significant network bottleneck. The decentralisation and 
localisation of available information increases transactions costs reducing the incentives 
for collaboration. 
Delivery of effective innovation within the built environment also needs to reflect the non-
economic considerations for sustainable development.86 This can lead to systems failure 
                                            
85 THINK (2011) Smart Cities Initiative: How to Foster a Quick Transition towards Local Sustainable Energy 
Systems – final report. THINK, FP7 funded EU programme. Available: 
http://www.symple.tm.fr/uploaded/pdf/THINK_smart_cities.pdf 
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arising from capability. Current activities do not take account of the role of ‘people’: social 
and behavioural sciences are not sufficiently involved. The Royal Institute of Town 
Planning, in their submission to the Farrell Review notes that “the maximising of economic 
benefits suggests a distortion of priorities. Economic value should not be seen in isolation 
but has to go hand in hand with rich social capital, green infrastructure and healthy 
lifestyles.” 
 
 
Table 12 Failures in the Future Cities market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Externalities 
Think 
2011
87
 
Slowing 
down 
“Since there are various activities that require the 
coordination of different actors from different sectors 
or with different functions in the same sector, the 
divergence of interests is a frequent obstacle to the 
sustainability in a city…Examples of 
divergences….1) between owners and tenants…2) 
between micro-generators and systems operators”. 
Information 
asymmetry 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Capabilities 
Think 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
“Mayors are not necessarily energy experts (at least 
not in general terms). Quite often, the people 
elected still have little introduction and appetency for 
the concepts of local sustainability and the related 
new culture of a new energy paradigm made of 
diversification, decentralization of sources and 
conversion facilities and of priority to the demand 
approach. Given the cross-cutting nature of climate 
change, and the corresponding wide variety of 
relevant issues (e.g., energy and all activities that 
are strongly dependent on energy, e.g., transport, 
buildings, industry, leisure, normal citizen life), it is 
everything but straightforward to have the required 
expertise at all these levels. Competence regarding 
sustainability might be limited, or it might be 
centralized (e.g., at the environ- mental department, 
which often has to deal with a whole range of 
environmental issues), not being able to spread its 
                                                                                                                                                 
86 TSB (2013) Technology Strategy Board 2013-14 Delivery Plan 
https://www.innovateuk.org/documents/1524978/2138994/Delivery+Plan+-+Financial+year+2013-14/c435471d-222c-4e63-8269-
d0f4b2b61c2f 
87 THINK (2011) Smart Cities Initiative: How to Foster a Quick Transition towards Local Sustainable Energy 
Systems – final report. THINK, FP7 funded EU programme 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
TSB 
2012 
expertise or even its values and culture horizontally 
throughout all the levels/departments required”.  
 
“No individual company has all the skills necessary 
to deliver the requirements of cities in the future. 
Even the largest ones find it difficult to build broad 
enough collaborations to meet the challenge. This is 
a particular problem for smaller innovative 
companies” 
Network 
TSB 
2012
88
 
 
 
TSB 
2012 
 
 
TSB 
Deli-
very 
Slowing 
down 
“There is nowhere for city governments, business 
and the knowledge base to collaborate to develop 
new integrated solutions” 
 
“Current activities do not take account of the role of 
people in cities. The social and behavioural sciences 
are not sufficiently involved” 
 
“Globally and in the UK, construction has a strong 
subcontracting culture. The market is dominated by 
a few large organisations, with a very large number 
of very small players who do most of the individual 
tasks on site. This means that information, and 
innovation, spreads slowly” 
Institutional 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Infrastructural 
TSB 
2012 
Slowing 
down 
There is a lack of facilities for demonstration and 
validation at scale and in use 
 
Low Impact buildings 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
The construction sector is of strategic importance for the UK and EU as it delivers the 
buildings and infrastructure to enable economic and social activity. The UK construction 
industry contributes significantly to the national economy. In 2011 output was £107bn, 
accounting for 7.6% of total UK output. 90% of this came from buildings and around 2 
million people are employed in the sector 
Data for the EU suggest construction accounts for 10% of EU GDP and 50% of fixed 
capital investment. 20 million people are directly employed while estimates from the 
European Construction Industry Federation reveal a further 44 million workers who are 
directly or closely affected 
                                            
88 TSB (2013) Technology Strategy Board 2013-14 Delivery Plan  
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While housing production and financing are dominated by a few major players, a 
fundamental barrier to innovation occurs with the fragmentation within the supply chain 
and the repair, maintenance and improvement (RMI) sector. Data from the National 
Housing Survey shows that 70% of new house building registrations in 2011 were 
recorded by businesses with 501 or more existing units. Of this, 10 very large companies 
with registration of more than 2,000 units accounted for 47% of the total. Those involved in 
the RMI sector tend to be smaller, with an annual market of over £23bn.  
A further source of market entry is individuals choosing to build their own homes using 
innovative designs and building materials. This requires access to land and architectural 
services. However, there is no integrated source for information to support these 
initiatives. An OFT report into house building in the UK recommended government 
consider the need to assist small house builders and individuals building their own homes 
so they can access the necessary technologies, which currently are mainly only available 
from abroad 
The traditional structure of the supply chain within construction tends to be locally sourced 
subcontracting. This creates search costs for householders who are attempting to 
introduce energy improvements to existing properties. This is reinforced by evidence of 
custom and practice in SME construction firms. Most of these work in geographically 
defined local areas, due to convenience of travel to and from site and partly due to the 
legacy of traditional approaches from family run businesses. 
This is further compounded by a lack of information on performance of existing buildings 
as well as incomplete information regarding data on actual building performance 
The benefits from implementing renewable energy technology measures may be 
outweighed by the transaction costs of gathering information and the perceived 
inconvenience of installing new equipment 
A lack of standardisation can also result in the split incentive effect, especially for new 
builds, which inhibits a holistic approach. Decisions on renewable energy technologies for 
example, taken by different actors, including architects, developers etc. are often taken 
without any coordination. These technologies are often developed by small or medium 
sized local firms who cannot achieve sufficient economies of scale. A lack of 
standardisation at regional and global level makes it very difficult to penetrate international 
markets 
A lack of necessary skills and experience required to implement new technologies is a 
fundamental barrier. A recent Chartered Institute of Building survey noted: “New initiatives 
and schemes such as BIM and the Green Deal, which have gained traction in recent 
years, may require a mixture of new and refined skills. 51% report that they feel 
construction workers won’t have these skills for BIM while 78% see real need for more 
training”. 
The Green Deal provides an opportunity for job creation, innovation and decreased 
spending and energy demands. It however requires a joined up approach between 
business, education, professions and government to ensure the skills are available for 
small scale installations as well as the most complex within commercial properties. 
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Fragmentation of the supply of off-site production is also a failure, although is considered 
less of an impact.  
A further systems failure arises from the lack of regulatory certainty about compliance. 
Despite this dual nature of the construction sector some argue that the concentration of 
output for new construction could enable the increased capability for innovation by 
agreeing processes and standards. However, house builders are unlikely to invest in 
innovative solutions to achieve carbon compliance until they know which metrics they will 
be measured against. They argue that, while existing energy efficiency programmes based 
on a list of cost effective measures are sufficient in the short term, a longer term approach 
for effectively reducing CO2 emissions from existing homes will require a transition from a 
measures based approach towards a standards based. This will impact significantly in 
terms of the stakeholders involved and the policy framework needed to stimulate 
innovation. 
A significant failure arises from the split incentives effect. This refers to situations where 
the investor pays upfront costs for the technology but is not the same person who keeps 
the benefits from lower energy costs. Within the private rental sector this is also known as 
the landlord-tenant divide. Given that 16.5% of all households or nearly 3.8 million homes 
are in the private rented sector 
The non-alignment of incentives occurs at other stages of the construction process. In 
terms of the implementation of renewable energy technology it can between the developer 
and building owner where the developer has no incentive to incorporate renewable energy 
technology. This is worsened by low rates of return and high risks for investments 
Within the construction process itself these divergent incentives can be significant failures. 
Within the pre-construction and design stage, modelling and software are critical. However 
there are no incentives to share learning, made worse by inconsistency in data application 
and compliance. This is a critical failure for the construction process. 
Table 13 Failures in the low impact buildings market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
IEA 
2012
89
; 
TINA 
2012a;
90
 
Slowing 
Down a 
lot 
[High market concentration new construction, 
alongside a fragmented supply chain leading to 
failure to integrate markets effectively.] 
                                            
89 IEA (2012) Renewable Energy Technology Deployment 2012 ‘Business Models for Renewable Energy in 
the built environment. Available: http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RE-BIZZ-final-report.pdf  
90 TINA (2012a) Non-domestic buildings summary report. Technology Innovation Needs Assessment. 
Available: http://www.carbontrust.com/media/218006/tina-non-domestic-buildings-energy-efficiency-summary-report.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
2012b;
91
 FMB 
2008
92
 
Externalities 
TINA 
2012a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IEA 
2012 
Show-
stopper 
“The landlord-tenant divide - where one party has no 
incentive to invest in carbon reducing measures as 
the other party receives the benefit of the 
investment. This also prevents data sharing from 
buildings‟ energy use”. 
 
“Energy costs are not seen as material – occupiers 
place greater premium on the look, comfort and 
productivity of a building rather than its energy use, 
so companies are not prepared to pay a premium in 
rent for a low carbon building” 
 
“The critical failure in modelling and software is due 
to a lack of incentives to share data - neither 
building owners nor operators provide (or even have 
access to) the necessary data on building 
performance. Similarly, developers do not conduct 
modelling incorporating unregulated demand 
(demand arising from appliances rather than 
integrated building services)”. 
 
“The hassle factor is mostly relevant for existing 
residential buildings, where the owners occupy the 
building. In new buildings there is no inconvenience 
related to installing RET, because the installation 
takes place before building users move in. In 
commercial buildings or rented multi- family houses, 
RET are generally installed on the roof or in a 
separate room with technical equipment. In rented 
residential buildings, the decision to invest in RET is 
taken by the owner based on economic 
considerations. Here, inconvenience for the tenants 
is not such an important criterion as in owner-
occupied buildings”. 
Information 
asymmetry 
TINA 
2012a 
 
 
 
IEA 
2012 
Slowing 
down 
“Companies do not have tools or knowledge to 
identify low carbon buildings, in part as there is no 
labelling for high performance buildings outside the 
public sector”. (Also related to capability failure). 
 
“Lack of information about financing options, 
mortgage assessment and transaction costs are 
especially relevant for small scale projects which 
comprise of only one single-family house, which is 
either newly built or owner-occupied. Commercial 
building owners are expected to have more 
                                            
91 TINA (2012b) Domestic Buildings, Summary report. Technology Innovation needs assessment; available: 
http://www.carbontrust.com/media/218010/tina-domestic-buildings-energy-efficiency-summary-report.pdf  
92 FMB (2008) Building a Greener Britain: Transforming the UK's existing Housing Stock. Federation of 
Master Builders. Available: http://www.fmb.org.uk/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=2358 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
knowledge about financing options, and in larger 
buildings or property develop- ments transaction 
costs relative to the size of the investment in 
equipment are lower”. 
Capabilities 
FMB 
2008 
Slowing 
down 
Traditional business model of suppliers lacks 
capability for collaboration 
Network 
 Slowing 
down 
Localised activities result in lack of information and 
knowledge exchange 
Institutional 
TINA 
2012a 
Slowing 
down 
“Existing building regulations are not tight enough, 
sufficiently enforced, or integrated well with planning 
tools”. 
Infrastructural 
FMB 
2008 
Slowing 
down 
Lack of skilled professionals in low carbon and 
renewable technologies  
 “51% report that they feel construction workers 
won’t have these skills for BIM while 78% see real 
need for more training”. 
 
Food 
The agri-science and food sectors comprise part of what is known as the ‘farm to fork’ 
chain, which traces the journey from primary agricultural production to food and beverage 
consumption. Overall, the EU-27 food value chain employed just over 48 million people in 
2008, equivalent to more than 20% of the EU total workforce and around 6% of total 
GDP.93 In addition to the economic weight of the sector, food is of key importance to 
society, as healthy people depend on healthy food systems. 
We discuss the barriers and failures associated with innovation at the beginning of the 
‘farm to fork’ chain in the ‘agri-science’ sector, while the ‘food’ section discusses those 
issues associated with food processing, wholesaling, transport and external trade, retailing 
and consumption. 
Agri-science 
Challenge led area 
‘8 great’ technology 
 
Agri-science is acknowledged as one of the eight great technologies, though with the 
caveat that it is not regarded so much a technology in itself, but rather the application of a 
range of scientific disciplines and technological competencies to the overall field of 
agriculture. Disciplines relevant to agri-science include biology, genetics, climate science 
and meteorology, physics, biochemistry and engineering, though this list is far from 
exhaustive. The technologies that come under this heading include genetic modification 
and optimisation of crops and livestock, satellite-assisted systems to improve planning and 
efficiency of agricultural cycles, improvements in lighting, food and other key conditions 
                                            
93 Eurostat: From farm to fork - food chain statistics. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/From_farm_to_fork_-_food_chain_statistics 
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based on deeper scientific understanding of crops and animals, as well as developments 
and advances in processes and machineries commonly used in the agricultural sector. 
The significance of agri-science stems in large part from the fact that food production is the 
largest single manufacturing sector in the UK, with agriculture as its key cornerstone. 
Given the increasing world population, global food demand rises continuously. To prevent 
the most disastrous consequences, UN forecasts suggest that food production will need to 
increase by 70% between now and 2050.94 Moreover, agriculture is not limited to food 
production: in addition to timber and several other crops traditionally grown for uses other 
than food, there is an increasing demand for biofuels, meaning that arable land for food 
production is becoming ever more of a scarce resource. Aside from the prospect of 
economic growth, successful innovation in agri-science thus also has considerable 
implications from a humanitarian point of view, given the potentially devastating 
consequences that loom if the demands for increased production and efficient use of time 
and space are not met. 
The UK has considerable strengths in this sector, especially in terms of being a world 
leader in basic science related to agriculture. This is true in terms of overall research 
output, but also in terms of specific centres of excellence in this field: the UK-based 
Broadbalk winter wheat experiment is the world’s longest running agricultural experiment, 
having been active since 1843. The John Innes Centre in Norwich and the Pirbright 
Institute in Surrey are just two of the most noteworthy world-leading facilities in the UK. 
However, there is nevertheless a host of barriers to successful innovation in the UK agri-
science sector, and indeed, the literature frequently notes that there has been a noticeable 
decrease in successful innovation over the past decades.95 
As noted, the agri-science sector covers a wide range of different types of product and 
process innovations. This means that while an especially wide range of different barriers to 
innovation exists in the agri-science sector, many of these only apply to some select types 
of innovation. The fragmented nature of the agricultural sector and relative lack of 
cooperation between businesses means that large-scale innovation that would require 
concerted efforts by several businesses are problematic. Likewise, innovations that do not 
require a network can still be hampered by technological lock-ins and long product cycles 
often inherent in large-scale activities like farming. Additionally, many new technologies 
generate benefits that lie outside the key aim of an agricultural business; where a new 
technology meets environmental needs without having immediate discernible economic 
benefit to the individual business, uptake is unlikely to be significant. 
However, whilst these features are significant in individual cases of specific technologies 
or products, these kinds of barriers say more about those specific products and less about 
the agri-science sector as a whole: if an individual product carries no visible capacity for 
economic gain, or has not been suitably designed to be integrated into existing structures 
and processes, further research and development may have the capacity to solve these 
problems and lead to successful operationalisation. More significantly, agri-science 
                                            
94 See eg HM Government Agri-science infographic; available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249259/agri-science_infographic.pdf  
95 see eg David Willets (2013) The Eight Great Technologies. Policy Exchange; available: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/eight%20great%20technologies.pdf  
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innovation overall is severely hampered by a wide range of institutional failures that cannot 
be remedied by agricultural businesses alone. 
The first key institutional failure worth highlighting concerns just one subset of innovation in 
agri-science but, unlike the barriers listed above, this barrier is squarely beyond the realms 
of market solutions. EU legislation on genetically modified (GM) foods presents a complete 
showstopper in this area. Whilst other parts of the world are implementing the results of 
the extensive research in this area, the EU is effectively isolated from these developments. 
The stringent regulations on this aspect is of course partially reflective of public attitudes 
towards GM foods in many parts of Europe, meaning that in this particular regions there 
would still be obstacles and problems regarding consumer interest and marketability even 
in the absence of current regulation. However, the increasing global market for GM foods 
highlights that this is an important area, where as it stands, successful innovation is flat-out 
impossible. Nevertheless, as highlighted above, gene manipulation is just one aspect of 
agri-science and of course all other aspects are not significantly affected by this barrier. 
More applicably to the entire industry, there is a perceived lack of available funds for 
innovation projects in agri-science. This is attributed to the fact that the most visible and 
publicised instruments to make funds available have generally been focused on those 
elements of the food industry that are closer to end-users (i.e. retailers, first tier suppliers). 
What is unclear from the literature is whether there genuinely is a lack of available funds, 
or whether there is merely a perception of this. Though this presents a barrier to innovation 
either way, this distinction will nevertheless be important when contemplating what kind of 
policy solution is advisable here. 
Aside from the EU stance on GM foods, the most frequently cited barrier to successful 
innovation in agri-science is a decreasing level of scientific expertise, especially in the 
shape of a severe breakdown of the link between basic research and appropriate 
development. The lack of scientists in applied research is highlighted by several reports. 
This is often explicitly noted in contrast to the strong basic research in relevant fields. 
Reasons suggested for this disconnect often centre around the UK research evaluation 
exercises (RAE/ REF), which reward high quality research published in peer reviewed 
academic journals, but place considerably less emphasis on successes in applied 
research and development. This is of course a general point that could just as easily be 
said to apply to any other industrial sector in the UK. However, in the case of agri-science 
the translation from basic research to development is additionally problematic as the 
facilities respectively for basic research and product development differ so significantly: 
whilst basic research can generally be done in a laboratory, development often requires a 
demonstration farm, creating an especially large leap in terms of the facilities and context 
between research and development. The compounding problem is then that the past 
decades have seen a reduction in demonstration farms. This factor in conjunction with the 
lack of incentive for researchers to veer more into an applied context presents the most 
significant overall barrier to innovation in agri-science. 
Table 14 Failures in the Agri-science market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
 No 
evidence 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
technology found 
Market power 
UKFCA 
2011
96
 
 
Slowing 
down 
Commercial terms can create barriers to change if 
short term financial and other requirements push out 
medium and longer-term investments in processes 
and technologies. 
Externalities 
UKFCA 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HoL 
2011
97
 
Slowing 
down 
Farming today is much more capital intensive than it 
was in the past. Farms can be locked into a 
particular way of working for a significant period of 
time because, like other businesses, they realise the 
return across the lifecycle of the investment in a 
technology or product. Once a ‘big ticket’ investment 
in equipment and systems is made, the incentive for 
a farmer to make further changes before those 
capital costs are recouped is low. 
 
Agricultural activity is multifunctional and many of 
the joint products are non-market goods and 
externalities, such as landscape features, 
biodiversity and animal welfare. Furthermore many 
of the joint products are negatively correlated with 
the main product. The consequences are first 
conflicts between competing goals (e.g. 
environmental protection and animal welfare as 
discussed by Milne et al., 2008) and second 
over/undersupply of non-market goods typically 
undesirable and desirable non-market goods 
respectively since, by implication, there is a lack of 
reward/penalty for provision of desirable/undesirable 
non-market goods. 
Information 
asymmetry 
UKFCA 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers must currently seek out and finance the 
advice and technical expertise needed to guide 
them through the acquisition of new techniques and 
technologies. Many get the majority of their 
information from the farming press, especially 
segments sponsored and supported by interests that 
are promoting a specific, and often stand-alone, 
approach or solution. The UK farming press is 
generally of a very high standard and a valuable 
addition to information provision on new approaches 
and techniques. But it can be difficult for individual 
farmers to stay abreast of the latest thinking and 
advice, and weigh the competing claims made for 
alternative approaches. 
Capabilities 
UKFCA 
2011; 
see 
also 
HoL 
2011; 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
Farming is now highly technical, both in terms of 
business management functions and in the 
application of new techniques. Basic business 
administration expertise is required to assess cash 
flows and monitor input costs relative to potential 
returns. Farmers must also navigate an increasingly 
                                            
96 UK Food Chain Alliance (UKFCA) (2011) Working Together to Safeguard and enhance UK farming. 
Discussion paper, Spring 2001; available: http://www.ghkint.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=0rDwrLvM4YM%3D&tabid=126 
97 House of Lords (HoL) (2011) Innovation in EU Agriculture – Oral evidence with associated written 
evidence. Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment Sub-Committee; available: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-d/innovation/ieuawae.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
see 
also 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013
98
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sophisticated series of commercial relationships 
relating to the production and supply of produce to 
market. They must understand myriad commercial 
terms, monitor and assess market signals, ensure 
compliance with increasing levels of regulation and 
navigate subsidy frameworks and the associated 
audit process. Together these create genuine 
manpower and financial resource pressures. Proper 
oversight and implementation of these 
arrangements demands a level of legal, compliance 
and financial competence that is far from universal 
among producers. 
Network 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013 
Show-
stopper 
(for large 
projects) 
Across the farming sector, there is a significant 
disparity in relative productivity and performance. 
The top 10% of farms produce more than £180 
output per £100 input while the bottom 10% fail to 
recover their costs. Differences in motivations and 
natural circumstances can partly explain this 
disparity. However, inconsistent levels of 
knowledge, slow uptake of technologies and 
perceived or actual barriers to knowledge transfer 
are often contributory factors. The diversity of the 
UK agri-tech sector makes it difficult for it to unite 
around cross-cutting sectoral issues, such as skills 
or R&D priorities. 
Institutional 
UKFCA 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HM 
Govern
ment 
2013; 
see 
also 
UKFCA 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
 
 
 
Many primary producers face financial constraints – 
including inadequate margins and limited access to 
capital – which limit their ability to invest in their 
businesses. Accordingly, there is less chance of 
them being in a position to make the changes that 
can deliver environmental, social and economic 
improvements. So far, independent examinations of 
business practice and the terms of contract in the 
value chain have focused on commercial 
agreements in the middle, looking at the relationship 
between retailers and first tier suppliers. Proposed 
remedies in these areas, such as the establishment 
of an ombudsman or adjudicator with oversight of 
retailer-supplier relationships, are directed at 
improving outcomes for consumers, and are not 
aimed at ensuring that significant financial resources 
reach the primary production level. 
 
Good regulation sets the conditions for a well-
functioning market that benefits industry and 
consumers and in general the EU has helped create 
these. However, […] the EU regulatory pipeline for 
genetically modified (GM) crops remains blocked. 
This is despite European Commission reports 
finding no scientific evidence associating GM 
                                            
98 HM Government (2013) A UK Strategy for Agricultural technologies. Industrial strategy: Government and 
Industry Partnership, July 2013; available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227259/9643-BIS-
UK_Agri_Tech_Strategy_Accessible.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
2011; 
see 
also 
HoL 
2011; 
see 
also 
CFG 
2009 
 
CFG 
No 
date
99
 
 
 
 
HoL 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
organisms with higher risks for the environment or 
food and feed safety. The EU approach is in 
contrast to other countries: GM crops are now grown 
by 17 million farmers on over 12% of the world’s 
arable land. 
 
 
 
 
The vacuum created by an overemphasis on 
support for basic science at the expense of applied 
science not only blocks the translation of science 
into practice, it also removes innovation at the 
applied level and breaks the contact with industry 
 
The loss of applied demonstration farms, the lack of 
resources for farm extension and a concentration of 
research funding only on RAE published papers, 
has undermined the UK’s capacity to commercialise 
its world class research base. A lack of effective 
communication between innovators and commercial 
businesses and poor communication and 
dissemination activity restricts the take up of new 
developments. 
Infrastructural 
CFG 
2009
100
 
Slowing 
down 
There is a shortage of research scientists involved in 
applied research. One such assessment for arable 
crop scientists by the Rothamsted Research 
Association
101
 indicated how few such scientists 
remain in this sector. In soils there is a dearth of 
expertise remaining which understands the 
interaction between tillage regimes and soil 
structure, soil nutrients, soil water and crop 
establishment.
102
 In livestock there are few 
quantitative geneticists remaining in universities and 
colleges, and those involved in the nutrition of 
livestock and in the management of grazing and 
forage crops are in severe decline. Across crops 
and livestock there has been a significant loss of 
engineers engaged in research leading to practical 
solutions. Since the mid-1980’s the science relating 
to agriculture has become narrower and deeper with 
                                            
99 Commercial Farmers Group (CFG) (No date) The Need for a New Vision for UK Agricultual Research and 
Development. Available: 
http://www.commercialfarmers.co.uk/The%20need%20for%20a%20new%20vision%20for%20UK%20agricultural%20RD.pdf 
 
100 Commercial Farmers Group (CFG) (2009) Response of the Commercial Farmers Group (CFG) to the 
consultation by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council on: Future directions in 
research relating to food security. Available: www.commercialfarmers.co.uk/BBSRCResponse.doc 
101 Mark Tatchell (2005) Scientific skills for knowledge transfer in arable agriculture in England: A Survey. 
Report to the Board of the Rothamsted Research Association 
102 Richard Godwin, Gordon Spoor, Brian Finney, Mike Hann, Bryan Davies (2008) Viewpoint The current 
status of soil and water management in England. Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England. Vol 
169 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
a focus on understanding how organisms work, not 
how this knowledge can be applied. 
 
 
 ‘Farm to fork’ value chain 
Challenge led area 
 
Most of the food that is eaten in the UK passes from this chain of farms to manufacturers 
and further on to food and beverage retailers or consumer services, until reaching the final 
consumers. This section deals with the stages of the value chain that come downstream 
from the primary agricultural and farm production. It discusses issues associated with: 
 The food and beverages manufacturing and processing stage 
 The wholesaling, transporting and external trade of food and beverages 
 The food and beverage retailing and consumption, from the point of view of consumers 
The food and beverage manufacturing sector comprises all companies that process foods, 
starting from relatively simple operations such as cleaning, grading and then preserving, 
tinning or freezing foods, up to more elaborate transformations, such as the production of 
ready-to-eat meals. In 2008, the EU-27 food and beverage manufacturing sector 
comprised almost 288,000 companies, providing more than 5 million jobs and generating 
close to €1,000b of turnover.103 In the UK, the food and beverages manufacturing sector is 
the single largest manufacturing activity, with a turnover of £92b and a GVA of £24bn.104 In 
addition, the sector accounts for 18% of the total turnover of all manufacturing sectors and 
employs around 400,000 people, representing around 16% of the overall manufacturing 
workforce in the country. On average, workers in the sector of food and drinks production 
in the UK are 50% more productive than the EU average in terms of GVA per employee.105 
This comes as a result of a 12% increase in productivity of the labour force during the last 
decade.106 
The UK’s food and beverage manufacturing sector is also a great trading partner internally 
and with the rest of the EU. It exports almost £19b of food and drink products a year, with 
over £12bn of food and non-alcoholic drink exports, 76% of which go to the EU. Internally, 
the sector buys two thirds of all the UK's agricultural produce of British farms. In terms of 
retail, the UK holds the largest food and beverage retail workforce (1.28 million, 17.3 % of 
the EU-27 total) and food services workforce in the EU (1.58 million, 21.6 %).  
                                            
103 Eurostat: From farm to fork - food chain statistics. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/From_farm_to_fork_-_food_chain_statistics 
104 Latest ONS Annual Business Survey 
105 Eurostat SBS statistics (GVA per employee) 
106 Defra (2013) Food Pocket Book 2013. Department for Environment, Food and rural Affairs. 
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This economic activity is carried out by around 7,700 food and drink enterprises, the 
majority of which are SMEs, employing less than 10 people on average.107 However, the 
UK is also home to some food manufacturing and retailing heavyweights such as Unilever 
(with £791m of R&D investment in 2010) 108 and Tesco (with £111m). On the other hand, 
in terms of R&D investment relative to turnover and staff, SMEs tend to be around twice as 
R&D-intensive as large companies.109 In aggregate the sector invested over £1b in R&D 
activities in 2011, which translated into more than 8,500 products.110 Most technological 
innovation activities focus mainly on incremental development of new variants that usually 
involve innovations in packaging, reformulation and branding, hence the large figures of 
new products and product variants. 
In terms of more fundamentally oriented research activity in Food Science, the UK is the 
fifth largest country in the world in terms of scientific output and the second in Europe (only 
behind Spain), with more than 19,000 scientific publications in the period 1996-2007. In 
terms of scientific quality the UK is in the top position in terms of citations per paper 
(19.51) for those countries with productions of larger than 10,000 papers, which evidences 
that research in the field is not only abundant, but also of international relevance.111  
Figure 7 shows the main universities and research institutes that contribute to the UK’s 
science base in this field. In addition to fundamental research, industry R&D is supported 
by initiatives such as the Biosciences KTN, the Food and Drink Innovation Network and 
the Food and Drink Federation, amongst others.  
The main sources of public R&D funding in this field are run by the Technology Strategy 
Board (TSB) and the Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) through measures 
such as the TSB’s Sustainable Agriculture and Food Innovation Platform (SAFIP) and 
BBSRC’s Diet and Health Research Industry Club (DRINC). In terms of overall strategy, 
Defra published the Food 2030 strategy in January 2010.112 Food 2030 was the first 
national food strategy in the UK for over 50 years and it set out the previous Government’s 
vision for a sustainable and secure food system for 2030:  
 Enabling and encouraging people to eat a healthy, sustainable diet 
 Ensuring a resilient, profitable and competitive food system 
 Increasing food production sustainably 
 Reducing the food system’s greenhouse gas emissions 
 Reducing, reusing and reprocessing waste 
                                            
107 UK Food and Drink Federation (2013) Food and Drinks Export Performance. Available at: 
http://www.fdf.org.uk/publicgeneral/ UK-food-and-drink-export-first-half-2013.pdf 
108 BIS R&D Scoreboard. Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208170217/ 
http://www.innovation.gov.uk/rd_scoreboard/downloads/2010_RD_Scoreboard_data.pdf 
109
 Arthur D. Little Limited (2013) Mapping current innovation and emerging R&D needs in the food and drink industry required for 
sustainable economic growth. Final Report to DEFRA, May 2013 
110 Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) and Mintel GNPD 
111 SCImago Journal and Country Rank. Available at: http://www.scimagojr.com 
112 DEFRA (2010) Food 2030: the UK’s national food strategy. Department for Environment, Food and rural 
Affairs. Available at: http://sd.defra.gov.uk/2010/01/food-2030/ 
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 Increasing the impact of skills, knowledge, research and technology113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Main UK’s food and beverage research organisations 
 
                                            
113 Work on this aspects has been taken forward with more recent Defra publications, such as the Sustainable 
Consumption report, published in July 2013 
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Source: Mapping current innovation and emerging R&D needs in the food and drink industry required for sustainable 
economic growth. Report to Defra, May 2013. 
Although the Food 2030 strategy does not necessarily reflect the views of the current 
Government, its overarching priorities are still relevant, as the market and system failures 
existing in the sector align nicely with issues that would stop or slow down the attainment 
of such objectives. Table 15 provides an overview of such market/system failures that 
have been identified in the literature for this sector, which comprise issues spanning from 
manufacturers of food and beverages to failures that manifest at the consumer’s end of the 
chain. 
Table 15 Failures in the farm-to-fork value chain market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Grant 
Thornto
n 
report
114
 
 
 
 
 
Grant 
Thorn-
ton 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defra, 
2013
115
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to raw materials: “Even for commodities 
where the UK is relatively self-sufficient, we are 
price takers rather than price makers in the global 
market. This means that FDM businesses are 
particularly exposed to volatility in raw material 
prices and availability. One way of mitigating this 
risk is to seek to develop more resilient supply 
chains as well as seeking greater trade 
liberalisation” 
 
Access to finance: “Even if funding is overall 
available to fund current operations, SMEs 
acknowledge they have difficulties in accessing 
bank loans for investment”. “There seem to be two 
contradictory versions regarding access to finance. 
On the one hand, banks point out that there has 
been a lack of demand, whilst businesses believe 
that there was not necessarily a significant drop in 
demand, but they are discouraged from applying. 
This is mainly due to the fact that banks have 
tightened lending criteria or are more risk averse 
and, therefore, charge high rates” 
Obtaining funding for technological innovation: “One 
area where a gap was identified concerned the 
ability to fund capex outlay for commercially 
available new technologies, including scaling up and 
turn-key plant. This concerned difficulties in 
justifying and committing funding within businesses 
as well as a lack of externally available funding 
sources. Availability of funding for technological 
innovation was less of an issue than access to it, 
suggesting that consultees and survey respondents 
                                            
114 Grant Thornton (2011) Sustainable Growth in the Food and Drink Manufacturing Industry. Grant Thornton 
report commissioned by the Food and Drink Federation. Available: 
https://www.fdf.org.uk/corporate_pubs/Grant_Thornton_full_report_2011.pdf  
115 DEFRA (2013) Mapping current innovation and emerging R&D needs in the food and drink industry 
required for sustainable economic growth. Report to Defra, May 2013 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
Grant 
Thorn-
ton 
report 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
felt that funding was available, but had difficulties in 
understanding how it fitted together and in being 
signposted to that which was likely to be most 
relevant to them.” 
Balance of power shift in the supply chain over the 
past five years: “Both corporates and SMEs 
surveyed agree that the balance of power has 
shifted gradually towards retailers over the past 
decades. Therefore, in the supply chain the power 
now lies with the retailers because of the sheer 
scale they achieved through consolidation. As a 
result, smaller companies may be obliged to operate 
under reduced profitability, limiting their ability to 
invest in improved product quality and innovation.” 
Externalities 
Rocha, 
2007
116
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurosta
t, 
2011
117
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurosta
t, 2011 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
Externalities associated with some manufacturing 
practices: e.g. “Factory farms create many and very 
significant negative market externalities through 
their operations. Pollution of ground water 
(increasing the cost of purifying water for 
communities nearby), and the foul smell (reducing 
the value of neighbouring properties) are just a few 
of the examples of the negative externalities factory 
farms can create. Thus, while consumers pay a 
lower price for the meat produced by factory farms, 
society at large is incurring a much higher cost for 
food produced in this way – a cost that is not 
captured by the market price.” 
 
Waste: “There are a range of externalities that may 
result from food and beverage processing, among 
which one of the most important is waste. The EU’s 
food, beverages and tobacco processing sector 
generated over 35 million tonnes of animal and 
vegetal waste in 2008, of which some 7.5 million 
tonnes was animal waste from food preparation.” 
“Household waste associated with food essentially 
concerns food packaging and animal and vegetal 
wastes. Animal and vegetal wastes from households 
amounted to 23.8 million tonnes in 2008 in the EU-
27, around 10.8 % of all household waste, and 
equivalent to 48 kg per capita; these levels and this 
share are believed to be underestimates.” 
 
Environmental impact due to over-reliance on 
transported foods: “The transportation of foodstuffs 
can have a considerable environmental impact 
through fuel use for transportation itself (so-called 
food miles) and energy use for refrigeration. Bulk 
foodstuffs have traditionally been transported over 
                                            
116 Cecilia Rocha (2007) Food Insecurity as Market Failure: A Contribution from Economics. Journal of 
Hunger & Environmental Nutrition, 1(4), 2007 
117 Eurostat (2011) Food: From farm to fork statistics 2011 edition. Eurostat pocketbooks. ISBN 978-92-79-
20239-1 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McCor
mick, 
2007
118
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eurosta
t, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
long distances by ship, although increasing use is 
being made of aviation for transporting perishable 
goods. Road freight transportation of agricultural 
products and foodstuffs is largely a national 
operation, although certain foods are moved 
considerable distances around the EU by road – for 
example, fruit and vegetables being transported 
from Spain or the Netherlands.” 
 
Health issues concerning the consumers: 
Obesity: “Individuals may well rationally choose to 
exercise less or eat more than is medically optimal 
in the sense of maximizing life expectancy. If the 
individual bears the full costs of these decisions 
(and is fully informed of the risks), many would find it 
difficult to support government intervention. 
However, if the individual does not bear the full cost, 
‘consumption’ will be higher than optimal and 
society bears the cost of this ‘externality’.” “The 
House of Commons Health Select Committee (HSC) 
recently estimated a subset of these costs, updating 
previous estimates made by the National Audit 
Office. The HSC estimates that the total cost of 
obesity [i.e. for those with a body mass index (BMI) 
greater than 30] and its consequences in England in 
2002 was around £3340–3724 million.” 
 
Issues derived from alcohol abuse: “Alcoholic 
beverages represent an important cultural element 
in several EU regions or countries. Nevertheless, 
harmful and hazardous alcohol consumption can be 
linked to a variety of health problems as well as 
traffic accidents, and can have a broad social impact 
through anti-social behaviour, crime, family and 
work problems. As well as the human 
consequences, alcohol abuse has economic costs, 
for example in terms of absenteeism and increased 
healthcare expenditure.” 
Information 
asymmetry 
Grant 
Thornto
n report 
 
 
 
Defra, 
2013 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
 
 
“There is a public perception that the industry must 
remain ‘traditional’, make use of conventional 
agricultural resources and that the use of new 
technologies such as genetically modified foods or 
nanotechnology might be harmful” 
 
Industry ‘reputation’: “This barrier did not focus on 
the availability of appropriately qualified graduates in 
science and engineering. Instead, it concerned the 
ability of industry to attract scientists and engineers 
from non-food industry related backgrounds into the 
food and drink sector and in particular how to 
energise young scientists and technologists.” “When 
                                            
118 McCormick, B., Stone, I. and Corporate Analytical Team (2007), Economic costs of obesity and the case for government intervention. 
Obesity Reviews, 8: 161–164 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defra, 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McCor
mick 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
questioned further as to why this barrier is apparent, 
some consultees indicated that this was because 
that the industry was considered to be of insufficient 
scientific challenge and interest to those with such 
skills, and to lack clearly defined scientific 
challenges which would enable scientists and 
technologists to publish in the best journals and 
develop a strong scientific reputation. Other 
consultees observed that it could involve an 
unattractive working environment compared to other 
sectors, and that salaries were often higher in other, 
adjacent sectors (e.g. the pharmaceutical industry).” 
 
Resistance to change due to information issues: 
“Reluctance amongst consumers to accept new 
technologies and change existing consumption 
behaviours and purchasing habits was cited as a 
barrier, particularly in terms of how consumers 
perceive the risks associated with novel food 
products and how open they are to embracing the 
use of new, unfamiliar technologies.” 
 
Imperfect information regarding optimal choices for 
consumers: “If individuals do not fully understand or 
accurately perceive the risks and consequences of 
their choices regarding diet, exercise and weight, 
they may make decisions that do not maximize their 
welfare. Imperfect information may take several 
forms in this context – information on the calorie 
content of different forms of food and activity, 
information on the links between calories and 
weight, information on the relationship between 
weight and health risks and costs, etc.” 
Capabilities    
Network 
Defra, 
2013 
Show-
stopper 
“The linkages between food manufacturers and 
retailers were highlighted as being particularly 
strained at times. Some manufacturers felt that they 
were not in control of their own destiny, with a 
strong emphasis by retailers on the promotion of 
own-brand products. Others observed that 
uncertainty was an issue in deciding where to invest 
in technological innovation, and worried that the 
needs of retailers might change at short notice, such 
that a significant investment in a new piece of 
equipment might become redundant if the retailers 
requirements changed (e.g. for a particular type of 
packaging).” “Other issues concerned finding the 
right organisations to partner with for specific 
technological innovation activities, and in 
transferring technologies from the public research 
base (i.e. research institutes and academia) to 
manufacturers.” “Others observed that headway is 
being made in this area – particularly in the 
relationships between retailers and primary 
producers.” 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
Institutional 
Defra, 
2013 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
The ability to make and register health claims: “The 
way in which companies can advertise health 
benefits has recently been tightened up to better 
protect consumers from dubious or misleading 
claims. It is now very costly and difficult to 
demonstrate proven health benefits, such that only a 
small number of products (for example cholesterol-
reducing spreads, yogurts and drinks) now do so. 
Consultees and survey respondents observed that 
this had implications for stifling innovation, in terms 
of the volume of expensive data required by the 
European Food Safety Authority, and the risk of 
claims being rejected in spite of significant effort. 
This is part of broader concerns around the way in 
which research and innovation proposals at the 
European level can influence businesses. Providers 
of raw materials and food manufacturers also 
expressed intense difficulties in making health 
claims for food ingredients (e.g. milk as a source of 
calcium and its impact on skeletal health).” 
Infrastructural 
Grant 
Thorn-
ton 
report 
Show-
stopper 
Skill shortages: “Companies have access to 
sufficient candidates with adequate skills for creative 
positions (sales, marketing), but struggle to find 
suitable candidates for engineering and science 
positions. In particular, companies face issues in 
recruiting food scientists, food nutritionists as well as 
technologists and engineers with the ability to adapt 
complex bespoke automated systems.” 
“The industry’s outdated image leads to a small 
number of students pursuing food and drink related 
degrees or apprenticeships and an inability for 
manufacturers to attract high calibre talent. Over the 
past decade, the number of students enrolled in 
higher education (HE) food and beverage courses 
has been experiencing ups and downs, with the 
latest years seeing an increase of c. 27% between 
2006/7-2009/10. However, students studying 
towards a degree in food and beverages still 
represent only 0.1% of the total student population.” 
 
Transport 
Transport is an especially broad economic sector, which the TSB has described as a 
‘system of systems’ that can be divided into sub-sectors in a number of ways. Transport in 
the respective areas of road, sea, air and rail has several distinctive characteristics for 
instance. Furthermore, the transport sector comprises both the vehicles themselves, as 
well as the infrastructures in which they operate. Additionally, and across these various 
sub-sections and subdivisions, there are private and public components, as well as a wide 
variety of different links connecting and coordinating the various components of ‘transport’. 
For the purposes of the analysis here, there are two distinctive features of the transport 
sector worth highlighting. Firstly, this sector has considerable implications for the UK 
economy not just in and of itself, but in terms of its relationship with most other sectors. 
For instance, the Eddington Transport study estimates that current levels of congestion 
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across all modes of transport costs the UK economy £7-8bn GDP per year. Additionally, 
the excess pollution caused by congestion impacts on the health, safety, and overall 
desirability of urban environments. Both in terms of vehicles themselves and in terms of 
the infrastructure and systems in which they operate, there is a strong case for fostering 
innovation in the transport sector, not least in order to ensure avoidance of adverse effects 
on other sectors.  
Secondly, the transport sector has in recent years become subject to regulation on 
emissions and pollution, resulting from considerations that go far beyond the immediate 
adverse effects noted above, specifically from issues such as climate change and both 
environmental and geopolitical issues resulting from the exploitation of fossil fuels. 
Regulations and agreements to cut greenhouse gas emissions have placed a heightened 
necessity for effective and widespread innovation on the transport sector, leading to a 
heightened need to understanding the barriers to innovation in this area. 
Low carbon car manufacturing 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
Producing an overview of barriers to innovation across the entire transport sector is 
unlikely to yield especially useful results: given its breadth and multiple different sub-
sectors, it is more than likely every single possible failure will be observable in some form, 
with many almost certainly appearing in several different guises across the sub-sectors. 
Identifying a specific area of innovation within the sector is likely to produce are more 
nuanced result. Low carbon technologies provide a useful example with considerably more 
specificity than the sector as a whole. This has been selected as an initial example due to 
the particular urgency for innovation in this area. It is a theme that appears consistently in 
the literature from both UK government departments and from the EU equivalents, and the 
additional significance of the need for innovation resulting from several wider societal 
challenges is self-explanatory. However, even the rather more specific theme of low 
carbon technology has considerable breadth, given that it can feature across all modes of 
transport and all types of vehicles. To narrow down further, JRC provides a useful 
analysis, which is more-or-less fully reproduced by the International Transport Forum: it 
places different modes of transport on a scale ranging from state monopoly to most 
intense competition. Specific types of public transport are at the former extreme end of this 
scale, where monopoly conditions act as a significant disincentive to innovation with 
especially small research activities being typical. At the latter end of the scale is the 
trucking and hgv industry, where competition levels are exceptionally high, and low entry 
and exit barriers result in many small firms operating at small margins, leading to limited 
capacity to cover fixed costs and finance innovation (see also ITF, 2010). Moreover, 
service providers in this area sell a relatively homogenous good that differs mainly through 
price, implying that innovative products contribute only marginally to the total turnover of 
the sector. Car manufacturing is placed in the moderate region of this scale, and is thus 
defined as ‘monopolistically’ competitive. The JRC report notes: 
Unlike other transport sectors that offer a mainly homogenous service, the automotive industry 
aims to differentiate their products between competitors. Innovative products serve as one 
criterion for this branding and may ultimately be one of the 'selling factors' of vehicles, as users 
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are not only price sensitive but also performance sensitive. In consequence, innovative products 
contribute significantly to the turnover of the industry…119 
Out of the various types or ‘modes’ of transportation, the car manufacturing industry thus 
presents what might be termed a ‘best shot’ at identifying an area with comparatively few 
barriers to innovation. Further narrowing down to the specific issue of low carbon 
technology, we have a suitably focused sample case. However, even on this focused 
scale, the literature identifies almost all key market and system failures, sometimes in 
multiple different ways. Though the data in the template contains some failures that apply 
not only to low carbon technology, all are cited specifically in relation to this particular area 
of innovation. 
The barriers to innovation in this area are relatively diverse and are for the most part only 
interrelated to a limited extent. Though not as fiercely competitive as the trucking/ HGV 
sector, competition in car manufacturing is nevertheless highly competitive and capital 
intensive, leading to problems with market entry and high levels of risk when attempting to 
bring new products to the market. Given that issues around climate change and carbon 
emissions are socially contentious and subject to considerable change and fluctuation, 
there is additionally an inherent uncertainty about consumer demand, further augmenting 
the risks involved in innovation. In the case of successful innovation, the competitiveness 
of the industry combined with the visibility of new products leads to especially rapid and 
significant spillovers, resulting in situations where innovators are unlikely to benefit from 
new products for significant periods of time. 
Additionally, there are skill and network related barriers. Though there have been many 
significant changes in the way cars are manufactured, and several hugely significant 
technological developments, the fundamental aspect of internal combustion through use of 
fossil fuels has remained relatively constant. Thus, the need for innovation in this particular 
aspect now requires knowledge and skills not traditionally found in the automotive sector, 
with skills shortages and a lack of networks and expertise to adequately locate and foster 
the newly required skills. 
Finally, there are some especially significant infrastructure failures, although these only 
apply to certain types of products and technologies within this field, specifically those that 
might be termed ‘radical’ rather than ‘incremental’ innovations. In such cases, there can be 
problems of path dependency in the wider national transport infrastructure that can be 
sufficiently severe to stop successful innovation in its tracks. This is particularly the case 
with electrical vehicles, where a nationwide infrastructure of re-charging points would be 
necessary, or any other technology where the existing and long-standing network of 
refilling stations would need to be comprehensively replaced or modified. The extent of 
coordination necessitated by this cannot be delivered by individual businesses alone. 
Table 16 Failures in the low carbon vehicle market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
                                            
119 T. Wiesenthal, G. Leduc, P. Cazzola, W. Schade, J. Koehler (2011) Mapping Innovation in the European 
transport Sector - An assessment of R&D efforts and priorities, institutional capacities, drivers and barriers to 
innovation. JRC European Commission 2011; available: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/26129/1/lfna24771enn.pdf  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
Dept 
for 
transpo
rt
120
 
2007, 
Wiesen
thal et 
al 2011 
Slowing 
down 
Transport technology is highly capital intensive and 
therefore exhibits slow replacement rates. The 
average replacement rate for passenger cars and 
light vehicles is around 10 years. […] Capital 
intensity and slow replacement rates in the transport 
sector inhibit low carbon innovation in a number of 
ways. They make purchasers more risk averse and 
inclined to opt for proven alternatives over new 
technologies. They significantly increase the costs of 
demonstration projects, which are generally an 
essential phase in the innovation process, prior to 
commercialisation. 
Market power 
E4tech 
2007
121
; Dept 
for 
Transp
ort 
2007
122
 
 
 
 
Dept 
for 
Transp
ort 
2007, 
Wiesen
thal et 
al 2011 
Slowing 
down 
Many areas of the automotive sector have relatively 
low profitability, making short-term gains more 
important and feasible than long-term 
developments. Additionally, there is still uncertainty 
about consumer demand for low-carbon vehicles, 
given the debates and lack of decisive public 
awareness on climate change and other factors 
behind the need for innovation in this area. It is 
therefore not possible yet to confirm inherent 
consumer demand. 
 
Capital intensity and slow replacement rates in the 
transport sector […]limit the size of the market open 
to new technologies at any moment in time, and 
thus the speed at which new lower carbon transport 
technologies can achieve market penetration, even 
if other barriers can be overcome. They also 
increase the challenges associated with raising 
capital or new finance to support the development 
and demonstration of new lower carbon options. 
 
Externalities 
Wiesen
thal et 
al 2011 
Slowing 
down 
As the automotive industry is especially competitive, 
spillovers are an especially significant problem. 
However, in the transport sector, it is important to 
consider spillover effects between and within 
subsectors. For example, the rail industry benefits 
from truck engine research. This amplifies the 
benefits that could result overall from spillovers in 
the transport sectors, especially in the case of more 
generally applicable areas such as low-carbon 
technology. 
Information 
asymmetry 
 No 
evidence 
 
                                            
120 Low Carbon transport innovation strategy, Department for Transport, May 2007; available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081022212629/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/scienceresearch/technology/lctis/lctisdocpdf  
121 E4tech (2007) A review of the UK innovation system for low carbon road transport technologies; a report 
for the Department of Transport, E4tech, March 2007; available: 
http://www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/sustainable/refs/transport/e4tech.pdf   
122 Dept for Transport (2007) Low Carbon transport innovation strategy. Department for Transport, May 2007; 
available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081022212629/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/scienceresearch/technology/lctis/lctisdocpdf   
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Failure Source Scale Description 
found 
Capabilities 
Wiesen
thal et 
al 2011 
Slowing 
down 
Lack of skills and knowledge is mentioned as one 
important barrier to transport innovation from both 
industry and public bodies (see e.g. ITF, 2010a,c). 
High-skilled employees will become increasingly 
important in a sector that needs a high pace of 
innovation in order to keep its global 
competitiveness and to comply with stricter 
environmental and safety regulations.  
 
Within transport, in particular the automobile sector 
and road freight sectors that are strongly affected by 
the decarbonisation would need to have a lead on 
clean high-value technologies in order to keep their 
employment levels stable (Dupressoir, 2009). [...] 
Already today, there is some indication of shortage 
of highly skilled workforce in the European transport 
sector 
Network 
JRC 
2011 
Slowing 
down 
Radical innovations on electric battery and fuel cell 
vehicles necessitate knowledge that goes beyond 
the automotive sector (see e.g. Sofka et al., 2008) 
and may involve a wide variety of changes in the 
way mobility is conceived. Hence, the sector needs 
to overcome the institutional lock-in effect and 
create novel cooperation with sectors that lie outside 
of the scope of traditional networks.  
Institutional 
E4tech 
2007, 
jrc 
2011, 
transpo
rt 
forum
123
 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
Uncertainty regarding the likely strength of 
government policy for CO2 reduction, and the 
consequent priority to attach to this issue in terms of 
developing carbon-reduction efficiency. The Stern 
Review emphasises that cuts will need to be made 
in transport emissions in the long term, while 
acknowledging this these may be difficult to meet, 
leading to uncertainty on the necessity or urgency 
for innovation in this area. 
Infrastructural 
E4tech 
2007 
Show-
stopper 
The nature of the UK’s existing transport 
infrastructure can act as a constraint on the 
technological options that are viable or cost-effective 
to introduce, creating infrastructure lock-in. This is 
most evident in the road sector where an extensive 
network of filling stations and refineries has been 
created over many years to support road transport 
based on gasoline and diesel fuels. Replacing this 
network with one based, for example, on the supply 
of hydrogen fuels, or numerous re-charging points 
for electric or part electric vehicles, could be a 
significant undertaking. 
 
Even in the promising and relatively focused area of low-carbon car manufacturing there is 
a broad range of barriers to successful innovation, highlighting the need for public support. 
                                            
123 Transport and Innovation: Towards a View on the Role of Public Policy. International Transport Forum. 
Forum Paper 2010 (No.9); available: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/pub/pdf/10FP09.pdf   
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However, as noted, the transport sector has several distinct sub-sectors, and it is worth 
assessing barriers in some of them, to produce a clearer idea of the range and diversity of 
barriers to innovation. Low-carbon car manufacturing is located in the subsector of 
vehicles production. However, transport includes not just innovation in the manufacture of 
vehicles themselves, but also in the wider systems and infrastructures in which they 
operate. It is worth taking an example from this area, as it is so fundamentally distinct from 
vehicle manufacture, that a significantly different set of barriers is likely to be present. The 
TSB highlights intelligent transport systems (ITS) as a key area of strength in the UK,124 
making this a useful case for further investigation of barriers to innovation. 
Intelligent Transport Systems 
Challenge led area 
Digital services 
 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) comprise various forms of digital systems, services 
and infrastructures that enhance the safety, ease and efficiency of use of the transport 
system. This includes systems aimed at demand management, such as road toll and 
congestion charge systems, where both the operationalising of the system itself, as well as 
products facilitating easier interaction with these systems are relevant. ITS also includes 
information systems for travellers, enabling for instance notification of disruptions, route 
planning, and availability of parking spaces. Systems of this type can also be adapted to 
freight and logistics, as well as to emergency services with systems enabling automatic 
notification of accidents, delays and congestion. Live timetables and integration of different 
modes of transport are further aspects that fall into this category.125  
The importance of innovation in this area is considerable. The economic consequences of 
traffic congestion and inefficient networks are well documented,126 as are the 
environmental consequences.127 It has furthermore been noted that systems to improve 
reliability and planning in the transport system could mitigate other adverse effects on 
individuals, such as personal cost, stress and frustration.128 It is furthermore most likely 
that pressure on transport systems will increase rather than decrease in the future, which, 
combined with financial strains on councils and governments negating many possibilities 
for large scale investments in ‘hard’ infrastructure, will lead to a heightened necessity to 
implement intelligent transport systems wherever possible. The Transport systems 
catapult initiative notes that if the UK does not emerge as a leader in this field, these 
systems will eventually have to be purchased from other countries.129 
                                            
124 Technology strategy board, Transport priority area: https://www.innovateuk.org/transport#action 
125 IBM (2007) Delivering Intelligent Transport Systems – Driving integration and innovation.  Transport 
systems white paper, available: http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/igs/pdf/transport-systems-white-paper.pdf 
126 The Eddington Transport Study (2006) www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/transportstrategy  
127 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006) www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm 
128 Technology strategy board, Intelligent Transport Systems and Services Innovation Platform. Available: 
https://www.innovateuk.org/documents/1524978/1814018/Intelligent+transport+systems+and+services+-
+innovation+platform+%2528Archive%2529/c60fe25f-4504-4286-8c9f-32595606273d 
129 Transport Systems Catapult (2013) Five Year Delivery Plan to March 2018 - Driving the 
UK’s global leadership in Intelligent Mobility, promoting sustained UK economic growth 
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In this area, there is a broad range of barriers to successful innovation. Some of these are 
relatively generic: start-up costs can be high, depending on the type of product. 
Furthermore, there is a distinct lack of knowledge on the part of potential customers about 
what exactly intelligent transport systems can do and what their advantages and benefits 
are. Additionally, there is need for clarification on some matters of liability: in many cases, 
it is so far unclear to what extent manufacturers of an ITS might be liable, if use of their 
product leads to undesirable outcomes (delay, accidents, etc.). However, whilst these 
various issues need to be addressed, especially that of low awareness and understanding 
on the part of potential customers, these are generally not identified as the main barriers to 
innovation in the fields of ITS. The most significant barriers stem from the scale and 
integration required by most ITS products.  
Most ITS products need to draw on data that allows them to cover broad geographical 
areas. The smallest common scale here are city-wide systems, such as the London 
congestion charge and related services, but often they need to stretch further, either 
nationwide or even internationally. A clear example is the data necessary for GPS systems 
in cars, where additional functions such as notification of congestion and accidents require 
data to be available at least nationally, ideally internationally and in a standardised format, 
for products to be suitable for wide distribution. Likewise, systems often require integration 
of live travel information of several different modes of public transport and transport 
systems. The availability of standardised data to be coordinated and adequately 
processed within an ITS product is so far lacking or decisively deficient. Given that this is a 
structural issue requiring coordination and standardisation beyond the capability of the 
companies involved in making the ITS products, there is a critical need for public support 
and a concerted effort to produce a more coherent data infrastructure allowing these 
products to be deployed more easily and widely. 
Table 17 Failures in the intelligent transport systems market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Niches 
2010130 
Slowing 
down 
[Scale is generally quite large for most types of 
products/ systems. The resulting start-up and 
implementation costs create additional difficulties in 
bringing innovations to the market] 
Externalities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Information 
asymmetry 
EU 
2011131 
Slowing 
down 
The lack of easy and efficient access to knowledge 
about the benefits and costs of ITS applications and 
                                                                                                                                                 
and wellbeing. Available: https://ts.catapult.org.uk/documents/2157668/0/Five+Year+Delivery+Plan/17da4867-9309-455a-
afa6-f92abfac357e?version=1.0 
130 Niches (2010) Guidelines for implementors of innovative bus systems. Niches, Coordination action funded 
by EC FP7. Available at: http://www.niches-transport.org/fileadmin/NICHESplus/G4Is/21582_policynotesWG2_3_low.pdf  
131 EU (2011) intelligent transport systems in action – Action Plan and legal Framework for the Deployment of 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) in Europe. Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, European 
Commission  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
services, and about experiences and evaluations of 
ITS implementation is recognised as a key reason for 
slow investment. Decision making for ITS deployment 
on the urban, regional and national level has been 
slow and uncoordinated. […] Investment decisions are 
typically based on awareness and understanding of 
possible options, steered by perceptions of benefits 
versus costs. For decision-makers to be able to give 
full consideration to ITS, they must understand the 
pros and cons of ITS and be aware that ITS make it 
possible to do more than simply add more ‘hard’ 
infrastructure to the transport network. Developing this 
awareness and understanding will help to cement ITS 
as a valid option for mobility-relate problem-solving, 
which should in turn help to boost ITS funding, 
investment and deployment. 
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Network 
EU 2011; 
See also 
ITF 
2010132; 
See also 
Giannout
akes and 
Li 2012133; 
See also 
IBM 
2007134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catapult
135 2013 
Slowing 
down 
(show-
stopper for 
some 
specific 
products) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
Given advances in data-collection technology and with 
growing demand for more precise and real-time 
information, the need for more — and better — data is 
increasing all the time. Yet differences between 
national policies on traveller information and 
information markets across Europe persist. […] 
Accurate road data is needed for in-car navigation 
devices as well as for travel planners and all kinds of 
traffic-management applications. However, data 
shortcomings are restricting the ability of in-car 
systems to consider traffic-management plans or 
routes established by the road authorities. Rules in EU 
countries on the collection of road and traffic-regulation 
data have been uneven and often completely lacking. 
There has also been a lack of standards regarding the 
attributes to be used for recording traffic regulations 
and traffic circulation plans or recommended routes for 
heavy goods vehicles. […] …the potential of ITS to 
make an impact on issues like congestion, safety and 
carbon emissions is at its greatest in urban areas. But 
urban mobility is a complex animal, and the fact that 
responsibilities are spread among many different 
stakeholders can make coordination and consensus 
difficult to achieve. Technical solutions exist — the 
main barriers to further ITS deployment in cities are 
rather organisational, institutional or financial. 
                                            
132 ITF (2010) Transport and Innovation: Unleashing the Potential. International Transport Forum Available: 
http://people.hofstra.edu/jean-paul_rodrigue/downloads/Transport%20and%20Innovation_Leipzig_Summary_JPR.pdf  
133 Giannoutakes KN and Li F (2012) Making a Business case for Intelligent Transport Systems: A Holistic 
Business model Framework. Transport reviews, 32(6) pp781-804 
134 IBM (2007) Delivering Intelligent Transport Systems – Driving integration and innovation.  Transport 
systems white paper, available: http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/igs/pdf/transport-systems-white-paper.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
down  
Very few journeys are made using one mode of 
transport alone. Passengers view journeys from end to 
end and consider comfort, cost and time as they make 
choices before and during those journeys; the 
circumstances can change through a journey, so up-to-
date information is vital –indeed its provision is already 
a growing market. Yet industry, government, 
authorities and operators all work in individual silos –
even the new information systems tend to work on only 
one form of transport. Businesses know that to deliver 
the required commercial, technical and social solutions 
they must work across and between these silos. There 
is currently a market failure with little or no interface or 
interactions between businesses. 
Institutional 
EU 2011 Slowing 
down 
Liability issues raised by the provision or use of ITS 
applications represent another potential barrier to the 
wider market penetration of some Intelligent Transport 
Systems. Liability issues have notably hampered the 
market introduction of intelligent integrated safety 
systems, with legal questions regarding 
product/manufacturer liability and driver responsibility. 
For advanced driver assistance systems, for instance, 
the liability risks may be highly complex — the term 
‘defective product’ is used in the EU product liability 
directive not only in a technical sense but is also linked 
to human factors including system requirements such 
as dependability, controllability, comprehensibility, 
predictability and misuse resistance, which in turn 
brings in human–machine-interaction safety issues. 
Infrastructural 
EU 2011 
See also 
ITF 2010 
See also 
IBM 2007 
Slowing 
down 
(showstopp
er for some 
specific 
products) 
Intelligent digital maps are a basic requirement for a 
whole range of ITS tools. The problem has been that 
the road data needed to produce them is not always 
available, accurate or reliable, with a lack of rules for 
timely updates. This hinders Europe-wide 
interoperability and the development of advanced — 
including safety-related — ITS technologies. The 
challenge is to ensure easy access to the digital road 
databases maintained by thousands of European road 
authorities in a standardised, non-discriminatory and 
transparent way. […] Like other highly complex 
systems, integrated ITS applications need a strategic 
framework — or ‘system architecture’ — as a basis for 
choices concerning their design and deployment, as 
well as for investment decisions. An ITS architecture 
needs to cover technical aspects plus the related 
organisational, legal and business issues. The ability to 
integrate systems in this way greatly increases their 
potential. However, despite the research efforts that 
have been made towards building a European ITS 
architecture (notably through the KAREN and FRAME 
projects — http://www.frame-online.net), only a limited 
                                                                                                                                                 
135 Transport Systems Catapult (2013) Five Year Delivery Plan to March 2018 - Driving the UK’s global 
leadership in Intelligent Mobility, promoting sustained UK economic growth and wellbeing. Available: 
https://ts.catapult.org.uk/documents/2157668/0/Five+Year+Delivery+Plan/17da4867-9309-455a-afa6-f92abfac357e?version=1.0  
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
81 
 
Failure Source Scale Description 
number of EU Member State administrations have 
developed or are using an ITS architecture to deploy IT 
systems and services. In addition, the interoperability, 
continuity of services, multimodality and urban aspects 
of ITS architecture have generally been overlooked, 
and need to be duly addressed. 
Civil aviation 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
Having assessed the relatively generic field of car manufacturing, as well as the service 
and infrastructure-based field of ITS, aeronautics presents a useful final example of a 
transport sub-sector, with a range of barriers to innovation distinct from those outlined here 
so far. 
The significance of the aerospace sector can hardly be overestimated: the sector supports 
over 230,000 jobs in the UK and contributes £24bn per annum to the UK economy.136 
Innovation in this sector has furthermore been acknowledged as generating considerable 
spillovers into other sectors.137 With consistent increase in air travel over the past 
decades, a trend that is highly likely to continue and increase as emerging economies 
become an ever more significant passenger-base, the potential growth by 2031 for the civil 
aerospace market is in excess of US$4.4tn.138 More specifically, it is forecast that nearly 
27,000 new large civil airliners (with a market value of $3.2 trillion) will be needed by 2030 
and by 2020 there will be a global market for around 9,500 civil helicopters (worth around 
$50bn).139 
Aside from this importance of the aerospace sector overall, as well as its contribution to 
the UK economy, it is further worth noting that the UK has the second largest aerospace 
industry in the world, with 17% global market share. However, this strength derives in large 
part from investments in research made in the 1970s and 1980s, and there is a strong 
sense in the literature that there is a danger that the UK may start to rest on these laurels. 
However, as the large emerging economies contribute ever more to demand and 
passenger-base in global civil aviation, they likewise also present increasing levels of 
competition: given the overall significance and projected growth of this sector, many 
countries are engaged in supporting and fostering their own industries in this field.140 The 
                                            
136 see eg Aerospace infographic: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225327/aerospace-sector_infographic.pdf  
137 National Aerospace Technology Strategy (NATS) (No date) SBAC, DTI and Aerospace Innovation and 
Growth team. Available: http://www.enviro.aero/Content/Upload/File/NATS%20brochure.pdf 
138 see Aerospace infographic: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225327/aerospace-
sector_infographic.pdf  
139 ADS (2012) Reach for the skies: A Strategic Vision for UK Aerospace. ADS, The Aerospace Growth 
Partnership, and the Department for Business, innovation and Skills. Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31807/12-954-reach-skies-strategic-vision-uk-
aerospace.pdf 
140 Ibid, p3 
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importance of successful innovation in this field is therefore clear. However, there is an 
especially broad range and severity of barriers to innovation in this area. 
The barrier that features most prominently and consistently in the literature is an 
increasing skills shortage, ranging from new employable graduates in the field to senior 
technicians and postgraduates with the required research expertise. Various reasons are 
given for this in the literature, ranging from inadequate education systems to a preference 
among engineering graduates to specialise in other fields where there are perceptions of 
better opportunities and higher salaries. At present, this is already a considerable barrier to 
successful innovation, but if continued, this trend may make innovation in civil aviation 
ever less likely. 
The second highly significant barrier relates to scale and risk. Aeronautical research and 
innovation is extremely costly, with especially long development cycles. In the first 
instance, this carries very high risks for the firms themselves. However, it also creates 
difficulty for funders outside the firm to decide whether the risks in providing finance are 
worthwhile. The highly competitive market additionally disincentivise long-term gambles. 
A possible solution to some of the excessive financial risks of innovation might be found in 
pooled research and innovation projects, and consequently pooled risk and resources. 
This could be a suitable approach for many potential research and innovation projects, 
especially because the literature frequently notes that the industry has become 
increasingly fragmented: very rarely are entire aircraft built from scratch by a single 
company; there is instead an ever more complex supply chain emerging, as more sub-
components require ever more component-specific expertise. Innovation in this area would 
therefore benefit from more concerted efforts, in order to pool risk and expertise alike. 
However, the literature also frequently notes that the supply chain is fragmented, with little 
formal coordination or overarching research collaboration. Not only does this mean that 
the sector as a whole requires coordination and public support – given the long innovation 
cycles, the literature additionally highlights that a long-term strategy exists for the sector, 
which different actors in the supply chain can rely on when contemplating whether to 
embark on major innovation projects. 
Additionally, for some select areas of innovation, specifically radical innovation involving 
new types of fuel and power for aircraft, a key barrier already highlighted earlier in the 
context of low-carbon car manufacturing is once again present, namely the path-
dependency of present re-fuelling infrastructures, which would require complete overhaul 
for new products requiring different infrastructures to take hold. Though in certain cases 
this is a show-stopping factor, it only applies to relatively few and specific types of 
products. Aside from this issue, civil aviation is overall a sector of huge importance to the 
UK economy, but where barriers to innovation are such that a major long-term sector 
strategy is necessary, which needs to help mitigate risks, coordinating the network of the 
supply chain, and counteract the serious skills shortage. 
Table 18 Failures in the civil aviation market 
Failures Source Scale Description 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
83 
 
Failures Source Scale Description 
Character of 
science and 
technology 
Innova 
2011141 
Slowing 
down 
Respondents [of the survey] rated R&D costs, 
technical risks, long development cycles […] as 
affecting innovation to ‘a large extent’. Also the 
availability of funds for innovation inside and outside to 
firms is perceived as affecting innovation considerably. 
[…] a long technology development cycle, combined 
with high capital investments and low profitability in the 
airline sector put pressure on innovation investments 
which are largely focused on later stages of the 
development cycle. This factor is further amplified by 
the cyclical nature of the sector. 
Market power 
AGP 
2013 
 
 
ADS 2012 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
Barriers to [market] entry are high 
 
 
Access to finance represents a risk to the industry: the 
nature of aerospace programmes, with heavy up-front 
investment costs, and long timescales to make a 
return, makes it hard for finance providers to 
understand risk and deters them from lending. It is also 
clear that there needs to be greater understanding of 
the types and availability of finance available to 
support business 
Externalities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Information 
asymmetry 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Capabilities 
AGP142 
2013, see 
also 
Raytheon 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 ADS 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (in 
future 
potentially 
show-
stopper) 
The current performance of the UK aerospace industry 
in investment in skills is below what it should be, and is 
most pronounced in relation to the use of 
apprenticeships. Only 15% of aerospace companies 
offered apprenticeships in 2009, whereas the UK 
manufacturing average was 18%. A variety of barriers 
prevent or deter employers from investing in training, 
including inability to source from local providers the 
standard of engineering courses required; access to 
finance to support training. 
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https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142625/Lifting_off_implementing_the_strategic_vision_for
_UK_aerospace.pdf  
Evidence of failures in each of the innovation areas 
 
84 
Failures Source Scale Description 
2012 
See also 
Raytheon 
2012143 
The UK aerospace sector suffers from a shortage of 
skilled engineers, particularly at senior technician, 
graduate and postgraduate level. 
 
Network 
ADS 
2012; 
See also 
Innova 
2011; 
See also 
Raytheon 
2012; 
See also 
NATS No 
date 
Slowing 
down 
Given this increasing global competition, the 
performance of the UK supply chain needs to improve 
at a faster rate than seen previously, if we are not to be 
overtaken. This includes suppliers adopting and 
maintaining continuous improvement plans for 
productivity, quality and delivery; taking opportunities 
to develop and incorporate product and manufacturing 
technology improvements; and having highly capable 
financial and supply chain management skills. […] 
moreover, the UK aerospace supply chain needs to 
have the ability to influence product design and 
functionality of future aircraft and engines. This will 
require early engagement with R&D networks during 
design processes. […] There may, in addition, be a 
requirement for some element of consolidation, 
clustering or simplification in the future UK aerospace 
supply chain in order to reduce complexity, enable 
investment in necessary R&D and encourage risk-
sharing collaboration with smaller companies. 
Delivering a detailed exploration of this proposed 
requirement will be another key piece of work for the 
AGP.  
Institutional 
CAA 
2011144 
See also 
Innova 
2011 
Slowing 
down 
Government has an important role to play in shaping 
the future of UK aviation by providing a robust 
framework that sends credible signals about the long-
term direction of policy. Given the long lead times 
involved in delivering aviation infrastructure and in 
developing new technologies, this policy stability will 
be crucial to generating the investment necessary to 
deliver Government’s objectives. 
Infrastructural 
Innova 
2011 
Show-
stopper (in 
select 
cases) 
To prevent technology lock-in two parallel research 
efforts should be pursued at the same time: 
drop-in alternatives of kerosene - renewable fuels that 
can be added / used in the current kerosene 
infrastructure. 
revolutionary aircraft power systems -fuel cell / 
hydrogen that require a new infrastructure and hence 
pose considerable barriers 
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Health and Care 
Regenerative Medicine 
Challenge led area 
‘8 great’ technology 
 
Regenerative medicine is a key area with potential for innovation that has been identified 
by the Policy Exchange think tank as one of the ‘8 Great Technologies’. The exact 
definitions of the field are not always fully congruent in the literature, but overlap 
sufficiently in order to speak of a reasonably well-defined field. Not a discipline in itself, 
regenerative medicine covers several fields, and is generally acknowledged to include 
advanced therapies based on cells, tissue engineering, developmental and stem cell 
biology, gene therapy, cellular therapeutics and new biomaterials. Summarising these 
various components, a textbook definition of regenerative medicine has been noted as a 
therapeutic interventions, which “replace or regenerate human cells, tissues or organs, to 
restore or establish normal function.”145 
Regenerative medicine is a topic of crucial importance, not just as a source of economic 
growth in and of itself, but also in terms of the wider benefits and changes that could be 
generated through innovation in this field. In the context of the economic crises of recent 
years, public health systems are coming under increasing financial pressure, heightening 
the need for new forms of treatment and therapy that can be more efficient than existing 
ones. For example, cell based products are often more expensive than existing 
alternatives due to high cost of manufacturing and distribution.146 
The ageing population especially in developed countries is adding to this pressure 
considerably. Most significantly, there is a strong necessity to shift wherever possible from 
palliative and therefore inevitably long-term treatments to curative treatments. This is 
especially the case for conditions where the latter currently does not exist, such as 
neurodegenerative diseases, and additionally for conditions such as diabetes, where the 
growing problem of obesity has led to increased demand and pressure on health systems. 
Especially for these areas, regenerative medicine has been highlighted as a key source for 
solutions. Besides the economic advantages that would be yielded by the UK becoming a 
leading player in this field, the benefits to public health, as well as the heightened 
capability of the healthcare system to provide curative rather than just palliative treatment 
for several key conditions provide significant grounds to consider the potential for 
innovation in this field. 
Stem cell research – the scientific foundation of regenerative medicine – has been 
conducted in various forms since the 1940s. In this sense, the field has a considerable 
history. However, it was not until the 1980s that the unique characteristics specifically of 
embryonic stem cells were understood. This marked the beginning of extensive political 
debates in all parts of the world about the moral implications of obtaining embryonic stem 
cells. This has resulted in marked differences across the globe regarding the legality of 
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stem cell research using human embryos. Several major industrialised countries have 
banned or severely restricted this type of research, including Germany, Austria and Italy, 
whilst many northern European countries are more permissive. The United States, 
currently the leading nation in both research and innovation in this field, is a particularly 
marked example, with some states enforcing an outright ban and others putting in place 
permissive regulation and financial support. In the case of the UK, there was initially 
cautious legislation in the form of the 1984 Warnock report followed by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 1990. The latter was subsequently amended 
significantly in 2001 and 2008/9, resulting in what has been termed a “…strict but 
facilitating regulatory regime for human embryonic stem cell based regenerative 
medicine.”147 
The comparatively permissive regulatory framework in the UK presents one immediate 
advantage for regenerative medicine in this country. Indeed, the UK has emerged as one 
of the strongest countries in terms of research output on the subject of regenerative 
medicine. Though the US is the undisputed leader in this field, only Germany and Japan 
rival the UK in terms of amount and quality of published research, indicating that there is a 
strong research base to build on. However, there are some significant bottlenecks in the 
UK in terms of translating this research into marketable products. These variously fall into 
the categories of market power through lock-in effects, information asymmetries, and 
capability and infrastructure failures. However, these various sub-components are linked, 
and are centred on one key problem, namely that large portions of regenerative medicine 
have not yet been proven to work effectively, thus falling short of a clear rationale for 
treatments of this type to replace existing treatments on the scale demanded by national 
public health systems such as the NHS. 
The companies that have been involved in regenerative medicine tend to be relatively 
small and the backgrounds of the personnel tend to be considerably more focused on 
science and research rather than development and market knowledge. An international 
survey showed that 85% of firms in this industry have fewer than 100 employees. This 
may in large part be due to the relative novelty of the field, with regulation and legality 
being too uncertain in too many countries for large-scale commercial activities beyond 
research-led endeavours to take hold. Thus, the same survey highlighted a very high level 
of company failure and problems with firm growth.148 The literature in the field consistently 
notes that there is effectively a breakdown in communication between end-users and 
researchers, which goes a long way in explaining the poor performance of commercial 
activities alongside highly successful research activities. But whilst research on the 
science of stem cells is considerable, there is limited evidence on whether products based 
on the research would be effective, both in terms of successful treatment and cost. This 
would be necessary in order to provide the NHS with a clear rationale to replace 
standardised, tried and tested existing treatment on the scale required by such a large 
infrastructure. Lack of understanding of user needs has effectively led to a breakdown in 
the marketability of an otherwise extremely promising field, with a clear case for public 
intervention and support to bridge these barriers. Without a concerted effort to help 
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produce the research confirming efficacy and effectiveness of the developed products, as 
well as enabling firms to access skills and knowledge of end-user needs, successful 
innovation in this field is likely to remain hampered.  
An additional factor compounding this major problem stems from a recent decrease in 
private investment in the pharmaceutical sector more generally. This decline may in part 
be explained by the kinds of inefficiencies and impasses considered above.149 However, 
another significant factor here is the ‘patent cliff’ of 2011/2012, where patents for several 
market-leading pharmaceuticals expired more-or-less simultaneously, leading to an overall 
drop in revenues in the sector. This in combination with more general moves across the 
sector away from catch-all, ‘blockbuster medicines’ towards more wider ranges of targeted 
therapies where profits are more widely spread over different products, has led overall 
private investment to move away to other sectors. Though the main barrier to successful 
innovation discussed above is of a structural nature and could therefore only be mitigated 
to a limited extent through private investment, this issue of a shift away from investment in 
pharmaceuticals is an additional compounding factor worth noting here, as it decisively 
augments the already significant rationale for public support for innovation in the area of 
regenerative medicine. 
Table 19 Failures in Regenerative Medicine 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
science and 
technology 
EPSRC 
2009
150
 
 
Slowing 
down 
Whilst evidence [on cost-effectiveness and positive 
clinical outcomes] is slowly being accumulated, a 
lack of evidence has made it hard to overcome other 
factors. A major constraint on establishing the 
required evidence base is a lack of private or public 
funding for appropriate studies. Companies have 
little incentive to fund research of this sort if sales 
are only likely to be modest. 
Market power 
VALUE
151
 
2012 
Slowing 
down 
A major challenge facing the regenerative medicine 
industry is the need to access adequate levels of 
funding in a timely fashion. However, access to 
capital is an increasing challenge as global biotech 
investment trends have shown a steady decline over 
the past years, reflecting the impact of the economic 
crisis, increased competition by other sectors such 
as the technology sector that generate favourable 
returns over short-time scales, volatile IPO (Initial 
Public Offering) markets and increasing regulatory 
demands for clinical safety and efficacy. 
Externalities  No 
evidence 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
found 
Information 
asymmetry 
EPSRC 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remedi 
2010
152
 
Show-
stopper 
The main reason for lack of uptake is that many cell 
therapy products have limited or unknown clinical 
utility in practice. For a clinician to use a cell therapy 
routinely it needs to meet a number of criteria, 
including be shown to be efficacious, easy to use, fit 
into established services and patterns of care, be 
cost-effective and better than currently available 
alternatives. 
 
One of the reasons for lack of utility is due to poor 
product specification and design. A number of first 
generation cell therapy products were developed 
without significant input from clinical end-users. As a 
consequence, they were difficult to integrate into 
routine practice.  
Capabilities 
Martin 
no date 
see 
also 
Remedi 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
This industry is strongly concentrated around small, 
science-based firms. On one hand, this has led to 
strong capabilities in terms of developing products in 
this highly complex and skill-intensive sector, but 
has also resulted in poor understanding of user 
needs, as expertise in existing companies does not 
have a focus on this, whilst the small size of 
companies creates additional difficulty in creating 
this focus. 
Network 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Institutional 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Infrastructural 
BIS 
2011; 
see 
also 
Remedi 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
A qualitative study for BIS also highlighted that 
trained support staff were needed alongside 
engineers, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 
production staff and Qualified Persons (QPs) to 
release finished cell-based products to deliver 
products effectively. Overall, it was felt that the 
number of staff (both clinical and non-clinical) with 
the necessary core skills and knowledge to deliver 
regenerative therapies was limited.  
Other related issues include problems with the 
storage and short shelf-life of autologous products 
and the long lead time in clinicians receiving 
products. 
Assisted living 
Challenge led area 
 
                                            
152 Williams D, Archer R and Dent A (2010) Building a Viable Regenerative Medicine Industry – A Guide for 
Stakeholders. Remedi. Available: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/lcbe/pdf/building%20a%20 
viable%20regenerative%20medicine%20industry.pdf  
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
89 
 
The TSB recognises that an ageing population in addition to presenting a number of 
challenges, also presents significant opportunities to enhance and extend the contribution 
of human capital. The changing demographic profile provides additional labour, a 
continuing knowledge resource and a social resource. The challenge becomes how to 
retain older adults healthy and engaged in society.153 
The answer lies in being able to redesign services around individuals so they can live 
independently for longer. Assisted living involves promoting independence and dignity 
through the integrated uses of services and technology. 
The developments in assisted living technologies present significant opportunities to 
combine enhanced patient experience and quality of life with increased efficiency and 
improved health outcomes. In the UK alone there is a potential £1bn cost saving with the 
use of tele-health (heavily incorporating telecare), just one of the core assisted living 
technologies.154 
In terms of potential demand, a projected 75m will be over the age of 65 in Europe.155 In 
terms of expenditure the global assisted living technology market is expected to grow from 
£6.2 billion in 2010 to £14.3 billion by 2015. In the UK, this equates to a telehealth market 
worth £35.7 million expected to grow to £70 million by 2015156 and an even bigger telecare 
market worth £106 million in 2010 and expected to grow to £252 million by 2015. Barriers 
towards adoption however, may limit the growth potential. These can occur at both the 
demand side and the supply side. 
Buyers of assisted living technologies may not necessarily be those who use them. 
Information asymmetry is an issue for buyers. In the case of central purchasers such as 
Clinical Commissioning groups, GPs or local authorities in terms of social care, there is a 
lack of awareness of the effectiveness and benefits of assisted living technologies.157  
Moreover, market trends indicate that the market is increasingly orientated around 
assisted living in homes.158 Private individuals, particularly younger members of the ageing 
groups, offer market opportunities directly. On the demand side there is evidence that the 
key themes are, firstly a lack of awareness of assisted living technologies; secondly a 
need for more accessible information to inform consumer choice, particularly in terms of 
where and what to buy.159 The potential exists to increase adoption and acceptance of 
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assisted living technologies by moving beyond the ‘medical model’, where consumers 
accept the advice on solutions from medical experts as they expect them to know the best 
solution, towards a quasi-retail model, where consumers purchase assisted living products 
in much the same way as other goods and services. This could widen access and reduce 
stigmatism of assisted living technologies. The potential is large with expenditure by 
private consumers in 2008 exceeding that of local authorities, with £244m private 
expenditure compared to £177m spent by local authorities. With the potential market 
growing the gap is likely to grow further.160 
A significant barrier to the market achieving potential growth arises from issues of 
standardisation and interoperability of equipment and the extent to which solutions are 
provided over open platforms. As with many network technologies open access to the 
platform can increase the availability of solutions and applications, generating potential 
positive network externalities.161 Relatively short lifecycles for technology can lead to a 
degree of lock-in. Evidence suggests that the costs of switching are too high as low levels 
of interoperability mean that changing equipment can mean having to change the whole 
infrastructure.162 
International variation in medical regimes can impede potential market growth as suppliers 
incur additional costs to tailor technologies to conform to different standards or 
regulations.163 
A consequence of different market structures and regulatory issues could also impede 
growth for UK firms, particularly SMEs. There is a perception that the UK environment for 
patenting software and methods is more difficult than is the case in the US. Larger 
corporations can draw on larger resources to pursue differentiated strategies to optimise 
IP, while UK firms have limited resource to pursue such strategies in the different 
markets.164 The UK supply market continues to be fragmented and, while there has been 
some trend towards mergers and acquisitions, firms are dwarfed by the global market 
players (Barlow et al). Future business models may be more orientated around particular 
groups of players, each potentially involved in all or a number of the elements of the value 
chain, greatly restricting the capability to lead progress towards standardisation.165 
A further important consideration is that of NHS Reform and the integration of health and 
social care services. The integration of health and social care is important for many 
reasons but particularly for the development of assisted living technologies, important for 
the transition of the system to one where people are able to live independently for longer. 
In the past, significant issues have existed around the functional specialisation and 
distinctness of public services, such as health and social care where older people (and the 
taxpayer) may be served best by integrated services but where the historical separation 
between the services has created particular working approaches/technical systems that 
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are not easily connected due to certain incompatibilities. This has led to the diffusion of 
these innovations within the NHS often being slow and in some cases failed166 and so a 
strategic approach to innovation was put forward in the UK Strategy for Health Innovation 
and Life Sciences, to be included in NHS reforms, following a review by the NHS Chief 
Executive of the adoption and diffusion of innovations across the NHS, published in 2011 
to help overcome this barrier. 
Table 20 Failures in the Assisted Living market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Externalities 
 
 
No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Information 
asymmetry 
BIS 
2013
167
 
 
 
COMO
DAL 
2012
168
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
“Low awareness amongst CCGs, GPs, and their 
equivalents internationally, of the proven benefits 
and capabilities of assisted living technologies” 
 
“Trust in the information or advice given is also 
important. Some people have faith that a care 
professional such as an occupational therapist 
would know the ‘best’ solution for them. Much of this 
may arise from the ‘medical’ model approach 
towards ageing and disability, where attitudes 
towards assistive living products and services are 
different to other products and consumers (or 
‘service users’) look to others to know what is best. 
Consumers may lack trust in private retailers’ 
independence and there are anecdotal reports of 
negative experiences, such as people being sold 
unsuitable products. Charities report concern that 
retailers, under pressure to increase profits, may 
pressurise users to top up their prescriptions. For 
high street suppliers of assistive living products, it 
seems that retailer accreditation may be important to 
ensure that ‘individuals don’t have advantage taken 
of them” 
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
                                            
166NHS (2011), Innovation, Health and Wealth: Accelerating Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http:/www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/
digitalasset/dh_134597.pdf 
167 BIS (2013) The Smart City Market: Opportunities for the UK. BIS Research paper no:136, Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills 
168 COMODAL (2012) Unlocking the potential of the younger older consumer: Consumer preferences and the 
assisted living market. Research findings from the COMMODAL project 
Evidence of failures in each of the innovation areas 
 
92 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Network 
BIS 
2013 
 
Barlow 
et al 
2012
169
 
Slowing 
down a 
lot 
“Standardisation and interoperability of equipment to 
which open platforms are utilised”  
 
“Suppliers are particularly concerned about the 
fragmentation of remote care purchasing, 
particularly in the NHS, which makes it difficult for 
them to negotiate and deliver substantial projects.” 
“Suppliers felt that the flow of information, cash and 
resources across boundaries in health and social 
care continues to be a significant barrier to 
investment” 
“Re-procurement of remote care technology is 
estimated to be necessary every three and five 
years, when equipment reaches the end of its 
lifecycle. However, service providers argue it is not 
easy to change suppliers. …..changing suppliers 
can mean changing the whole infrastructure at great 
expense” 
Institutional 
BIS 
2013 
Slowing 
down 
“Disparity in medical regulation regimes globally 
(and even within Europe)” 
Infrastructural 
NHS
170
 
2011 
Show-
stopper 
NHS reform, integration of health and social care 
services. 
 
‘the acknowledgement that whilst the NHS is 
recognised as a world leader in invention, the 
diffusion of these innovations within the NHS has 
often been slow and in some cases failed’ 
 
Stratified medicine 
Challenge led area 
High value manufacturing 
 
While patient treatment has always been personalised by clinicians based upon individual 
circumstances and medical history, the greater understanding of molecular basis of 
diseases has enabled a greater opportunity to narrow categorisation towards 
individualised treatments. 
Stratified medicine171 (or personalised medicine as it is known in the USA) is the tailoring 
of medical treatment to the individual characteristics of each individual or groups of 
patients. It is a multi-faceted approach to patient care that improves the ability to diagnose 
and treat disease as well as increasing the potential for earlier detection, increasing the 
effectiveness of treatments. The approach is very research driven, relying on scientific 
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breakthroughs in the understanding of how an individual’s unique molecular and genetic 
profile make them susceptible to particular diseases. This also enables increased ability to 
predict the effectiveness and safety of particular treatments for each patient. 
The market for stratified medicine is projected to increase significantly, particularly in 
cancer treatments. Estimates of the costs of treatment for new cancers – including 
hospitalisation, screening, surgery, radiotherapy, drugs and diagnostics, amounted to 
$286bn in 2009, although estimates reported by Kings College in 2008 estimated global 
cancer costs at $895bn. Predicted costs are expected to exceed $1 trillion in 2013.172 
The molecular diagnostics market is a closely aligned area within personalised medicine. 
Growth estimates by Price Waterhouse suggest the market will double from $3bn in 2009 
to $6bn in 2015, with substantial growth through cancer companion diagnostics. 
Progression from new developments to clinical practice, in order to achieve economic 
potential faces a number of barriers. These can be categorised within our taxonomy of 
market and systems failures. A theme running through these potential failures is the 
impact on information asymmetry that the need to integrate new partnerships, arising from 
the new integration of molecular diagnostics with traditional pharmaceuticals creates. This 
feeds through into investment decisions and there currently exists potentially socially 
inefficient levels of investment. 
There are significant benefits – both economic and clinical – to stratification. The 
combination of molecular diagnostics and therapeutic agents is increasingly expected to 
inform treatment selection by predicting more accurately the safety and efficacy of 
treatments in specific sub-groups of patients. This has positive social benefits through 
reducing the overall incidence of adverse events through better targeting of treatments, 
reducing uncertainty about the effectiveness of treatments and increasing adoption and 
compliance.   
However, a significant barrier arising from externalities in terms of appropriation of 
investment returns. New personalised drugs narrow the potential market, therefore 
reducing the volume open to pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, there is a 
recognised low level of investment from those who pay the costs of treatments as 
information asymmetry is an important barrier. It is difficult to identify which combination of 
diagnostic test, IT and operational systems will actually achieve cost efficiencies. 
Uncertainty about future revenue streams are further compounded by the continuation of a 
single pricing model for treatments. The research to identify ‘high value’ patients may also 
be hugely costly and complex, reducing research. 
There are also significant costs in implementing new diagnostic tests. While individually 
they are not very expensive, the overall costs can be hugely significant. The view is that 
the difficulty in tracking much earlier stage and experimental testing creates fear and 
uncertainty about the overall eventual costs. There is also a lack of longitudinal accounting 
which would enable payers to capture long-term cost savings from near-term testing. 
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The issue of data security also presents a barrier as private information must be protected, 
particularly at early stages of development. For research to truly benefit from the 
accumulation of genome sequencing data there has to be a high level of enrolment, raising 
privacy and data protection concerns. Moreover, genomic information on its own is only 
part of the story. This information is greatly enhanced when linked to clinical outcomes. 
This would require a secure electronic link between genome databases and health 
records, raising serious technical, ethical and legal issues. 
Established frameworks and legislation are essential to ensure the storage of data is 
secure. In the UK health providers must ensure they have systems in place to meet the 
requirements of the Data Protection Act, with severe penalties for breaches in data 
security. The veracity of data is also a key issue. Test information may be misused, 
particularly at early stages of investigation and development. which may harm patients.  
Because of the complexity, high capital costs and the size of databases being created 
there is increasing requirement for collaboration among many academic groups, public 
institutions and industry, often across international boundaries.173 
Establishing standards in healthcare has always presented challenges. Issues such as 
quality, cost and continuity of care, patient safety concerns are all important. Issues of 
informatics and IT systems, as referred above are all barriers to establishing standards. 
This poses a significant institutional problem among actors in the health sector.174 
 
Table 21 Failures in the Future Cities market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Acade
my of 
Medical 
Scienc
es 
2007
175
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
Companies have little latitude to increase price after 
a drug is marketed – while economists assert that 
price is the best indicator of value in a well-
functioning market, prices are regulated in many 
European countries and face substantial inflexibility 
or, as least inertia in the more open US market. 
Externalities 
The 
Acade
my of 
Medical 
Scienc
es 
Show-
stopper 
“Pharmaceutical companies have low incentives to 
invest in diagnostics that potentially could reduce 
the size of their market. The traditional business 
model for the manufacturers of prescription drugs is 
one of high margin - high risk R&D, with strong IP 
protection, while for diagnostic research the model 
                                            
173
 The Academy of Medical Research (2013) Realising the potential of stratified medicine. July 2013, available: 
www.acmedsci.ac.uk/download.php?i=15909&f=file  
174 Richesson and Krishner (2007) Data Standards in Clinical Research: Gaps, Overlaps, Challenges and 
Future Directions Journal of American Medical Informatics Association, 914: pp687-696 and The Academy of 
Medical Research (2013) Realising the potential of stratified medicine 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
2007 tends to be lower margins, platform based with an 
assumption of high volumes”. 
Information 
asymmetry 
Jakka 
and 
Rossba
ch 
2013
176
 
Slowing 
down 
“it is difficult to identify, which diagnostic tests, 
corresponding assays, information technologies and 
operational systems will truly save costs; (ii) 
although individual diagnostic tests or systems may 
not be very expensive, the overall costs could be 
amazingly high” 
 
“no structures exist that allow payers to assess cost 
savings from prognostic and preventive diagnostic 
testing……Furthermore, the high customer turnover 
of many commercial payers makes it less attractive 
for payers to reimburse prophylactic tests that 
minimize the likelihood of a disease occurring much 
later in life. Also, to differentiate between a 
diagnostic test that actually saves costs on a long-
term basis and tests that create costs, it may be in 
the interests of payers to delay adopting novel 
biomarker-based diagnostics since actual cost 
savings of such tests may not be known until a test 
has been on the market for some time. 
Consequently, the generation of high-quality health 
economics evidence could provide a basis and the 
confidence that enables payers to faster adopt 
diagnostic tests and would align physicians’ 
incentives with patient care, clinical practice and 
outcomes.” 
Capabilities 
 
 
No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Network 
Jakka 
and 
Rossba
ch 
2013 
 
Slowing 
down 
“Mining such data will help to generate 
computational methods and algorithms to predict 
future clinical needs for each patient and to generate 
comprehensive profiles of patient groups. Such 
stratified patient populations and comprehensive 
systems biology approaches will result in powerful 
new diagnostics and therapeutics and provide 
invaluable new insights into prevention. Key to these 
developments will be the integration of medical data 
in the context of the dynamic biological pathways 
and molecular networks in both health and disease 
that are both actionable and predictive and thus 
useful to both clinicians and patients”. 
Institutional 
Jakka& 
Ross-
bach 
2013 
Slowing 
down 
“…establishing standards in healthcare has always 
been very challenging” 
Infrastructural  No  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 evidence 
found 
 
Creative Industries 
Digital services 
 
The types of industries that fall under the category of creative industries include, but are 
not limited to, audio-visual, music, design, performance, publishing, gaming, radio and 
architecture industries. Creative industries have an important stake in contributing to 
productivity by means of (i.) investment in innovation, (ii.) generating knowledge spillovers, 
(iii.) stimulating competition and UK competiveness, and (iv.) stimulating industry uptake 
and the creation of jobs.177 According to the European Commission178 creative industries 
are in a strategic position to generate spillovers in other industries because creative 
industries operate at the intersection of art and business and technology that drive the 
development of ICT applications, consumer electronics, and telecommunication 
devices.179 Overall, the creative industry is a high growth industry. The UK Technology 
Strategy board (TSB) says that 1.4 million people are employed in the creative industries, 
which account for roughly 5.3% of UK output. Both at the UK governmental and European 
governmental there is recognition of the strategic economic potential of creative industry 
development (aside from social and cultural stakes) and this recognition had led to the 
establishment of several policies the specifically target creative industries in the UK. At the 
same time, because the definition of creative industries remains relatively open, there are 
few specific policies that target creative industries. Much of the creative industry comprises 
SMEs, hence, several of the policies that influence the development of creative industries 
are SME policy.  
This section outlines the types of market failures that undermine innovation and 
development in the creative industries. According to BERR the enterprise enablers are: 
culture, knowledge and skills, access to finance, regulatory framework, and business 
innovation.180 Whilst these enablers can promote the development of the creative 
industries, they can also function as barriers to development. And, these barriers are 
closely related to some of the failures. 
A summary of the market failures that influence the creative industries is in Table 22. In 
the creative industries, high levels of market power can be an indication of a consumer 
lock-in effect. The consumer lock-in effect plays a role in, for example, the gaming industry 
where the demand for games is dependent on the type of games console. The consumer 
lock-in effect may create a situation of high market power that stifles innovation. Bakhshi et 
al.181 argue that market dominance can create ‘winner takes it all situations’. As indicated 
                                            
177 BERR (2008) Enterprise: unlocking the UK’s talent. HM Treasury, BERR and Unlocking Talent. Available: 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44992.pdf  
178 COM (2012) 537 final. Promoting cultural and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU. European 
Commission. 
179 The EC COM(2012) 537 builds on the EC green paper COM(2010)183 on unlocking the potential of 
cultural and creative industries 
180 BERR (2008) Enterprise: unlocking the UK’s talent 
181 Bakhshi, H. Hargreaves, I., and Mateaos-Garcia, J. (2013) A Manifesto for the Creative Economy. Nesta 
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in Table 22, under these scenarios, at least in the short-run, market power may slow down 
the innovative capacity of the industry. 
Financing difficulty is one type of failure (i.e. externality) that is pertinent to creative 
industries. Several reports identify that firms which are active in the creative industry 
experience difficulties in raising capital. As a result of these financing barriers firms may 
refrain from investing in otherwise profitable activity. As identified by the TSB (pp. 5),182 the 
reasons that explain why the creative industries struggle to finance investment include 
“high risk valuation of intellectual property and content assets”. 
The creative industries in the UK benefit from a wide range of financial support to help 
overcome the financial barrier. One example of financial aid is the Small Business 
Research Initiative (SBRI) a type of public procurement grant. The SBRI is a type of public 
private partnerships that support SMEs with technological orientation. Ideas are supported 
that are expected that have a specific social value. The SBRI requires the company to 
develop a prototype and to launch the prototype on the market. Alternative financing 
schemes launched by the TSB include Innovation vouchers (grants for SMEs up to £5000 
to partner-up with a knowledge or technology supplier) and the Smart scheme (provides 
seed funding to early stage companies to e.g. conduct market research and develop a 
prototype). EU funds include Eurostars, risk-sharing facility, CIP, and as of 2014, Horizon 
2020.183 At an aggregate level, financing difficulties slow down innovation and 
development. 
One major showstopper in the creative industries is that the private sector fails to grasp 
the value of arts including the value of preserving cultural heritage. Bakhshi, et al.184 state 
that “arts do produce value that can be meaningfully assessed and measured by 
economists, but that they of course produce cultural value which cannot be expressed in 
monetary units.” In this case, the relation between art and innovation is not evident. 
A major constraint to the development of creative industries is the mismatch between the 
knowledge and skills needed to become a successful entrepreneur in the creative 
industries and the formal education and training provided. Specifically, BERR argues 
“business needs innovative people with skills and entrepreneurial drive. The Government 
has a unique and essential role in supporting business innovation, by ensuring there is a 
stock of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) graduates and flexible 
labour markets for them to enter”.185 The TSB find that there is a lack of technical skills 
and experience in digital content creating tools. It is clear that a lack of knowledge and 
skills slows-down the creative process and development. 
                                            
182 TSB (2006) Creative Industries Strategy 2006-2013. Technology Strategy Board 
183 The Risk-Sharing Finance Facility is a debt-based financial instrument created as a joint programme of the 
EIB and the EC. It can access two billion euro in capital, of which half is provided by the EC under the 
Seventh Framework Programme. The programme supports relative high-risk projects by means of financial 
instruments like loans, guarantees, and equity investment. The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme (CIP) provides innovative SMEs, e.g. operating in creative industries, easier access to finance 
and business support services. 
184 Bakhshi, H. Hargreaves, I., and Mateaos-Garcia, J. (2013) A manifesto for the creative economy. Nesta. P 
77 
185 BERR (2008) Enterprise: unlocking the UK’s talent, p 82 
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As identified in the EC communication,186 there are powerful dynamics operating at the 
intersection of different creative industries. However, spillovers are limited, presumably as 
a lack of cross-sectoral network and coordination. In response to such network failures, 
the UK government supports the development of collaborative R&D projects. Knowledge 
Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) are launched with the intention to increase enhance the 
creation and transfer of knowledge by providing a network, and thereby stimulating the 
competitiveness, productivity and performance of business, including those operating in 
creative industries. This type of partnership programmes intend to link agents producing 
new knowledge with agents that commercialize knowledge. KTPs establish partnerships 
between business and (academic) research institutions (and the UK government covers 
roughly two thirds of the cost for SME participation).  
Institutional rules and regulation can both enable the development of creative industries as 
well as block the development. In particular bureaucracy and red tape can be cumbersome 
for small business development. Fortunately, the regulatory framework in the UK is one 
that does not pose serious bureaucratic constraints to doing business. However, social 
rules may form a barrier to innovation in the creative industry. As highlighted in the BERR 
report on creative industries, two types of fears inhibit entrepreneurs: fear of failure and 
fear of dealing with finance. These institutional/cultural constraints can act as long-run 
barriers slowing down innovation and development in the industry. One perspective is that 
creative skills must be better installed from early age by integrating the culture of 
entrepreneurship in to the UK educational system.187 
Two types of failure have not been discussed: information asymmetry and infrastructural 
failure. It may be reasonable to assume that overall, for the creative industries, these types 
of failures are not the most pertinent. At this stage, we have not identified specific 
examples in the literature linking these failures to the innovative development in the 
creative industry. However, we cannot entirely exclude the relevance of these failures 
because the creative industries are heavily influenced by government capital investment. 
For example, the performing arts are heavily dependent on government subsidies, and 
changes in this government budget frequently leads to bankruptcy processes (as is 
experienced in the current crisis). Information asymmetries likewise play a role in the 
relationship between SMEs and credit extensions. Overall, the relationship between these 
types of failures and the creative industries needs to be explored more in detail.  
In the next section, we specifically focus on the role of intellectual property rights 
protection in the design industry. 
Table 22 Failures in the Creative Industries 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
Technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power Bakhsh Slowing “One reason for this market dominance is the 
                                            
186 COM (2012) 537 final. Promoting cultural and creative sectors for growth and jobs in the EU. European 
Commission 
187 See also the 2011 White Paper for Higher Education 'Students at the Heart of the System 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
i, et al. 
(2013) 
pp. 81 
down network effects in Internet platform markets (…) 
which can create ‘winner takes all’ situations (…) . In 
the absence of diversity in demand for different 
platforms, or of easy interoperability between them, 
consumers and business competitors can find 
themselves, at least in the short term, facing 
unacceptable levels of market power”  
Externalities 
Bakhsh
i, et al. 
(2013) 
pp. 63 
BERR 
(2008), 
pp. 48 
 
 
COM(2
012) 
537, 
pp. 4 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 “Barriers to finance in the creative economy”  
 
 
“For a minority of firms, barriers to accessing finance 
persist” 
 
 
“Access to finance remains a major difficulty: the 
banking sector does not have the necessary 
expertise to analyse business models in these 
sectors and does not adequately value their 
intangible assets. The financial and economic crisis 
only makes this situation more critical at the very 
time when investments are needed to adapt” 
Information 
asymmetry 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Capabilities 
Bakhsh
i, et al. 
(2013) 
pp. 96 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
“Today in the UK there is an alarming mismatch 
between the supply and demand for creative skills, 
with severe skill shortages precisely in the Internet-
related areas where UK business s need to 
compete”  
Network 
COM(2
012) 
537, 
pp. 4 
Slowing 
down 
“Powerful dynamics take place at the borderlines 
between various sectors (for instance through 
increased linkages between gaming, film and music) 
and with other industries (such as fashion, high-end 
or tourism). However, the sectors and policies are 
still often organised in sectoral silos, limiting the 
scope for synergies and the emergence of new 
solutions and businesses.” 
Institutional 
BERR 
(2008, 
pp. 52)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BERR 
(2008, 
pp. 16) 
Slowing 
down 
“Confidence in dealing with finance is not high 
compared to other aspects of running a business. 
Some entrepreneurs can therefore lack the skills 
and confidence to access external finance. As a 
result businesses can become inadequately 
capitalised and their survival and growth threatened. 
Some entrepreneurs have strong perceptions that 
accessing the finance will be problematic, which 
discourages them from applying for the finance they 
need.” 
 
“Fear of failure is commonly cited as part of the 
explanation for differences in enterprise and 
businesses formation rates between the UK and US. 
36 per cent of people in the UK compared with 21 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
per cent in the US say that fear of failure would 
prevent them from starting a business” 
Intellectual property rights (see section on design) 
Infrastructural 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Note on a sub-sector: Design 
Failures in design industries are broadly similar to failures in the creative industries. 
Producing a full additional analysis for this sub-sector of the creative industries is therefore 
superfluous. However, it is worth discussing briefly this particular sub-sector, to illustrate 
further the barriers to innovation in the wider creative sector, and also to point out some 
key distinguishing features.  
According to the Big Innovation Centre, design is a “major driver of innovation, enabling 
firms to develop more valuable products and services, and streamline their business 
processes”.188 Nesta even uses data measuring the development of the design industry as 
part of its innovation index; reflecting that a big component of innovation in the UK is in 
intangible (rather than tangible) assets.  
In this section we explore the features that distinguish the success of the design industry 
focussing specifically on the importance of intellectual property. One specific feature of the 
UK design industry is that it largely is a knowledge-based industry that is heavily 
dependent on international markets. 
The design industry has several niches. One way to categorize branches of the design 
industry is as follows: 
 Architectural and engineering services 
 Computer and telecommunications services 
 Printing and publishing 
 Fashion and craft 
 Advanced manufacturing 
 Design services (specialized design and technical activities)189 
                                            
188 Big Innovation Centre (2012). UK design as a Global Industry. International trade and intellectual property. 
Big Innovation Centre & UK Intellectual Property Office, p 14 
189 This categorization of the design industry is used in the document: Big Innovation Centre (2012). UK 
design as a Global Industry. International trade and intellectual property. Big Innovation Centre & UK 
Intellectual Property Office 
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Based on this categorization is it clear that whilst part of the design industry takes place in 
specialized segments of the industry, design also is part of non-design industry. The 
design industry consists of micro enterprises (e.g. largely in the specialized design 
services) as well as large multinational corporations operating across the industry (e.g. 
retail). A relatively large percentage of the design industry workforce is highly skilled. On 
average, roughly 4% of the total UK workforce works as a designer and the largest 
percentage of the design workforce is in the area of graphic design.190  
What makes the design industry of particular interest to the UK economy? A study by the 
UK Design Council191 shows that firms that intensively use design outperform non-design 
intensive firms by 200%. Moreover, 80% of the firms surveyed find that design is important 
for maintaining competitiveness. An additional reason why the design industry is crucial for 
future innovation and development is that the design industry is a major contributor to the 
UK export market. According to the Big Innovation Centre “Around 35% of UK exports 
come from industries that employ higher-than-average concentrations of designers – when 
weighted according to the pay of core designers, design accounts for around 2% of UK 
exports.”192 
Intellectual property rights protection plays an important role in the design industry. 
Innovation in the design industry is challenged by the high level of complexity of the 
intellectually property rights system. The failure of intellectual property rights protection is 
the institutional failure to enable faster, easier, and cheaper protection and enforcement of 
property. The rationale for intellectual property rights protection is the following. The 
protection of intellectual property rights gives firms the exclusive right to capitalize on 
investment in innovative design for a limited period of time, limiting spillovers. As a result, it 
is expected that firms have greater incentives to engage in innovative actively.  
There are four main types of intellectual property rights: trademarks, patents, copyrights, 
and designs. Trademarks are signs used to market goods and services. Patents are 
designed to protect inventions e.g. a process innovation, including formulae. Copyright 
applies automatically to written works such as books but also to clothing designs.193 
‘Designs’ in the UK are either registered (more extensive protection up to 25 years of 
protection) or unregistered (less extensive up of to 15 years of protection and automatic 
protection). ‘Designs’ intend to protect the appearance of a product. There are several 
efforts to consolidate the information in intellectual property rights protection for the design 
industries: e.g. the Centre for Fashion Enterprise offers specific guidance on the topic for 
the fashion industry.194 
                                            
190 Big Innovation Centre (2012) UK design as a Global Industry. International trade and intellectual property. 
Big Innovation Centre & UK Intellectual Property Office 
191 Design Council (2011) Design for Innovation. Facts, figures and practical plans for growth; A Design 
Council paper published to coincide with the Government’s Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth, 
December 2011 
192 Big Innovation Centre (2012) UK design as a Global Industry. International trade and intellectual property. 
Big Innovation Centre & UK Intellectual Property Office, p 5 
193 Grochala, K (2014) Intellectual Property Law: Failing the Fashion Industry and Why the “Innovative Design 
Protection Act” Should be Passed. Student Scholarship. Paper 133. Grochala also notes that property law 
does not apply to clothing, only copyright does. 
194 Centre for Fashion Enterprise (2012) Intellectual property in the fashion design industry 
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‘Designs’ are a form of intellectual property protection that is particularly relevant for the 
design industry. A firm that registers a ‘design’ in the UK does not protect the product from 
being copied aboard. One option is to protect the product across the UK using the 
‘Registered Community Design’. Another option is to apply for protection in specific 
countries separately. Finally, via the Hague system195 it is possible to apply for protection 
in over 60 different countries by completing a single application. Similarly, via the Madrid 
International Trademark System (WIPO) it is possible to register trademarks using a single 
application worldwide. And, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) can be used to protect 
intellectual property on the basis of a single patent in 148 countries (WIPO). The patent 
application process is especially cumbersome; it takes several years, is expensive and is 
highly demanding.  
The Big Innovation Centre outlines two challenges for the design industry: (i.) lack of 
enforceability of a global design rights registration system and (ii.) lack of awareness of the 
range of intellectual property protection instruments that are important for the design 
industry. According to the Big Innovation Centre “Developing service contracts, licensing 
designs and protecting design goods is a complex task for any business, and it is even 
harder to do in international markets. Small businesses often have limited resources to 
enforce their legal rights, and this may prevent them from exporting. It may also be hard 
for smaller businesses to select the right type of intellectual property protection, given the 
diversity of options available”.196 
Aside from the difficulty of enforcing intellectual property rights geographically, the difficulty 
of enforcement of property rights protection also has a different dimension. As argued by 
Grochala, the fashion industry is rampant with counterfeiting. Unauthorized copying is 
inadequately dealt with, so intellectual property rights protection is not taken seriously in 
the industry.197 Similarly Hargreaves argues that designers are sceptical that design rights 
can be enforced (and hence are sceptical that they are worth any level of investment). 198 
Quite differently, Hargreaves also argues that the intellectual property laws designed to 
create incentives for innovation are obstructing innovation today for another reason. The 
argument that the author makes is that innovation is inhibited by stringent copyright 
protection. Specifically, the advances in digital economy and IT have enabled a rapid 
sharing of information, which is now ‘blocked’ by copyrights. The mere expansion of 
available information and its ease of exchangeability have resulted in individuals and 
companies frequently (involuntarily) breaching copyrights. “Widespread disregard for the 
law erodes the certainty that underpins consumer and investor confidence”.199 One view is 
that more clarity is required about copyrights protection and its limits to enable a cultural 
shift to greater respect for intellectual property. 
                                            
195 For more information see e.g. WIPO, The Hague treatment agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Industrial Designs: Main Features and Advantages 
196 Big Innovation Centre (2012) UK design as a Global Industry. International trade and intellectual property. 
Big Innovation Centre & UK Intellectual Property Office, p 6 
197 Grochala, K (2014) Intellectual Property Law: Failing the Fashion Industry and Why the “Innovative Design 
Protection Act” Should be Passed. Student Scholarship. Paper 133 
198 Hargreaves, I. (2011) Digital Opportunity. A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth 
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Partly in response to the administrative complexity – and often the high costs – involved in 
protecting intellectual property rights, a substantial part the UK design industry does not 
rely on property rights protection. As indicated in the Big Innovation Centre report, relative 
to the economic weight of the UK design industry, UK patent registrations are relatively 
low.  
One explanation for the success of the UK as a major exporter of design is the industries’ 
ability to stay at the frontier of ‘knowledge creation’. Knowledge creation, especially, tacit 
knowledge is not easily copied and spread across the industry.  
Financial Services 
Digital services 
 
Once perhaps seen as a slow-moving industry, today the financial services industry is 
dynamic and is a catalyst for technological upgrading and innovation. The types of 
innovation in the financial services that may resonate strongly include the shift to internet 
banking, mobile banking, paperless money, and novel payment systems (along with the 
development of e-commerce and ICT).200 Additional innovations include the advances in 
securitization, use of derivatives, and improvements in the diversification of risk. As a 
result of these innovations, there has been a substantial financial deepening.  
Whist these recent developments are positively related to competitiveness and growth (in 
terms of volume) of the financial sector, the financial services industry is confronted with 
several major challenges that are currently of crucial importance for the sustainable 
development of the industry. As frequently argued, the financial crisis has created 
opportunities to revise the financial services structure, its operations and relevant incentive 
mechanisms. In this section we focus on these various types of challenges to the industry. 
The TSB (in consultation with industrial stakeholders) has defined three groups of 
challenges that are fundamental for the technological development of the financial 
services: (i.) technology knowhow and behaviours, (ii.) know-how markets structure and 
data, (iii) behaviours and trust.201 The challenges for the financial service industry can be 
summarised as consisting of physical technology but also of market intelligence. Whilst 
several of these challenges are not related to failures, as discussed in our context of 
analysis, there are a few specific examples that are worth describing in more detail.  
One of the challenges identified under the category ‘technology knowhow and behaviours’ 
is to identify new technologies that can contribute to enhancing capabilities. One example 
is the need to develop faster flow of high volume market information using models and 
techniques that are secure. Another of the TSB identified challenges is that of generating 
more industry-university collaborations with the objective of enhancing data availability and 
quality. As explained in the document, major difficulties may include that stakeholders are 
                                            
200 See also the work of Berger and Nakata on the effect of ICT and financial service innovations on 
development in less developed economies. Berger, E. and Nakata, C. (2013). Implementing Technologies 
for Financial Service Innovations in Base of Pyramid Markets. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
30(6), pp. 1199-1211 
201 TSB (2010) Financial Services Strategy 2010-2013. Technology strategy Board 
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hesitant to collaborate because of the fear of infringing anti-competition regulations. 
Another possibility is that stakeholders shield intellectual property from competitors. Both t 
are possible explanation of why the financial services industry has not sought support from 
a wider (academic) network. In fact, for the most, the financial industry has little tradition of 
interacting with academia or research organisations in advancing data possibilities.  
According to the TSB, investing in the above described network gap (i.e. network failure) 
can lead to more knowledge transferring and sharing of best practices. Expected 
outcomes of improving network cooperation can lead the overall industry to avoid 
duplicating efforts in addressing common challenges. Moreover, this may also lead to an 
improvement of the IT architecture and infrastructure relevant for risk modelling. 
Several academic papers relate innovation in the financial services to competition levels 
and competition regulation. For example, Bos et al.202 build on the work of Aghion and 
Griffith (2005) to explain the inverse U relationship between competition and innovation in 
the financial services industry. The authors measure innovation using data on the ability of 
US banks to “minimize costs through innovations”. The estimations reveal that a positive 
mark-up (market power) is associated with an optimum level of innovation. The results 
also reveal that (during 1984-2004) US financial deregulation (whilst increasing 
competition) lowered innovation potential below the optimum. 
Whilst this study on the US financial system suggests that competition in the financial 
system is ‘too high’ and therefore yields a ‘suboptimal’ level of innovation, there are 
several rather convincing arguments that there is a ‘too high’ level of market power in the 
industry. ICAEW203 for example argues that regulations in the financial sector are stringent 
and inhibit new competitors to enter the market. In contrast, Kroszner and Strahan204 find 
that “many financial innovations have enhanced the liquidity of assets, firms, and markets, 
improved opportunities for diversification, and increased competition between suppliers of 
credit”. However, the authors also argue that this increase in financial deepening has 
substantially increased the concentration of systemic risk within the system and this has 
caused it to become more vulnerable to crises. 
At the same time, several scholars ague that one of the reasons for the depth of the 
current financial crisis is that the industry is, ‘too big to fail’. Too big to fail refers to the fact 
that the collapse of a bank has a devastating effect on the financial system and the wider 
economy, to the extent that government policy has been to intervene with rescue 
packages to prevent banks from failing. A related problem is one frequently referred to as 
the ‘principal-agent’ problem where the state cannot motivate the financial sector to align 
its behaviour with the preferences of the state (and consumers). More specifically, the 
financial sector, knowing it is ‘too big to fail’ is more liberal in pursuing high-risk activity, 
based on the understanding that in times of losses the state is likely to provide support. 
This argument is likewise related to the behaviour and trust challenges identified by the 
TSB: herd instincts and bonus culture. Bonus culture essentially refers to the high bonuses 
and rewards that are awarded-especially amongst the higher echelons in the financial 
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sector. Thus, whilst those responsible for high-risk activity do not take (full) responsibility 
for financial losses, they do enjoy high bonuses in times of financial boom and, quite 
controversially, also in times of financial bust. Under the ambition of creating a more 
sustainable financial sector, “a change in culture and attitude is needed, with more focus 
on long-term sustainability. Providing services that meet the economic needs of society 
should be placed above short-term profits and bonuses”.205 
The other behavioural challenge identified by the TSB, ‘herd instincts’ is one of the 
underlying reasons why the collapse of one bank is likely to have a devastating effect on 
the entire economy. Herd instinct refers to the phenomena that people move in groups 
without a decisive organization. In reference to the financial sector, this means that groups 
of individuals move jointly in upward trends generating bubbles and move jointly in 
downward trends, possibly generating a financial collapse. In downward trends, individuals 
fear exiting the market too late and incurring losses. Related issues are bank-runs where 
consumers rush to withdraw their deposits leading to insolvency.  
Traditional economic models that are still being used in the financial sector to model risk 
are based on the assumption that individuals behave rationally. However, for example, 
herd behaviour can be described as irrational behaviour. E.g. as referenced to above, 
panic and frenzy can result in a bank run although the bank run, when not restrained, 
causes banks to become insolvent and inevitable leads to a crash where individuals lose 
out. One of the challenges for the development of the financial sector is the development 
of economic models that take into account decision-making processes and irrational 
behaviour.  
The financial system has developed into an increasingly complex system and, partly 
because of this complexity, the system lacks transparency (generating information 
asymmetries). The stability of the financial system is dependent on the trust of consumers. 
New research initiatives aim to better understand the role of trust and trust creation.206 E.g. 
as a result of the lack of political foresight and bonus culture, ICAEW similarly argue that 
“there is a low level of trust in financial services, and a widespread view that finance could 
serve society better.”207 
The increased complexity in the financial sector is also creating capacity failures within the 
sector. One view is that the financial trade has become so specialized that non-specialists 
within the financial system are not in a position to challenge the trade. The most prominent 
example is that of the trade in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and the fragile real 
estate market in the US. The combination of the bonus-culture and the lack of 
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transparency in the management of the system are toxic to the system and have been 
major triggers for the current financial crisis.  
In addition, the increase of financial sector regulation has generated perverse incentives in 
the system. Some regulations are used to the advantage of the big industrial players and 
have led to large-scale detrimental failures that are not easily detected by outsiders. 
Kroszner and Strahan conclude that “regulatory reform should not turn back the clock but 
should, instead, improve the stability of this interconnected financial system by minimizing 
regulatory arbitrage and increasing transparency”.208 Because of the severity of the crisis, 
we argue that the institutional failures (i.e. the bonus culture and the unintended effect of 
regulations) are showstoppers to desirable innovation within the industry and beyond.  
Table 23 Failures in financial services 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Krosz-
ner and 
Stra-
han 
(2011, 
pp. 
242)  
 
 
ICAEW 
(2012), 
pp. 4 
Slowing 
down 
‘Too big to fail’ 
“Many financial innovations have enhanced the 
liquidity of assets, firms, and markets, improved 
opportunities for diversification, and increased 
competition between suppliers of credit” 
 
Regulations in the financial sector are stringent and 
inhibit new competitors to enter the market.  
“In practice, regulation can protect the financial 
services sector rather than consumers by creating 
barriers to entry for new entrants or by creating a 
defence against charges of misconduct by 
complying with rules”. 
Externalities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Information 
asymmetry 
ICAEW 
2012, 
pp. 1 
Slowing 
down 
“In many countries, there is a low level of trust in 
financial services, and a widespread view that 
finance could serve society better” 
Capabilities 
ICAEW 
2012, 
pp. 8 
Slowing 
down 
The financial sector has also become highly 
specialised. Individuals can be experts in narrow 
areas, but lack understanding of wider aspects. This 
deep specialism can make it difficult for non-
specialists to challenge the experts.  
Network 
ICAEW 
2012 
Show-
stopper 
Lack of cooperation with academia, research, 
sharing of best-practices 
Institutional 
ICAEW 
2012, 
pp. 1 
Show-
stopper 
“Bonus culture” 
 
 
                                            
208 Kroszner, S. R.  and Strahan, P. E. (2011) Financial Regulatory Reform challenges ahead. American 
Economics Review, 101(3), pp. 242-246. P245 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
107 
 
Failure Source Scale Description 
 
ICAEW 
2012, 
pp. 4 
“A change in culture and attitude is needed, with 
more focus on long-term sustainability. Providing 
services that meet the economic needs of society 
should be placed above short-term profits and 
bonuses”. 
“Regulation can lead to an emphasis on compliance 
with the rules rather than meeting the objectives 
behind the regulation as it is imposed externally” 
Infrastructural 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Satellites and Space 
‘8 great’ technology 
High value manufacturing 
Digital services 
 
The space sector can be categorised into an ‘upstream’ and a ‘downstream’ sector. The 
upstream sector includes companies that provide services that are related to the launch of 
systems into space including companies involved in the manufacturing of space hardware 
and academia involved in the development of space hardware. The downstream sector 
comprises of companies such as satellite operators and academia (e.g. researchers in the 
field of earth observation) and companies that use satellite technology. Space and satellite 
technology have become part of everyday life: checking the weather forecast, watching 
TV, using the internet, travelling, and more. Space and satellite technology also are an 
important asset to the public sector: in monitoring epidemics, natural disasters and rescue 
operations, such as the detection of forest fires and deforestation. For example, Lynch et 
al. argue that in order to prevent the deforestation of the Amazon, illegal logging needs to 
be monitored using satellite technology and this requires the additional implementation of 
a more novel type of “radar satellites that can ‘see’ through clouds.”209 
The UK space agenda is represented by the UK Space Agency, which was set up in 2010 
replacing the British National Space Centre (BNSC). The International Space Innovation 
centre (ISIC) is a separate entity that focuses on research. Since 2013, the ISIC is merged 
with the newly established Satellite Applications Catapult. Prior to this merger, the IGS 
report released in 2010 suggests the following:  
“there is an overall lack of coherency among the disparate stakeholders in Space and policy 
areas. We attribute this to the lack of horizontal responsibilities between Government 
Departments, and to the current implementation (centred on a partnership of interests) being 
insufficiently inclusive”.210 
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Similar challenges have been identified regarding the lack of coordination of public 
funding. Possibly, the restructuring of the UK space landscape intends to overcome such 
network and coordination failures. As indicated on its website, the Satellite Applications 
aims 
“to become a world-leading centre of business and technology innovation stimulating the 
development of commercially successful satellite derived products and services, supporting UK 
businesses of all sizes, in all sectors, to get maximum benefit from their use of satellite 
technology, and establish links to research groups and like-minded organisations around the 
world to foster collaboration that delivers commercial success and economic growth.”211 
Rather than acting as a funding agent, the catapult seeks to stimulate collaborations 
between different organizations. This catapult may be launched in response to the ‘Death 
Valley’ (a type of network failure) identified in the IGS report where R&D solutions fail to be 
launched in the commercial market (see also IGS, Technologies, Capabilities and 
Facilities Report (overview) volume 3). By better connecting different agents in the space 
market, the catapult may speed up the innovation process, contributing to higher growth in 
the industry and to the overall UK economy.  
The document “a UK Space Innovation and Growth Strategy 2010-2030” (Space IGS) 
outlines the role of the UK space sector in the wider economy. Overall, the space sector is 
a high growth sector with growth rates around 9%. The UK has a substantial share in the 
world space market amounting to roughly 6% of the world market. The vast majority of the 
UK market is captured by a handful of organizations some of which have annual turnovers 
of more than 3 billion pounds.212 For example, according to BIS,213 there are only around 
20 satellite builders in the world. There also are some smaller companies with turnovers 
around 10 thousand pounds active in the UK market. The main reason that most of the 
space industry is concentrated in the hands of a few providers is that there are substantial 
barriers to entry. Capital investment in the upstream space sector is largely irreversible 
(i.e. because investments have little salvage value) and there are few economies of scale 
in the upstream sector. The downstream space sector does have large economies of 
scale. This means that extending the use of space applications/technology to additional 
users has no or low costs.214 In order to ensure incentives to invest R&D, it is possible to 
restrict access to space applications. Moreover, as a result of the skewed cost and 
revenue structure of the industry, organizations are frequently vertically and horizontally 
integrated. 
Overall, it is clear that market power plays a significant role in the space sector, with few 
players dominating the market. However, because of the characteristics of the industry, 
the market power is not a showstopper to innovation. Innovation is (in part) dependent on 
the opportunities created by major players pooling resources. 
As already mentioned, the cost with respect to accessing space products such as 
navigation and internet is close to nil. Also, advances in the sector can have substantial 
knowledge and technological spillovers to other related and unrelated sectors and 
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industries. It is clear that investment in knowledge and technology involves substantial 
initial costs. The returns on successful investments is endangered by competitors that are 
able to use the technology or knowledge to develop similar projects. If innovative produces 
are difficult to protect there are disincentives in the market to invest in innovation. 
Technological and knowledge spillovers include computer software and the miniaturization 
of electronic components.215 A related complexity is that companies will steer investment 
to the opportunity that has the largest possible return on investment and not to the 
opportunity that has the largest ‘social benefit’.  
One type of negative externality in the space sector is that of space debris. Space debris 
refers to the unused satellites and other detritus in space. This type of space pollution is 
largely undesirable and can also be costly when such ‘unused’ satellite collides with 
another ‘active’ satellite or when a satellite crashes to earth. The costs of such collision are 
(usually) borne by the manufacturer of the ‘active’ satellite. Space law, the first treaties 
were signed in 1967, provides some regulation for satellites in orbit even though the 
enforcement of such law remains a challenge. The relation between this type of law and 
innovation is not clear. Another example about the relation between regulation in the field 
of satellites comes from the work of Sohn, who indicates that in Korea the regulations for 
satellite and terrestrial digital media broadcasting are inconsistent and have resulted in the 
failure of both types of broadcasting to the detriment of the development of a national 
market in this area.216 
One of the challenges in the space industry is that of an awareness gap of the 
opportunities in the space industry. The issue of awareness is analyzed in the special IGS 
report ‘ Raising Awareness’. According to this report, the issue of awareness plays a role 
in the general public, the public sector, the private sector, and in the education sector. The 
awareness gap is alike to the concept of information asymmetry and created 
misalignments of opportunities between different actors. For example, the private sector 
not realizing the potential of new space technology for their business development. The 
lack of awareness in the education sector is related to governments’ failure to steer 
education towards skills required in high growths sectors. The degree to which there is a 
skills shortage in the UK space sector remains unclear. Following the ‘Size and Health’ 
survey conducted by BIS skill shortage was not reported by the majority of respondents.217 
The survey respondents that did indicate a skill shortage usually indicated a shortage in 
engineers. Yet, the IGS reported that on the basis of a BNSC survey indicated a 
substantial skills shortage in the space market.  
Table 24 summarizes the evidence regarding types of market failures that play a role in 
the (and satellites) sector. Overall, the identified failures slow innovation down. No specific 
example has been identified regarding the capabilities failure. Yet, as in most sectors that 
involve technical skills it is unlikely that that are no such failures in the space market. We 
have identified network failures as a showstopper to innovation. Despite the efforts of the 
                                            
215 Ibid 
216 Sohn, K. (2013) How Some Regulatory Policies can Undermine the Success of a New Technology: A 
Case Study of Digital Multimedia Broadcasting in South Korea . Keio Communication Review No. 35 
217 BIS (2010)  The Space Economy in the UK: An economic analysis of the sector and the role of policy, BIS 
Economics Paper No. 3 , p. 35 
Evidence of failures in each of the innovation areas 
 
110 
UK government to overcome such failure, it is likely that such failures will persist in the 
future, at times slowing down innovation and at times resulting in missed opportunities.  
Table 24 Failures in the Space industry 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 62 
Slowing 
down 
“SMEs feel they are often playing on an uneven field 
when it comes to competing with large organisations 
and Government research and development 
facilities which sometimes compete with them.” 
Externalities 
BIS, 
2010 
pp. 44 
BIS 
2010, 
pp. 52 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
“The market will not undertake many socially 
desirable projects” 
 
“Space debris is also a source of externality” 
Information 
asymmetry 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 64 
Slowing 
down 
“The IGT has investigated awareness issues 
affecting Space and has found there is an 
awareness gap which, unattended, will act as a 
barrier to the future growth of the sector.”  
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Network 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 61 
 
 
 
 
 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 61 
 
 
 
 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 59 
Show-
stopper 
“Technology concepts originating in R&D often 
emerge in the form of technical papers and patents 
but are unable to grow in maturity through 
development and qualification phase due to an 
effect commonly known as Death Valley. The 
problem is simply that emerging Science side 
technologies receive little push from their originators 
who have no responsibility for exploitation or 
industry.” 
 
“Funding for Space research and development is 
derived from multiple sources including UK 
Research Councils European Space Agency and 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The 
current diverse funding streams inevitably leave 
gaps that preclude continuous and efficient progress 
through the stages of innovation, development and 
industrial implementation”. 
 
“The underlying difficulty for BNSC is that it cannot 
force each partner to take a wider policy view to 
achieve a greater synergy, and nor is it empowered 
to draw down budget from a central source or 
appropriate it from Departments. There is a 
tendency for Departments to resort to brinkmanship 
in the run-up to, and during, ESA Ministerial 
meetings”  
Institutional  No  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
evidence 
found 
Infrastructural 
BIS, 
2010 
IGS 
2010, 
pp. 68 
Slowing 
down 
Some indication of shortage of engineers. 
“The UK Space industry is displaying skills gaps 
within the existing workforce as well as difficulties in 
recruiting sufficient new employees. A 2008 BNSC 
survey indicated that two thirds of vacancies for 
experienced staff and half of vacancies for 
graduates with applied degrees were not filled at the 
first attempt. New employees often lack the skills 
needed to help them make a more positive 
contribution to the business and existing employees 
are missing skills that would make the business 
more efficient and competitive.” 
 
Technologies and sub-technologies 
Having assessed barriers to innovation at the level of sectors and subsectors, specifically 
challenge-led areas and development areas, the analysis now turns to a conceptually 
different set of sectors, namely those centred on specific kinds of technologies rather than 
specific areas of social, political and economic life. Many of the following sectors fall under 
the heading of ‘enabling technologies’, i.e. general purpose technologies that may find 
application in any of the more substantive fields assessed so far, as well as a host of 
others. Specifically, the following sections will cover nanotechnology and advanced 
materials, ICT, electronics, photonics and electrical systems, and biosciences.  
The distinction between Enabling technologies and the rest of technological fields is a 
concept that can be traced back to the literature of the late 90s on General Purpose 
Technologies (GPT). GPTs are technological domains that allow for large, generalised 
leaps in technical progress and economic growth. They are characterised by their 
pervasiveness, as they are mainly used as inputs by other downstream applications, rather 
than on their own. This pervasiveness means that any development or any investment in 
R&D and innovation in such technologies spreads through the entire economy, bringing 
generalised productivity gains.218 In order to correctly classify a technological domain as a 
GPT or an enabling technology it has to satisfy a set of requirements:  
 It is a single, recognisable generic technology 
 Initially has much scope for improvement but comes to be widely used across the 
economy 
 Has many different uses 
 Creates many spillover effects 
                                            
218 T F. Bresnahan, M Trajtenberg (1995) General Purpose Technologies "Engines of Growth?" Journal of 
Econometrics, Annals of Econometrics, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 83-108 
Evidence of failures in each of the innovation areas 
 
112 
Such technologies feed into many different industrial value chains and are often 
multidisciplinary in nature.219 As a result, they create value along the whole chain and have 
the potential to enable innovation in processes, goods and services. In recent years, both 
the UK and the EC as a whole have positioned themselves to be heavily invested in 
supporting research and innovation in such fields. The Technology Strategy Board’s 
overall strategy, Concept to Commercialisation,220 complements the thematic approach of 
supporting promising areas with the focus on enabling technologies, as areas that are key 
to add flexibility in the way new market needs can be addressed. The four enabling 
technologies that are at the core of TSB’s support are: Advanced materials; Electronics, 
Sensors and photonics; Biosciences; and ICT. In turn, the EC has defined a list of the 
most strategically relevant Key Enabling Technologies (KETs),221 consisting of: 
Nanotechnology; Micro- and Nano electronics, including semiconductors; Industrial 
biotechnology; Photonics; Advanced materials; Advanced manufacturing technologies. 
The divergences between the list of enabling technologies of the different individual 
member states and the list of KETs of the EC can be explained by the strengths and limits 
of their research and industrial landscapes. China, Japan and the US are also focusing on 
their own sets of enabling technologies, which include biotechnology, ICT and 
nanotechnology amongst others.222 
Due to their intrinsic characteristics, and taken as an aggregate, innovation in enabling 
technologies exhibits common types of market and systemic failures that can slow down or 
stop development in these fields. This is especially true for a subset of them; those more 
related to the industrial manufacturing world (nanotechnology and advanced materials), 
forming the basis of competences such as high value manufacturing. These three areas 
have very high barriers to market entry and innovation.  
Nanotechnology and Advanced Materials 
Enabling technology 
‘8 great’ technology 
High value manufacturing 
 
The British Standards Institution (BSI) defines nanotechnology as the “Design, 
characterisation, production and application of structures, devices and systems by 
controlling shape and size in the nano-scale, which covers the size range from 
approximately 1nm to 100nm”. In addition, nanotechnology can also include any 
technology that incorporates or employs nano-materials or involves processes performed 
at the nano-scale. Nanotechnology has been characterised as a young but emerging 
general-purpose technology223 that combines all the classic basic sciences and has a 
realistic potential to spur innovation in many vital fields such as healthcare, energy, 
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environment and manufacturing. It is increasingly becoming a widely used pervasive 
technology and exhibits scope for continued technological improvement. 
Estimates for the size of the global market for nanotechnologies range widely, depending 
on their scope. For example, the EC224 expected a global market size of around $27b by 
2012-2015, while the TSB225 expected the market for nano-enabled products to be around 
$81b around the same period. More recent estimates set the global market for 
nanotechnology at $20.7b in 2012, with total sales expected to reach $48.9b in 2017, 
increasing at an annual growth rate of 18.7%.226  
The UK has existing commercial strengths in nanotechnology. It is home to the third 
highest number of nanotechnology companies in general and is also third in number of 
companies focused in applying nanotechnology to healthcare.227 In addition, it has 
renowned expertise in nano-optics and nano-scale materials and has the fourth largest 
number of nanotechnology patents applied for globally. Finally, the UK plays a leading role 
in the development of international nanotechnology standards through the BSI.  
In terms of research and innovation policy, the UK government has had a historically 
longstanding focus on the nanotechnology field. In 2002, the Government published the 
Taylor Report228 and committed £90m funding between 2003 and 2007 to fund the Micro 
and Nano Technology Manufacturing Initiative. In 2007 the TSB took on responsibility for 
the network of MNT Facilities and carried out a strategic review in 2009. This review 
informed the TSB’s Nanoscale Technologies Strategy 2009-12.229 In parallel, the 
Government launched its cross ministerial UK Strategy for nanotechnologies in 2010.230 
Currently, the TSB’s work is focused on a number of market and technology application 
themes and nanotechnology is no longer considered a homogenous industry or a single 
sector.231 Nanotechnology is pervasive across all TSB sectors and programmes and, at 
present time, the TSB manages a portfolio of at least £16.8m in projects involving 
nanotechnology. Moreover, the Nanotechnology Strategy Forum (NSF) acts as an expert 
advisory body, incorporating the views of industry, regulators, academia and NGOs with 
the aim to promote discussion and engagement on strategic issues, in order to advance 
nanotechnology industries responsibly in the UK.  
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Advanced materials have also a pervasive nature. They are used in almost all 
manufacturing industries and underpin many key business sectors. Improving the 
properties of materials has historically been one of the most recurrent industrial innovation 
activities. Nowadays, the term ‘advanced materials’ usually refers to materials whose 
structure has been modified or improved at the micro or nano scale level to satisfy 
particularly demanding requirements of specific applications. Such requirements may 
require special properties in terms of functionality, performance, reliability, user 
friendliness or health and environmental compatibility. Although it is increasingly common 
to tailor materials to specific applications, it is also true that many advanced materials that 
have been developed in the last decades are characterised by having a myriad of 
application areas (i.e. graphene, carbon nanotubes, advanced superconductors and 
composites, etc.).  
The expected size of the global market for advanced materials was estimated at around 
$150b for the period 2012-2015. In the UK, businesses whose core activity is to produce, 
process and recycle materials have an annual turnover of around £197bn and contribute 
GVA of £53bn. Around 75% of European entrepreneurs have seen their material costs rise 
over the last five years and a majority of them expect this trend to continue.  
Uncertainty in future availability of affordable raw materials and energy puts at risk the 
continued development in this area and can put whole industries at risk. As a result, it is 
safe to say that sustainability from an economic, environmental and social perspective is 
one of the main challenges of the development of advanced materials. Advanced materials 
also suffer from long and capital-intensive development cycles, where sustained 
collaboration between multiple disciplines of the research base and the industrial world is 
key in order to ensure that new ideas can eventually lead to tangible improvements. The 
cost of developing and manufacturing products, together with intense competition from 
low-cost manufacturing overseas and a fragmented supply chain dominated by SMEs are 
other challenges that businesses face when developing and testing new designs and 
materials. 
Advanced Materials was identified by the TSB as a priority area and a 2008-2011 
strategy232 was put in place, focusing on advanced materials for three challenge areas: 
energy, sustainability and high value markets. Advanced materials are an integral part of 
the competency in high value manufacturing and, subsequently, the strategy was 
integrated into the more general enabling technologies strategy 2012-2015.  
Both nanotechnology and advanced materials have very high barriers to market entry and 
innovation and are characterised as knowledge intensive and associated with high R&D 
intensity, rapid innovation cycles, high capital expenditure and highly-skilled employment. 
As a result, they are bound to have similar market/system failures. 
Table 25 provides an overview of market/system failures that have been identified in the 
literature for industrial enabling technologies. It comprises issues that affect the topics of 
nanotechnology, advanced materials and high value manufacturing. In some cases, the 
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failures in the literature refer to a particular case in one of these specific technological 
fields, but in most cases the same issues can be sensibly extrapolated to the other areas. 
For the most part, private investors find it difficult to invest in higher-risk, early-stage 
innovation across the two areas.233 This makes it hard for entrepreneurs and innovators to 
develop their ideas to a level of technological readiness that can attract more market 
oriented funding. Moreover, new developments often require further work across several of 
such areas. As a result, substantial R&D investment is required before any technical and 
market feasibilities can be assessed and any productivity gains realised. In order to be a 
first mover and keep the advantage, these investments need to be sustained and properly 
recouped over time. Due to the pervasiveness of enabling technologies, second movers 
usually can benefit from free-rider effects and take advantage of the resolution of 
technological or market uncertainties by the first mover, who carries all the costs and risks. 
Two challenges hinder access to risk capital for nanotechnology and advanced materials. 
First, funding for early stage and fundamental research and development is usually 
focused on technological novelty, rather than on the potential market impact. While such 
funding is necessary, the technologies developed with such support are typically at a level 
of technological readiness where they still need a lot more work before they can be 
commercialised. Secondly, actors such as banks, venture capital funds and business 
angels are very reluctant to invest in such high-risk projects due to the financial crisis and 
the availability of areas with a lower and clearer risk-reward profile (such as clean tech). 
As a result, companies usually agree that funding for basic research is relatively easy to 
obtain234 but lack risk capital for stages such as prototyping, testing and scaling up to 
production volumes or facilities. In some cases, the precondition to secure such funding 
elsewhere is the relocation of the company outside its country of origin. 
Market power failures in nanotechnology and advanced materials are the result of the 
inherent technological complexity and of the economies of scale and scope involved in 
recouping R&D and innovation investments in such areas. As a result, SMEs have a 
pressure to specialise and mainly play roles as specialised knowledge suppliers to large 
companies. In turn, large companies use their organisational and financial muscle to 
deploy such technologies in new products, dealing with issues such as global supply chain 
management and access to raw resources. While this kind of “division of labour” can be 
beneficial to overcome fragmentation, it can also push power from SMEs and consumers 
to large corporations that can dictate the pace of technical advance and appropriate most 
of the margins for high value added products. 
With regard to capability failures, both nanotechnology and advanced materials also suffer 
from a generalised lack of skills. However, in the case of industrial technologies other 
issues exacerbate this failure. First, there is a lack of prospects for finding highly skilled 
manufacturing jobs due to industry outsourcing and offshoring. Second, there are high 
barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs in terms of capital investment. Unlike the start-ups 
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in the digital economy, it is very difficult for a young entrepreneur to start a nanotechnology 
or advanced materials venture due to the comparatively large capital investment required. 
The same holds true for companies in the biotechnology domain. These situations can 
lead to a negative feedback loop whereby degrees traditionally linked to industrial jobs are 
less demanded in favour of those that allow graduates to find jobs or start their own 
ventures more easily. 
Table 25 Failures in nanotechnology and advanced materials 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
science and 
technology 
Bresna
han et 
al, 
1995
235
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
“Our analysis shows that the characteristics of 
GPT's imply a sort of increasing returns to scale 
phenomenon, and that this may have a large role to 
play in determining the rate of technical advance; on 
the other hand this phenomenon makes it difficult for 
a decentralized economy to fully exploit the growth 
opportunities offered by evolving GPT's. In 
particular; if the relationship between the GPT and 
its users is limited to arms-length market 
transactions, there will be "too little, too late" 
innovation in both sectors.” 
Market power 
DTI, 
2011
236
 
 
 
 
 
 
DTI, 
2011 
 
 
 
 
ZEW & 
TNO, 
2010
237
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
lot) 
Size matters: “SMEs play an important role in 
providing inputs and innovative solutions especially 
to large companies. However, SMEs may lack the 
organisational and financial capacity to place new 
products on the global market. Large companies are 
thus more likely to be better capable of deploying 
KETs for innovation advance.” 
 
“Knowledge about manufacturing is often necessary 
in order to exert sufficient control over the entire 
value chain to commercialise a technology. In the 
last decade, commodity production has increasingly 
been outsourced to Asia, leading to a lack of mass 
volume production in Europe.” 
 
“The European market for nanotechnology is 
fragmented, resulting in a lack of critical mass. This 
makes the commercialisation of nanotechnology 
less effective compared to markets in the US, which 
are more unified and less fragmented.” 
Externalities 
Bresna
han et 
al, 
1995 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
“The vertical externality is closely related to the 
familiar problem of appropriability, except that here it 
runs both ways, and hence corresponds to a 
bilateral moral hazard problem (Holmstrom, 1982, 
Tirole, 1988). Firms […] have linked payoffs; the 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ruttan, 
2008
238
 
upstream firm would innovate only if there is a 
mechanism […] that allows it to appropriate some of 
the social returns. The trouble is that [...] implies that 
the private incentive for downstream innovation is 
too low. For appropriability in the familiar range it is 
clear that neither side will have sufficient incentives 
to innovate.” 
 
“The key technical assumptions are generality of 
purpose and innovation complementarities. “Our 
model is a stylized set of related industries with 
highly decentralized technical progress centered 
around the GPT […] These translate in a world of 
imperfect appropriability in two distinct externalities: 
the “vertical” externality between the GPT and each 
application sector, and the “horizontal” one across 
application sectors” (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
1995: 88). This results in a divergence between the 
social optimum and the decentralized Nash 
equilibrium because of the complementarities 
between the two conventional externalities and the 
positive feedbacks that are generated” 
Information 
asymmetry 
ZEW & 
TNO, 
2010 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Norms and values: “Because of the very nature of 
nanotechnology and its environmental, health and 
safety concerns, cluster network organisation have 
to establish a certain work ethic to address these 
issues. Furthermore, external communication and 
public relation of these organisations have to be 
clear to ensure market acceptance and the 
deployment of nanotechnology.” “What this cluster 
lacks is a higher utilisation of knowledge for practical 
applications. Next to information deficits of 
companies, which do not see the potential of 
nanotechnology” 
“European companies are also reluctant to 
approach venture capital funds, unlike companies in 
the US. This is a cultural challenge, which is hard to 
change through policy initiatives.” 
Capabilities 
DTI, 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Show-
stopper 
(especial
ly in 
manufact
uring) 
Access to talent: “The importance of skilled labour 
for competitiveness is widely acknowledged, but 
demographic developments and limited interest of 
young people in studying natural sciences and 
engineering are reducing the talent pool in Europe. 
The limited access to talents in Europe may spur 
off-shoring of knowledge intensive activities such as 
R&D to other world regions.” “High tech companies 
in the EU in KET-related industries are concerned 
about their access to high-skilled labour and access 
to R&D facilities, and many research institutes 
mention difficulties in attracting PhD students in 
science and technology. This, combined with an 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZEW & 
TNO, 
2010 
increased focus and high investments in higher 
education in science and key technological areas in 
China, India, Japan, Korea, and the US, is a 
growing threat and a challenge for Europe not least 
due to different demographics in Europe and its 
competitors.” 
 
“An essential success factor for KETs is a highly 
skilled labour force and a thick labour market 
(Wolfe, 2008). […] A main challenge is to train 
students in cross-disciplinary fields which are 
particularly important for research in KETs. A lack of 
skilled people is a severe problem as it may 
jeopardise current and future KET developments. 
The problem becomes more acute when compared 
to the efforts of emerging economies (such as 
China, India and may south- east Asian countries) to 
catch up with Western economies in education 
levels.” 
Network 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Institutional 
DTI, 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Royal 
Society
, 
2004
239
 
Show-
stopper 
Gaps in the continuous support to all firms in the 
value-chain: “The multinational companies have 
substantial funds and are likely to carry out most 
R&D internally, the SMEs benefit from a large range 
of public support opportunities at both European 
level and in the Member States. However, many 
mid-cap firms […], which do not come under the 
SME definition, face many of the same challenges 
encountered by SMEs, such as lack of internal 
means to ensure the deployment of KETs. Company 
representatives from the mid-cap category of firms 
interviewed for this study state that it is very difficult 
to obtain funding for deployment activities. R&D 
projects with a high potential may remain 
unexploited because national funding schemes will 
not allow inclusion of foreign companies.” 
 
“Recently, a distinction has been made between a 
1st and 2nd Valley of Death. The 1st refers to the 
difficulty that technological innovators face in raising 
funds for the development of their products, and the 
2nd refers to the difficulties in deploying new 
products after development. The 2nd Valley of 
Death is determined by government regulations and 
market support mechanisms, which tend to differ 
between countries. In theory the deployment of 
products will take place in the countries providing 
the most favourable production and market 
conditions. If conditions are not competitive in 
Europe, the technologies developed in Europe (and 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
thus often funded by European governments) may 
be deployed in countries outside Europe. If this 
holds true, Europe could be funding the 
development of new technologies, and the benefits 
would primarily be accrued in other world regions in 
the form of jobs and socio-economic growth.” 
 
“Alongside purely technical barriers to progress are 
those relating to regulation such as classification 
and standardisation of nano-materials and 
processes, and the management of any health, 
safety and environmental risks that may emerge. 
Appropriate regulation and guidance informed by 
scientific evidence will help to overcome some of 
these barriers, and there are already discussions 
between industry and regulators on the above 
issues. Until these regulatory measures are in place, 
industry will be vulnerable to reduced consumer 
confidence, uncertainty over appropriate insurance 
cover (Swiss Re 2004) and litigation should some 
nano-materials prove to be harmful. These issues 
will be of particular importance to the smaller, more 
innovative companies.” 
Infrastructural 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
ICT 
Big Data 
Enabling technology 
‘8 great’ technology 
Digital services 
 
‘Big Data’ generally refers to datasets that are impractical to analyse with traditional 
database tools due to their size, variety and speed of creation. The origins of the Big Data 
concept can be traced back to what was known as the “information explosion”, a term that 
was first used in 1941 according to the Oxford English Dictionary.240 Back then it was 
already noticed that the volume of information generated by society doubled at an ever-
increasing rate and that this would present several challenges in the future. The term Big 
Data was coined during the mid-90s by people at SGI, then one of the most prominent 
American manufacturers of computing for the 3D graphics industry. Later on, with the 
advent of information technologies for all and the Internet the conceptual idea of 
information overload became a practical consideration for all of us, due to our limited 
capacity to cope with the volumes of data that were being continuously generated. More 
recently our ability to generate, communicate, share, and access data has experienced 
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another revolution, made possible by the use of mobile devices loaded with sensors and 
by the use of social networks. Some 90% of the world's digital data have been created in 
the past two years241 and the rate of expansion does not show signs of stopping. 
Nowadays, the term Big Data is used as a more vague concept, encompassing not only 
large datasets but also the hardware and software needed for their analysis. This includes 
all the solutions that deal with the capture, curation, management, processing and analysis 
of these large datasets. What constitutes Big Data is always changing, as the “Big Data" of 
fifteen years ago would not qualify as Big Data by today's standards, thanks to the 
development of new tools and the advancement in available computational power. The 
definition of what constitutes Big Data also varies by sector, depending on the software 
tools and sizes of datasets commonly used in a particular industry. 
The current Big Data market reached $11.59b in 2012 and has been projected to reach 
$18.1b by the end of 2013, an annual growth of 61%.242 In this market we can distinguish 
between Big Data vendors, companies offering services related to the deployment of big 
data technologies and Big Data practitioners. Although continuous growth is to be 
expected from vendors and associated services, Big Data practitioners are the ones who 
are expected to provide more value going forward, especially in vertical markets such as 
retail, media, financial services, aviation and medicine. 
Consumers unwittingly produce most of the data being generated today. When we 
communicate, make payments, take pictures or simply move from one place to another we 
are constantly generating data that are collected and processed somewhere else, usually 
with a commercial purpose. Part of what makes the concept of Big Data so compelling to 
industry is the promise of allowing companies to find answers to questions they previously 
did not know to ask. The use of big data and analytics tools to improve business results 
has already made an impact in the business results of large IT players and in shaping and 
making possible some of the successful business models of the Internet economy. These 
tools can be as varied as  
 Recommendation Engines 
 Sentiment Analysis 
 Risk Modelling 
 Fraud Detection 
 Marketing Campaign Analysis 
 Customer Churn Analysis 
 Social Graph Analysis 
                                            
241 BIS (2013) Big Data: Transforming the data revolution into new products and services – Accelerating the 
commercialisation of technologies. Available at: www.gov.uk/bis/industrial-strategy  
242 Jeff Kelly, David Floyer, Dave Vellante, Stu Miniman. (2013) Wikibon: Big Data Vendor Revenue and 
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 Customer Experience Analytics 
 Network Monitoring 
In 2011, a McKinsey study243 analysed the impact and potential benefits of big data in five 
domains: healthcare in the United States, the public sector in Europe, retail in the United 
States, and manufacturing and personal-location data globally. The study concluded that 
Big Data could unlock more value in each sector by increasing margins, improving 
efficiency and quality and reducing expenditures. Potential additional benefits for the public 
sector are support to policy decision-making processes at all scales and reductions in 
fraud and errors. 
Accenture’s recent analytics study244 reports that a third of the surveyed enterprises larger 
than 1,000 employees in the US and UK are already using analytics and Big Data across 
the board. In addition, two thirds of them have created new management positions (such 
as "Chief Data Officer") to lead data management in the last 18 months. However, there is 
a whole sector of companies where the uptake of these solutions is still slow, such as in 
non-IT SMEs and in industries with very tight margins. These companies are still reluctant 
to undertake Big Data projects due to unclear return on investment, lack of specific 
business use cases, lack of access to skills and concerns over the maturity of the available 
products and services. If such companies do not have the necessary skills on board to 
select vendors to support Big Data initiatives they will be unable to evaluate the products 
and services on offer in the context of how best to monetise Big Data to achieve 
competitive advantages. This is an on-going obstacle for these businesses that poses a 
barrier to the adoption of a sustainable culture of data-driven decision-making.  
On the side of the citizen, user and consumer, the promises of Big Data raise both utopian 
and dystopian ideas.245 Will large-scale datasets and tools help to create cheaper, more 
personalised services and access to public goods? Or will these innovations cause a new 
wave of privacy incursions and invasive marketing? Will data analytics help us understand 
online communities and political movements? Or will it be used to track dissent and 
suppress speech? Big Data can help communities build resilience in the face of 
environmental, political, social and economic stresses by providing useful feedback loops 
of information and knowledge.246 However, the collection and use of massive datasets can 
create new vulnerabilities and risks, enabling discrimination against individuals, skewing 
evidence, and creating dependencies on centralised infrastructures. For example, people 
with lower levels of income and education are not accessing or creating online content 
nearly as much as the more educated middle-class population. If journalists, academics 
and policy makers rely on Big Data analytics in future they risk ignoring issues important to 
many poor and working-class people. Should this situation persist, some authors have 
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already reframed the concept of the Digital Divide247 and identified a Big Data Divide,248 
where the ability or not to exploit these innovations increases the gap between the 
information-rich and the information- poor. Proposing actions that aim to tackle these 
barriers and failures is a good way for government to get involved in ensuring that Big 
Data and innovations derived from it reach all sectors of the population and the economy. 
In addition, measures can be implemented to educate and protect the citizen and 
consumers with regard to the fair and legal use of the data that is collected. 
Science has also been transformed by accelerating change in IT, mainly due to the huge 
increases in computing power and network bandwidth, accompanied by an explosion in 
data volumes and information. On the research front, this information overload caused by 
the creation of huge volumes of scientific data is commonly labelled as the Data Deluge.249 
Big Data innovations and developments have transformed the way of performing research, 
with data-based research becoming more important and increasing needs for data sharing, 
collaboration and cross-disciplinary work, much of it international. This new way of 
conducting research (Figure 8), labelled e-Science, e-Research or Big Science (especially 
when large research infrastructures are present), is much more intensive in the use of 
shared research expertise, large instruments and infrastructures, computing resources, 
and access to collections of primary research data and information. This creates a new 
series of challenges and barriers that need to be tackled if this transition to data based 
science is to be successful. 
Figure 8 Research, curation and publication process of e-Science 
 
Source: From Data Deluge to Data Curation. P Lord, A Macdonald, L Lyon, D Giaretta. UKOLN (2003). 
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Government-level, overall strategies for data stewardship and data infrastructure are 
needed so that research administrators can refer to them and support researchers in their 
evolving roles and duties with regard to data management. In order to extract maximum 
value of scientific data, public policy can, in addition to supporting new technological 
development, tackle critical issues such as data ownership, stewardship, curation, sharing, 
privacy, legal and ethical issues. 
All research intensive countries are positioning themselves to capitalise on the competitive 
advantages that Big Data is bringing about for scientific discovery. In 2010, the EC report 
from the High level Expert Group on Scientiﬁc Data250 explored the main policy 
implications and challenges of the scientific data deluge. The report sets out a vision for 
scientific e-infrastructure in Europe by 2030, supporting seamless access, use, re-use, and 
trust of scientific data. In this vision the data become the main infrastructure and asset, on 
which science, technology, the economy and society can advance. This report contains 
the following set of policy recommendations, aimed at removing the existing barriers to 
achieve such vision  
 Develop an international framework for a Collaborative Data Infrastructure 
 Earmark additional funds for scientific e-infrastructure 
 Develop and use new ways to measure data value, and reward those who contribute it 
 Train a new generation of data scientists and broaden public understanding 
 Create incentives for green technologies in the data infrastructure 
 Establish a high-level, inter-ministerial group on a global level to plan for data 
infrastructure 
In the US, the Obama Administration launched in March 2012 a “Big Data Research and 
Development Initiative” in which six Federal departments and agencies announced more 
than $200m in new commitments to improve the tools and techniques needed to access, 
organise and extract new knowledge from huge datasets. 
In the UK, BIS launched a government strategy to put the UK at the forefront of extracting 
knowledge and value from data. The UK’s data strategy251 was one of the outcomes of the 
information economy strategy published in June 2013 and was carried out in partnership 
with industry and academia. The strategy discusses the following aspects, with the aim of 
setting the direction and leadership for UK’s data capability:  
 Human capital: a skilled workforce, and data-confident citizens 
 The tools and infrastructure which are available to store and analyse data 
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 Data as an enabler: the ability of consumers, businesses and academia to access and 
share data appropriately 
BIS’ strategy includes measures to build capability in the commercial, academic and public 
sector, strengthen skills focused at schools, higher, further education and continued 
professional development and to ensure that the UK’s infrastructure and R&D environment 
supports improved data capability. 
To sum up, Big Data is currently at the heart of modern science and business. Getting to 
grips with the ever increasing amounts of generated data and the desirability of unlocking 
the information hidden within it are now a key themes in most enterprises, as well as in 
most scientific disciplines. From the cited list of relevant documentation, the following 
failures and barriers with a particular impact in the Big Data domain have been identified 
(Table 26). 
Table 26 Failures in Big Data 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Kelly et 
al, 
2013 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Consumer lock-in 
The development of Big Data platforms and tools by 
some large vendors are based on closed, locked-
down solutions instead of open frameworks. This 
can limit the interoperability with competing and 
complimentary products and reduce customer 
choice. 
 
High cost of market entry/exit 
For smaller companies, investments in Big Data 
technologies might be too large and benefits might 
still be unclear (see information asymmetry) 
Externalities 
Boyd, 
Crawfo
rd, 
2012, 
see 
also 
Bellagi
o, 2013 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Decisions by individual consumers to withhold data 
may have large negative externalities for society’s 
overall ability to reap the benefits of Big Data, and 
decisions by individual businesses may have large 
negative externalities for citizens’ privacy. 
Information 
asymmetry 
Kelly et 
al, 
2013 
 
Boyd, 
Crawfo
rd, 
2012 
 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Lack of understanding among enterprises on how to 
extract value from Big Data and unclear ROI 
 
 
Organizational resistance to adopting Big Data 
analytics-driven decision-making to replace “gut 
instinct”-style decision-making. 
 
Lack of best practices and related technologies for 
managing Big Data as a corporate asset, including 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
data quality, data governance, and security 
platforms and tools. 
 
For the public sector: Reticence and concern of the 
citizens with regard to ownership, privacy and 
acceptable limits of use of the information collected 
(see Institutional)  
Capabilities 
Mckins
ey, 
2011; 
see 
also 
Kelly et 
al, 
2013; 
see 
also 
Accent
ure, 
2013; 
see 
also 
BIS, 
2013; 
see 
also 
EC, 
2010 
Show-
stopper 
Insufficient labour market skills, knowhow and ability 
to capture innovative opportunities.  
Enterprises interested in leveraging Big Data must 
be prepared to deal with too few skilled Big Data 
practitioners and raw, immature technology. 
 
In the scientific world immature technology is a 
given but access to skills still represents a problem. 
This shortage is in part because the discipline of 
data science is still not well defined, as it 
encompasses a blend of changing functional areas. 
In order for Big Data to truly gain mainstream 
adoption and achieve its full potential, it is critical to 
overcome the skills gap. 
Network 
Boyd, 
Crawfo
rd, 
2012 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Lack of trust can cause a sub-optimal flow of 
information and level of cooperation between users 
and managers of Big Data systems. 
Institutional 
Mckins
ey, 
2011 
 
Boyd, 
Crawfo
rd, 
2012 
 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Rules and regulations regarding legal, ethical and 
privacy issues. This affects both the commercial 
world as well as government.  
 
In the case of research, ownership, access rights, 
and ethical issues are important to speed up 
adoption. Defining ‘who pays’ and ‘who does what’ 
with regard to preservation and curation of data is 
also necessary to increase adoption and establish 
good processes for data management. 
Infrastructural 
BIS, 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EC, 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
In the case of supporting public research, most of 
the research infrastructures that deal with big data 
are unlikely to be funded and maintained through 
the project funding of specific research groups. Big 
Science is based on large research infrastructures 
of national and international strategic importance 
(i.e. grids, supercomputers, digital repositories, etc.). 
A failure to support them can lead to a slow down to 
the shift to data based e-Science. 
 
Opening up Big Science infrastructures to 
companies without sufficient funds to implement 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
2010 them on their own can help reduce the Big Data 
divide and increase collaboration and knowledge 
transfer, increasing innovation. 
 
Cyber security 
Enabling technology 
Digital services 
 
Cyber security is an area of crucial importance within the broader ICT sector, not just as a 
key area of economic activity in its own right, but also in terms of its significance to all 
other sectors that draw on ICT in any form. Whilst data protection and data safety was until 
relatively recently squarely in the realms of the state, with government intelligence and 
databases the key forms of data to be secured, from the 1970s onwards, the growth of 
information economies led to increasing involvement of the private sector in this field, both 
in terms of producers of privacy and security-enabling products, as well as in terms of 
consumers. UKTI highlights cyber security as one of the key sub-sectors of ICT in the UK. 
Products and services centred on authentication, authorisation, trust, identity 
management, cryptography, cryptanalysis, computer security (largely defence against 
malware), human aspects of security, privacy, information hiding, anonymity, digital rights 
management and watermarking all fall under this heading. With this definition, the UK 
cyber security market is currently estimated to be worth £2.8bn.252 
While cyber security is therefore an area of considerable importance in terms of its own 
size and value this is dwarfed by the scale of economic and social damage that its 
products seek to mitigate. Cyber crime is a much acknowledged and debated problem, 
leading the UK government – among many other countries – to devise a cyber security 
strategy with considerable attached funds and personnel.253 Cyber crime can take many 
shapes, including, but not limited to, identity theft, fraud (both often linked to stealing 
money), government, military and industrial espionage, spreading propaganda, recruitment 
and fundraising for terrorist activities, attacking digital infrastructures, web sites and online 
services for commercial and political reasons alike (‘hacking’). Given this breadth, the 
targets of cyber crime can range from governments themselves and large corporations via 
smaller organisations, right down to private individuals, including vulnerable individuals of 
all kinds. The purely economic annual cost of cyber crime is estimated by UKTI as 
£26.9bn.254 This is however likely to be a conservative estimate: whilst loss incurred 
through corruption, apprehension or destruction of data, as well as apprehension of money 
through fraud and identify theft can be measured, the existence and prevalence of cyber 
crime has additionally made consumers cautious. Given the known risks, many potential 
consumers in the digital sphere are reluctant to conduct online purchases and other forms 
of e-commerce, thus stifling many opportunities for new economic activity and business 
growth. 
                                            
252 See UKTI ICT sector opportunities: http://www.ukti.gov.uk/pt_pt/investintheuk/sectoropportunities/ict.html?null  
253 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-
final.pdf  
254 See UKTI ICT sector opportunities: http://www.ukti.gov.uk/pt_pt/investintheuk/sectoropportunities/ict.html?null 
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The need for a well-functioning, innovative and efficient cyber-security industry is therefore 
abundantly clear. The continuing damage wrought by cyber crime is in itself a clear 
indication that this is currently not in place. Responding to this, there is a growing body of 
literature and research on cyber security and its apparent shortcomings. Much of this 
literature does not relate exclusively – or even chiefly – to innovation, but covers the area 
in much broader terms, including aspects such as differences in laws on and policing of 
cyber crime, where national differences complicate arrest and prosecution of cyber 
criminals. However, a substantial portion of this literature does focus also on barriers to 
successful innovation in cyber security. There are some problems worth highlighting 
initially before turning to the main barrier. 
First, in the case of some types of products, the existence of relatively few, relatively 
ubiquitous companies and product types, can allow cyber criminals to re-commit an initially 
laborious criminal action with ease. Once a weakness has been identified in a security 
system, everyone who uses that system becomes vulnerable. Perversely then, the more 
commercially successful and widespread a security system or product becomes, the 
greater the criminal incentive to try and bypass it, and the greater the likelihood of its 
eventual failure.  
Second, the common practice of elaborate disclaimers, especially on software packages, 
has led to institutionalised unaccountability, where producers cannot be held to account in 
the event of the software failing to keep its promise of protection and security. This lack of 
accountability does not encourage the creation of reliably robust security systems, 
especially where less robust systems are significantly easier and less costly do develop. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the cyber security market rewards first-to-
market products, creating incentives for rapid development of products rather than 
optimisation. 
Third, there are some issues of inappropriability. Throughout the ICT sector, new 
technologies spread quickly, meaning that companies other than the initial innovator will 
swiftly benefit from the original innovation. The literature highlights some additional 
externalities at the level of the consumer, where their safety is not simply ensured by 
acting alone and using high quality cyber security systems, but also by being part of a 
wider network of users who also take security seriously: interacting with many other users 
who are exposed to threats in turn increases the security threat to an individual user within 
that network, no matter how well they are protected. Both the production and consumption 
side of cyber security are therefore embedded in wider networks characterised by 
significant externalities, making simple cost-benefit analyses problematic for all parties. 
Though significant, these three issues do not feature especially widely in the literature and 
apply only to certain types of product within the wider cyber security industry. There are 
conceivable measures of public support to mitigate them. However, across the literature, 
there is a much more ubiquitous barrier to innovation in the sector, which is variously 
highlighted by all sources used to assess the sector in this report. The fundamental source 
of these barriers is the fact that, unlike with most other ICT-related products, the vast 
majority of consumers have no understanding of how cyber security products work, do not 
gain any significant understanding once they start using them and are additionally unable 
to gauge whether or how well a product works until it fails. 
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To illustrate: most ICT tools are intended for individuals who have a certain level of 
expertise or knowledge in the function that these tools are supposed to fulfil, i.e. office or 
desktop publishing programmes will generally be used by individuals who, professionally 
or privately, have some knowledge of writing, editing, designing, or printing. Cyber security 
products do not follow this paradigm – they are not intended for particular groups with an 
interest or expertise in the details of security systems. Put simply, the vast majority of 
consumers of cyber security products ‘just want it to work’, whilst having little or no 
understanding of what exactly ‘it’ does and being unable to verify whether or not ‘it’ is in 
fact working until damage through malware, security breaches, etc. actually occurs, and 
even in such a situation the consumer can hardly verify whether the product was weak and 
unable to stop a simple and unsophisticated threat, or whether its high quality was 
circumvented by a particularly skilled and innovative cyber criminal. 
Table 27 Barriers and opportunities in cyber security innovation 
 
Source: Bauer van Eeten 2009 p 711, based on in-depth qualitative study of 57 professionals in the IT sector with high 
exposure to cyber threats 
This key distinguishing feature of the cyber security sector highlights almost 
insurmountable information asymmetries: the nature and function of the products is such 
that consumers simply cannot tell the difference between a good product and a bad 
product. Companies are thereby completely disincentivised to engage in large and costly 
development programmes. Large sections of the market have been taken over by 
freeware/ open source programmes, while those that do charge for their products tend to 
build their reputation through marketing and advertising rather than through especially high 
quality new products. The literature frequently notes that a possible solution to this would 
be a robust and comprehensive testing and certification system for cyber security 
products. Whilst such systems already exist, they tend to lack coordination, participation 
and reliable authority located beyond the industry itself. This is one immediate possible 
form that public support in this sector could take. 
This issue furthermore leads to some problems around externalities: robust and reliable 
cyber security systems tend to have an effect on user interfaces of the products and 
services they are designed to protect. They may impose several additional checks and 
longer and more elaborate login-procedures; they may require more processor speeds or 
system memory, and may easily take up a larger amount of network space and connection 
speed than less sophisticated programs and systems. Given users’ general lack of 
The Case for Public Support of Innovation 
129 
 
understanding of these systems, this trade-off most commonly plays out strongly in favour 
of easy user interfaces, i.e. most companies will sacrifice security for ease of use. This 
issue has been pointed out in the case of financial services, as well as for the providers of 
digital infrastructures themselves.  
 
Table 28 Failures in the cyber security market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power 
Bauer 
and 
van 
Eeten 
2009
255
 
p 712 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENISA 
2008
256
 
see 
also 
Anders
on and 
Moore 
2006
257
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
As software is typically installed in many versions, 
configurations, and contexts, the cost of patch 
development can be very significant. From the 
perspective of software vendors it may therefore be 
advantageous to invest in security upfront rather 
than have the follow-up costs of patching. However, 
given the complexity of modern software packages 
and the benefits of short time-to-market, it will not be 
economical to invest to the point where all potential 
flaws are eliminated. […] Time-to-market is 
lengthened by software testing and the cost of 
software development is increased. In industries 
with network effects and first-mover advantages, 
such delays may result in significantly reduced 
revenues over the product life cycle (Anderson & 
Moore, 2006). Thus, the more competitive the 
software market segment, the lower the incentive to 
improve security beyond a minimum threshold. 
 
Lack of diversity is a common complaint against 
platform vendors […]; lack of diversity makes 
successful attacks more devastating and harder to 
insure against. Homogeneous architectures share 
common vulnerabilities, and this increases the 
variance of the loss distribution due to security 
incidents. Such high variance undermines many 
firms’ confidence in technology and makes them 
reluctant to invest. 
Externalities 
Kox 
and 
Straath
 
 
A second problem is related to the external effects, 
or externalities, of investments in security. ISPs may 
not be able to capture the full benefits of their 
                                            
255 Bauer, JM and van Eeten MJG (2009) Cybersecurity: Stakeholder Incentives, Externalities, and Policy 
Options. Telecommunications Policy 33 pp.706-719 
256 ENISA (2008) Security Economics and the Internal Market. Authored by Ross Anderson, Rainer Boehme, 
Richard Clayton and Tyler Moore; commissioned by the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security. Available: http://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/archive/economics-sec 
257 Anderson R and Moore T (2006) The Economics of Information Security. Science, 314(5799), pp610-613 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
of 
2013
258
 
 
 
Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bauer 
and 
van 
Eeten 
2009, 
p713 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Powell 
2001,
259
 see 
also 
ENISA 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[overall:] 
slowing 
down a 
lot 
 
investments in cyber security, for example because 
part of the potential benefits is for customers of 
other ISPs. 
 
A […] problem arises for core infrastructure 
providers (so-called backbone providers) who are 
responsible for the resilience of the Internet against 
shocks like natural disasters and massive DDoS 
attacks. Many end users expect that the Internet is 
available at all times and this requires sufficient 
spare capacity in the backbone. However, the 
organizations responsible for the backbone 
infrastructure only capture a fraction of the benefits 
of redundant capacity, and may be inclined to invest 
less than is socially optimal. 
 
 
…financial service providers are to a considerable 
degree able to manage risks emanating from their 
customer relations. However, they need to make 
choices balancing enhanced security and the growth 
of their electronic business. In principle, they could 
use highly secure platforms to conduct e-commerce 
transactions. Such an approach would likely have 
detrimental effects on users as it decreases the 
convenience of conducting business. Financial 
organizations thus face a trade-off between higher 
security and migrating transactions to cost-saving 
electronic platforms. 
 
If firms share security innovations and confront a 
common problem, individual firms may fail to deal 
with the problem because they hope they will get the 
benefit when another firm creates a security 
innovation to solve it. Because of this incentive to 
free ride firms may not innovate as quickly as they 
should. 
Information 
asymmetry 
Kox 
and 
Straath
of 2013 
p 2/3; 
See 
also 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A first problem is information asymmetry between 
two economic agents. For example, end users may 
not be able to verify whether an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) gives correct information about its 
security performance. This uncertainty makes end 
users reluctant to pay for security. For ISPs this 
means that their investments in cyber security do 
not give them an advantage over competitors; 
                                            
258 Kox H and Straathof B (2013) Economic aspects of Internet security. CPB Background Document. 
Available: http://www.cpb.nl/en/publications  
259 Powell, B (2001) Is Cybersecurity a Public Good? Evidence from the Financial Services Industry. 
Independent Institute Working Paper Number 57. Available: 
http://www.independent.org/pdf/working_papers/57_cyber.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
ENISA 
2012
260
; See 
also 
Bauer 
and 
van 
Eeten 
2009; 
See 
also 
ENISA 
2008 
Anders
on and 
Moore 
2006 
ENISA 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[overall:] 
show-
stopper 
additional security will only increase costs. ISP’s can 
try to escape this mechanism by investing in a 
reputation of providing high degree of security. As 
building a reputation requires substantial 
investments, market concentration will increase and 
competition might be reduced. 
 
Insecure software dominates the market for the 
simple reason that most users cannot distinguish it 
from secure software; thus, developers are not 
compensated for costly efforts to strengthen their 
code. 
Another instance of asymmetric information found in 
the information security market is a lack of data 
sharing about vulnerabilities and attacks. 
Companies are hesitant to discuss their weaknesses 
with competitors even though a coordinated view of 
attacks could prompt faster mitigation to everyone’s 
benefit. In the USA, this problem has been tackled 
by information-sharing associations, security-breach 
disclosure laws and vulnerability markets. There has 
been discussion of a security-breach disclosure 
directive in Europe. We assess these options later. 
Capabilities 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Network 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Institutional 
ENISA 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms seeking to manage risk often do so by 
externalising it to less powerful suppliers or 
customers. The most obvious example is the way in 
which software and service suppliers impose ‘shrink-
wrap’ or ‘click-wrap’ licenses on customers 
disclaiming all liability, including for security failures, 
and in some cases also taking ‘consent’ to the 
installation of spyware. This is a public policy issue 
as it removes a major incentive for the emergence of 
a market for more secure languages and tools, and 
for the employment of professional software 
engineering methods. […] Another example is the 
problem of mobile phone security; mobile phones 
have a long and complex supply chain, starting from 
the intellectual property owners, the chipmaker, the 
software supplier, the handset vendor, the network 
operator and brand from which the customer buys 
service. Each of these players seeks to have others 
bear the costs of security as much as possible, while 
using security mechanisms to maximise its own 
                                            
260 ENISA  (2012) Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe. Available: 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/incentives-and-barriers-of-the-cyber-
insurance-market-in-europe 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
 
 
Anders
on and 
Moore 
2006 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
power in the chain. 
 
Although vendors are capable of creating more 
secure software, the economics of the software 
industry provide them with little incentive to do so. In 
many markets, the attitude of ‘ship it Tuesday and 
get it right by version 3’ is perfectly rational 
behaviour. Consumers generally reward vendors for 
adding features, for being first to market, or for being 
dominant in an existing market and especially so in 
platform markets with network externalities. These 
motivations clash with the task of writing more 
secure software, which requires time-consuming 
testing and a focus on simplicity. 
Infrastructural 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 
Enabling technology 
‘8 great’ technology 
High value manufacturing 
 
In the UK, robotics and autonomous systems, also abbreviated as RAS, are regarded as 
crucial drivers of job creation and growth. In 2013, the UK government allocated £35 
million towards the development of RAS centres of excellence. Some basic examples of 
robots are vending machines, robot pets, and oil and well bore robots. Application areas 
have shifted from focus on the automotive and production sector to a wide range of 
sectors such as high-tech manufacturing, space, domestic, health care and medical 
technology, agriculture and more. One example of the more novel types of application of 
robots in agriculture is that of using robots to remove weeds from arable land. An example 
of an application in the health sector is the EC funded project to develop a customizable 
robot companion for people with memory problems or impaired mobility. Advances in ICT 
technology contribute to the development of future upgrading and or generations of robots. 
Specifically, cloud computing is expected to initiate the generation of ‘ubirobots’ that can 
share knowledge by connecting to cloud infrastructures.261 
The International Federation of Robots (IFR) estimates that the total world market of robot 
systems in 2012 was 26 billion dollars. In the EU, the big players in robotics are Germany, 
Italy, Sweden, and Finland. In 2011, the world market for robotics was spilt between 28% 
in the EU, 16% in the Americas, and 56% in Asia and Australasia. The biggest world 
players are Japan, Korea, and China.262 
                                            
261 Chibani A, Amirat Y, Mohammed S, Matson E, Hagita N and Barreto M (2013) Ubiquitous robotics: recent 
challenges and future trends. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 61, pp 1162-1172 
262  Innoboro (2013) Robotics in Europe. Data from Innoboro 
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Despite the recognition of the widespread potential of RAS, there are several failures that 
inhibit a rapid take up of RAS. In this section we discuss some of these failures and, where 
possible, we indicate the relevant RAS market in which the failure applies. 
One of the challenges identified by the UK government in the field is lack of cooperation 
between industry and academia. This is an underpinning motive for the launch of the UK 
catapult programme. The amount of industrial activity that is organized in cluster 
environments is still below its potential. There is a vast amount of academic research in 
the field, e.g. including robot programming, robot learning, robot control, robot simulation, 
and various application areas for autonomous systems. Nonetheless, the links between 
advanced research and the commercialisation of RAS products appear weak.  
Forge and Blackman evaluated the challenges in the EU market.263 Figure 9 (see also 
Forge and Blackman) presents the predicted trend lines (2010-2020) of different RAS 
product markets with respect to their general level of acceptance. On the vertical axis are 
noted differing degrees of acceptance ranging from low level of acceptance and to high 
level of acceptance and commercial possibilities. More specifically, on the lower bound: 
entry-level specialized and niche minority technology that remains costly. At mid-scale: 
major growth competences with non-robotic processes and/or technologies. And on the 
upper bound: accepted with market pricing as a mainstream technology. Overall, the 
different RAS product markets are expected to follow a positive trend line with most 
product markets reaching commercial production potential by the year 2020. Today, the 
medium and large companies operating in the industrial manufacturing of RAS are already 
at this level of production. The professional service market is similarly already at a rather 
mature level. This professional service market includes: professional maintenance robots 
and pipeline robots. Quite differently, small and micro sized companies operating in 
manufacturing still have substantial potential to grow in the field and to adopt RAS 
solutions in the work environment. Depending on the future development of the market 
there is however, the possibility that this market too reaches a sustainable commercial 
basis by 2020. 
The JRC identified several key aspects that currently hinder the uptake of RAS by smaller 
size companies across Europe. First, access to financing remains a major challenge and 
thus either robotics must become cheaper for smaller companies to adopts RAS solutions 
and/or smaller sized companies much come to understand the potential of robotics as a 
key asset to their production. At the same time, smaller companies working in the field of 
RAS development require support to cross the ‘valley of death’ from having developed a 
RAS model or prototype and launching the product on the market. There may also be 
resistance from within companies to introduce labour-saving robots. This fear is also linked 
to the lack of awareness about the potential and technological possibilities of RAS to small 
firms. Because the market is novel, the market knowledge about robotics is low. 
Additionally, there are some learning costs to make use of RAS; such learning costs include 
the knowledge on how to install, tailor, programme, and maintain the RAS. At a more 
                                            
263 Forge S and Blackman C (2010) A Helping Hand for Europe: The Competitive Outlook for the EU Robotics 
Industry. JRC Scientific and Technical reports 
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fundamental educational level, in some subfields of RAS, there is a chronic shortage of 
skilled engineers (TSB), as well as technicians and researchers.264 
Domestic services and care support for the elderly and medical and health care more 
broadly appear to be robotics markets with significant potential for growth. One of the 
current barriers is that the current cost of production is too high for commercial markets. 
Similarly, according to the JCR (2010), medical robots are currently only used in niche 
markets. Further technological development is necessary to make these products 
affordable at a larger scale. There are also suggestions that there is a need for a cultural 
shift towards an integrated life-style between man and robot. The study by Vaussard et 
al.265 for example, analyzed the interaction between domestic robotic vacuum cleaners 
and the household and found that people tended not to trust the operations of roots that 
they could not monitor.  
Moreover, according to JCR, road vehicle management RAS will not deployed on a large 
scale in the near future for reasons such as safety, acceptance and liability. Mahbub 
reviewed the barriers to RAS development in the construction industry266 and identified the 
lack of standardisation as a significant barrier to the RAS take-up in the industry. This may 
be related to rapid development in RAS. As a result of the rapid changes in the industry 
there may be a high level of uncertainty regarding the types of RAS solutions that are 
worth investing in and some companies fear that they cannot ‘keep-up’ with the rapid 
developments. More standardization is required to reduce the uncertainty over 
investments. Additionally, Mahbub identified that there is a high level of industry 
fragmentation, which creates first mover disadvantages in the industry. Mahbub argues 
that companies refrain from investing because they fear that they are not able to capture 
the benefit of the investment. Finally, the high level of dynamics and changing conditions 
of the construction sites also acts as technological barriers to the take-up of RAS 
solutions.  
In addition to the issues related to standardization and safety, an additional regulatory 
failure in the robotics industry is that the patenting rights and protection could be improved 
for the innovation of RAS solutions (JCR, 2010). 
Figure 9 Failures in the RAS market 
                                            
264 Forge S and Blackman C (2010) A Helping Hand for Europe: The Competitive Outlook for the EU Robotics 
Industry. JRC Scientific and Technical reports 
265 Vaussard F, Fink J, Bauwens V, Retornaz P, Hamel D, Dillenbourg P and Mondada F (2013) Lessons 
learned from robotic vacuum cleaners entering the home ecosystem. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 
10(2013) 
266 Mahbub R (2008) An Investigation into the barriers to the implementation of automation and robotics 
technologies in the construction industry. Doctoral thesis, Queensland University of Technology 
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Source: Adapted from JCR (2010). 
 
It is expected that RAS solutions will become an integral part of various commercial 
applications in the coming decade as result of future technological advances. Specifically, 
as a result of technical advances, it is possible that the cost of RAS technology will reduce 
and robotics will become more affordable. Hence, more actors will be interested in 
adopting RAS in their workspace and/or domestic lifestyle. The development of RAS 
market is dynamic and the current failures in the market are not permanent. What may be 
of greater concern for the UK market is that the UK currently lacks a significant market 
share. Developing niche competences is an important a priority for the UK if it seeks to 
compete in the market. 
Table 29 Failures in Robotics (in the EU) 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
JCR, 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
Technological advances will allow RAS solutions to 
become accessible at market prices 
Market power 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Externalities 
JCR, 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
Need for seed capital to adopt RAS solutions in the 
workplace,  
Support for SMEs to cross the ‘valley of death’  
Information 
asymmetry 
JCR 
2010, pp. 
99 
Slowing 
down 
“Lack of sufficient communication on robotics 
capabilities to raise awareness in the market” 
Capabilities 
JCR 2010 Slowing 
down 
Lack of skills and absorptive capacity in SMEs to adopt 
RAS solutions in the workplace.  
Network 
JCR 2010 
Mahbub 
(2008) 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
Too few clusters, networking between different actors. 
Construction industry (amongst others) is fragmented. 
Institutional 
JCR 
2010, pp. 
99 
Slowing 
down 
Lack of technical standards 
“The EU robotics industry does hold valuable patents 
for robotics but does not have a complete set for all 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
applications, so its IPR holdings could be stronger” 
Infrastructural 
JCR, 
2010 
Slowing 
down 
There is a low level of education and skills in RAS 
markets; e.g. engineers, technicians and researchers.  
Electronics, Photonics and Electrical Systems 
Enabling technology 
High value manufacturing 
 
Electronics, photonics and electrical systems (EPES) are a set of key enabling 
technologies, with considerable strengths in the UK. The UK EPES sector employs around 
330,000 people in terms of manufacturing alone and an additional 235,000 in distribution 
and sales of resulting goods. EPES accounts for 10% of UK manufacturing and the sector 
generates £29bn a year in revenues. However, not just a significant sector in its own right, 
the EPES sector produces an extremely wide variety of products and components that are 
crucial for innovation, growth and development in several other key sectors, including 
healthcare, transport, energy, built environment, security and environmental sustainability. 
It furthermore has considerable overlap with the ICT sector, meaning that several 
important product markets fall into both these categories.267 Though it is commonly 
assumed that EPES manufacturing in the UK is a shrinking industry due to production 
moving increasingly to emerging and developing economies, this is in fact only the case 
for individual components and products which do not require highly specialised skill. With a 
host of new and emerging technologies, there are large areas of the sector where highly 
specialised skill levels are required, resulting in the visibly strong UK manufacturing base. 
Even as basic research in this field continues to produce bases for new innovations, there 
are plenty of prospects for the UK EPES sector to build on an already strong capability. 
Nevertheless, there are several barriers to successful innovation in the EPES sector. 
Given the sheer breadth of this sector, it is perhaps unsurprising that barriers to innovation 
can be pointed to with relative ease. Summarising the general sector challenges, TSB 
notes on its EPES home page 
The main challenges for the electronics sector in the UK include the prohibitive cost of product 
development and manufacturing (particularly for early-stage companies), a fragmented supply 
chain, a general lack of vertically integrated companies that can realise products with an internal 
supply, and a fiercely competitive global market.268 
This assessment of the situation is confirmed by the evidence on the EPES sector. Short 
product-cycles, capital intensive market entry and fierce global competition pose significant 
obstacles to innovation. Development of new products is further disincentivised by the 
medium and long-term inappropriability, stemming from the fact that once production has 
become standardised, it swiftly moves to locations with cheaper labour costs, allowing 
several companies without a strong R&D base to benefit from the new product. A lack of 
                                            
267 See Technology Strategy Board, Electronics, Photonics and electrical Systems homepage: 
https://www.innovateuk.org/electronics-sensors-and-photonics; see also Technology Strategy Board, Electronics, 
Photonics and electrical Systems – Key Technology Area 2008-2011, available: 
http://www.efutures.ac.uk/sites/default/files/EPES%20Strategy.pdf  
268 See Technology Strategy Board, Electronics, Photonics and electrical Systems homepage: 
https://www.innovateuk.org/electronics-sensors-and-photonics 
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coordination in the form of overlapping R&D activities in several disparate and often small 
facilities is likewise frequently acknowledged. This is accompanied by a perceived skills 
shortage, though other reports note that those with the appropriate skills to engage in 
development in this field struggle to find work in industry. In conjunction, these two 
observations highlight an especially significant lack of coordination and communication 
between the academic sector and commercial research in this sector. 
There are some other minor points, such as one specific EU directive requiring collectively 
financing certain forms of waste disposal in the sector, increasing the burden on smaller 
firms and market entrants and thereby further obstructing innovation from these smaller 
players. 
However, in addition to this array of factors inhibiting successful innovation, a key feature 
worth highlighting here that is not readily captured by an enquiry into sector-specific 
market and system failures is the connectedness of EPES to other sectors. In certain 
instances, EPES can genuinely be understood as a stand-alone sector, for instance in the 
case of many consumer electronics. However, the reports on the sector consistently note 
that products from this sector usually find application in different sectors (e.g. health, 
transport, sustainability, etc.) and are moreover often combined with other ‘enabling 
technologies’, most frequently with ICT. This means that although there are some general 
factors inhibiting innovation across the EPES sector, each individual innovation will then 
additionally be hampered by barriers in the sector in which it is to find its application.  
The evidence on the EPES sector thus highlights that there is a range of barriers to 
innovation, and that public support especially to improve coordination and cooperation 
between existing commercial research facilities, as well as between academia and 
commercial development would make a significant difference to the UK’s ability to be 
better placed in the fiercely competitive global market. However, the EPES sector is also 
an especially good example of the special status of enabling technologies, where the 
marketable products resulting from the innovation process are additionally dependent on 
the barriers to innovation that exist in sectors beyond EPES itself. Illustrative examples of 
this are photonics for the health sector, where in addition to the barriers outlined here, the 
challenge of conducting trials in large-scale national health systems presents further 
barriers. On a different note, an innovative product consumer electronics might include not 
just the electronic/ photonic hardware, but also software and possibly advanced materials. 
The emergence of the final product will therefore be obstructed by barriers from all three 
‘enabling technologies’ combined. 
Table 30 Failures in the Electronics, Photonics and electrical systems (EPES) 
market 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
INNOVA 
2011269 
 
 
The electrical and optical equipment sector is highly 
capital-intensive, especially the electronics subsector. 
                                            
269 INNOVA (2011) Electrical and Optical Equipment Sector – Sectoral Innovation Watch, Final sector report. 
INNOVA, European Commission; available: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/proinno/sector-report-
electrical_en.pdf  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
technology  
 
Photonics
21 
2006270 
 
 
 
Photonics
21 2006 
 
 
[all:] 
slowing 
down a lot 
[…] Radical innovation makes the capitalisation on 
R&D investments more uncertain. 
 
The fabrication of test devices for R&D laboratories is 
expensive and requires highly developed expertise. It 
can only be carried out in state of the art facilities: 
piecemeal funding in individual university-based 
groups is rarely effective. 
 
A major challenge for the future of photonic 
components research is that, as technologies 
move to smaller dimensions, as well as to 
heterogeneous material combinations, the 
research infrastructure is becoming more 
capital and maintenance intensive. It is no 
longer possible for a small or medium sized 
research unit to do independent research in 
the photonic components field. 
Market power 
INNOVA 
2011; see 
also EC 
2009271 
 
 
 
 
INNOVA 
2011; see 
also EC 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[all:] 
slowing 
down 
The majority the products in the subsector optical 
equipment, medical devices specifically, are tailored 
for specific target groups (e.g. illnesses or uses). 
Markets are therefore highly segmented and national 
markets are often too small for extensive R&D 
investments to be worthwhile, for efficient, capital-
intensive production techniques to be implemented 
and for the necessary turnovers to be achieved 
(Thumm, 2000). 
 
The technological cycle in the electrical and optical 
equipment sector is very short. Innovative products 
which may become mature and being produced low-
cost countries locations (European Commission, 
2006a). This makes it hard for firms to capitalize on 
their R&D investments. The semiconductor industry is 
an example of an industry that has been affected by 
the dramatic changes in the conditions of global 
competitiveness (ELECTRA, 2008; ESIA, 2006). 
Externalities 
INNOVA 
2011; see 
also EC 
2009 
Slowing 
down 
…due to the rapid technological cycle, products which 
are innovative may become mature and being 
produced in low-cost countries locations. In addition to 
production, innovation activities are increasingly off-
shored to R&D facilities in low-cost countries (OECD, 
2008b). This shortens the innovation cycles for firms, 
requires more radical innovation (which can increase 
the uncertainty of demand) and increases the negative 
                                            
270 Photonics21 (2006) Towards a Brighter Future for Europe – Strategic Research Agenda in Photonics. 
Photonics21, European Technology Platform. Available: 
http://www.fp7.org.tr/tubitak_content_files/270/ETP/Photonics/sra_april.pdf  
271 EC (2009) Investing in the Future of Jobs and Skills: Scenarios, implications and options in anticipation of 
future skills and knowledge needs: Computer, Electronic and Optical Products. TNO, Submitted to the 
European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=3268&langId=en  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
consequences of legacy innovations… 
Information 
asymmetry 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
Capabilities 
INNOVA 
2011, see 
also 
Photonics
21 2006 
 
 
 
 
Slowing 
down 
A lack of highly skilled and educated human resources 
can slow down innovation in the E&O Equipment 
Sector (Wintjes &Dunnewijk, 2008; EITO, 2007; 
European Commission, 2006a; European Commission, 
2006b; Eucomed, 2007). Among the skills that are 
mentioned as necessary, are: engineering, science, 
technology management, project management and 
business management. Specifically, strong academic 
skills and knowledge on core engineering studies is 
needed. In the Optical subsector, there is a shortage of 
medical engineers, such as medical Informatics 
specialists (Eucomed, 2007) 
Network 
INNOVA 
2011; see 
also EC 
2009 
Slowing 
down 
Several sources report that European ICT research 
lacks coordination, cooperation, technology transfers 
to businesses and funding (see i.e. EITO, 2007; 
Wintjes & Dunnewijk, 2008, ESIA, 2006; European 
Commission, 2009b). For example, coordination 
should reduce overlap in national research 
programmes. European Technology platforms, Joint 
Technology Initiatives and joint national programmes 
aim at the (further) development of European centres 
of excellence, such as the European Institute of 
Technology. In the European Semiconductor industry, 
R&D programmes and co-operation fall short of a 
coherent and consistent concept for stimulating R&D 
investment (ESIA, 2006).  
Institutional 
INNOVA 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photonics
21 2006 
 
 
[all:] 
Slowing 
down 
According to the European Directive 2002/96/EC, the 
costs of processing historical waste have to be 
financed by all producers that are in the market. 
Therefore, new market entrants have to pay for waste 
that is caused by the large existing manufacturers. In 
this way, there is criticism that this Directive creates 
incentives for large manufactures to produce 
excessively in order to discourage entrance, and to 
spread the costs among existing and new producers 
(Mock and Perino, 2008). 
 
A structural weakness at present is that many photonic 
component researchers, after having completed PhD 
research and possible post-doctoral research 
experiences, have great difficulty to find positions in 
industry in which they can build upon their research 
expertise. The present industry in Europe cannot 
absorb this considerable and highly valuable human 
capital that is continuously lost to the sector. European 
industry has over the past decades considerably 
decreased the amount of long-term oriented research 
in photonic components. Central research laboratories 
hardly exist anymore and most of the on-going 
research has a rather short time horizon. 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
Infrastructural 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
 
 
Biosciences 
In a 2009 document the EC outlines the role of key enabling technologies (KET) in 
contributing to innovation and sustainable industrial development throughout the EU.272 
The KETs identified are nanotechnology, micro- and nano-electronics including 
semiconductors, advanced materials, biotechnology, and photonics. These technologies 
are recognised as playing important roles in increasing the level of competitiveness of EU 
industries e.g. stimulating investment in upstream and downstream industries. This section 
outlines the types of market failures that undermine development in the field of (industrial) 
biotechnology. As part of biosciences, biotechnology is closely related to advances in 
technology and innovation. 
Industrial Biotechnology 
Enabling technology 
High value manufacturing 
 
Biotechnology can be broadly defined as the use of biological resources (plants, algae, 
micro-organisms) with the objective of developing new materials, chemicals and forms of 
energy. The possibilities of applying biotechnology in industry are vast and can be found, 
for example, in industries such as (bio)plastics, agri-food, automobile, skin care, and 
medicine. Expected benefits of industrial biotechnology take-up include advancing into 
more sustainable and cleaner technologies, increased productivity and economic 
development. Industrial biotechnology is not a self-standing industry; instead it is a key 
underpinning technology that has applications in several different industries (see also 
BERR and BBSRC).273 The biotechnology industry is a major contribution to the 
development of traditional sectors such as food industries but also is a catalyst for the 
development of new sectors, including biofuels. This non-industry specificity aspect is key 
to describing the function of biotechnology (as well as some other KET) in industrial 
development. According to BERR 
                                            
272 EC SEC (2009) Preparing for our future: Developing a common strategy for key enabling technologies in 
the EU. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/communication_key_enabling_technologies_en.pdf  
273 BERR (2009) IB 2025: Maximizing UK opportunities from industrial biotechnology in a low carbon 
economy. Report to government by the industrial biotechnology innovation and growth team 
NB: BBSRC is a non-departmental body that was established in 1994 and it is one of seven UK research 
councils (RCUK) funded by the Government's Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). BBSRC 
supports initiatives of scientists and research students in the UK. The role of BBSRC is to contribute and 
support research initiatives on and related to biotechnology and to encourage university-business 
collaborations. 
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“…parts of the sector depend crucially on the availability of land to grow biomass, and on 
technology breakthroughs to ensure feedstock and production costs that are comparable to 
current petrochemical alternatives.”274 
Land access challenges in industrial biotechnology are related to the high volatility of 
prices of commodities such as food and oil. The (future) price of e.g. argi-food stemming 
from biotech engineering is dependent on the world price of food. And, the uncertainty 
over such world prices creates additional tension and competition over land access. The 
additional uncertainty over technological breakthroughs hampers the industrial 
development. Aside from difficulties related to land-access and volatile market prices, 
market failures too are a culprit to high levels of uncertainty in the biotech industry. An 
overview of the different market failures that impact industrial biotechnology is presented in 
Table 31. 
Even though the potential from technological advancement in biotechnology is vast, its 
benefits are sometimes controversial. Monsanto is one of the pioneers in the 
biotechnology industry, in the field of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), where it has 
a patent position so powerful as to enable the company to maintain a dominant position in 
the market. Critics of companies such as Monsanto, argue that, as a result of patent 
protection, the biotech market lacks competition and disregards environmental and health 
hazards. Nonetheless, large multinationals such as Monsanto are also in a position to 
contribute to further developments and applications of biotechnology.  
Excessive market power may block the technological advancements and application of 
biotechnology in several different industries. Yet, without protection during early stage 
investment the return on investment for industrial leaders is compromised. As argued in 
the TINA report on bioenergy, insufficient protection of intellectual property can result in 
firms investing below capacity, hence slowing-down development. It is important to note 
that SMEs active in downstream industries may be willing to pay for investment in 
development in the field of biotechnology but often such actors often do not bear the cost. 
For one, it may not be clear ex-ante who will benefit from the cost of investment and the 
returns on investment in biotechnology take many years to materialise. Overall, the 
potential of industrial biotechnology is dependent on patent protection to better enable the 
exploration of innovation opportunities.  
The types of issues regarding information asymmetry that are identified in the literature 
(BERR) involve that of a lack of policymaker and consumer understanding of the benefits 
of industrial biotechnology, which is slowing-down the take-up, and commercialization of 
bio-tech solutions. BERR likewise identifies that one of the market constraints in the field 
of biotechnology is a lack of skills, i.e. at every level, which hampers the flow of new ideas 
into the communization and industrial up-take. 
Both at the UK level and at the European level, network failures are identified challenges 
in the biotechnology industry.275 As a result of industrial fragmentation and coordination it 
is difficult to coordinate the actions in research, industries, and policy. Within industry, 
                                            
274 Ibid, p32 
275 Ibid; see also European Commission (2010) The Knowledge Based Bio-Economy In Europe (KBBE): 
Achievements and Challenges 
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there is a communication gap between industries and between upstream and downstream 
supply chains. Overall, network challenges substantially slow down the innovative process.  
An additional challenge in industrial biotechnology is that of developing industrial 
standards. Specifically, following a document of the European Commission (2010, pp. 6), 
“industry finds it difficult to seek authorisation for novel food products, because of the 
lengthy procedures and the uncertainty of the outcome.” We categorize this type of failure 
as an institutional failure because it reflects a shortcoming of regulation (at the regional 
and international level) to provide industry reliable market access. This type of uncertainty 
is expected to slow-down innovation in industrial biotechnology. 
Finally, based on the literature survey, we identified some infrastructural failures related to 
the biotechnology industry (see Table 31). These failures entail “a lack of publicly funded 
business support schemes” in terms of equipment and demonstration facilities.276 The 
early testing of ideas is key to a successful launch and commercialization of biotech 
produce. This means that some initiatives in the field are stillborn. 
Table 31 Failures in the biotechnology industry 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
 No 
evidence 
found 
 
Market power    
Externalities 
TINA, 
bioenergy 
pp. 27 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
“Spill-over effects reduce the benefits of engaging in 
early stage RD&D, due to the challenges of retaining 
IP benefits, and gaining the full market value from 
these investments. Investors are hence less willing to 
invest sufficiently in these pre commercial 
technologies, creating an investment ‘valley of death’ 
in the area of RD&D between early stage conceptual 
technologies and commercial application”. 
Information 
asymmetry 
 
BERR 
(2009, pp. 
45) 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
“Lack of understanding of IB and its potential – among 
businesses, consumers and policy makers (…) the 
main initial barrier to public acceptance of IB is a lack 
of knowledge or understanding of such new 
technologies. 
Capabilities 
BERR 
(2009, pp. 
44) 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
“Improvements in skills are required at every level. In 
particular, Masters level training is needed in the UK to 
deliver appropriate interdisciplinary IB skills, to 
transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries and 
enable shared strategies and collaborative thinking at 
each stage of the product or process development 
lifecycle. In addition, skills are needed to scale up 
production (‘from genes to tonnes’) to generate wealth 
from IB. (…) Students at A level and degree level need 
greater competence in basic laboratory skills than they 
currently show, so that they are capable, for example, 
                                            
276 BERR (2009) IB 2025: Maximizing UK opportunities from industrial biotechnology in a low carbon 
economy. Report to government by the industrial biotechnology innovation and growth team 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
of preparing their own solutions rather than depending 
on those prepared by lab technicians.” 
Network 
BERR 
(2009, pp. 
44, 45); 
 
European 
Commissi
on (2010, 
pp. 6) 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
“Companies and centres developing IB products and 
processes and the chemistry-using industries that will 
generate the rewards of IB are not well connected in 
the UK.” 
 
“Research in health, food and diet-related diseases is 
both complex and fragmented” 
Institutional 
European 
Commissi
on 
(20120, 
pp. 6) 
Slowing 
down (a lot) 
“Industry finds it difficult to seek authorisation for novel 
food products, because of the lengthy procedures and 
the uncertainty of the outcome” 
Infrastructural 
BERR 
(2009, pp. 
43, 45) 
Show-
stopper 
“Equipment and facilities for demonstrator projects 
suffer, in particular, from a lack of publicly funded 
business support schemes.
 
The demonstrator 
risk/reward profile is not attractive enough for private 
investors or large corporates. As a result, there is a 
shortfall of such facilities in the UK. Companies often 
go overseas to prove their ideas (…). There is a 
particular shortage of demonstration facilities for 
fermentation, for certain key areas such as upstream 
pre-treatment of biomass and for certain downstream 
operations.” 
 
“The adoption of IB is also hampered by lack of 
expertise in IB in most UK university Technology 
Transfer Offices. Technology transfer (early-stage 
university research and commercialisation) requires 
the ability to value the related intellectual property. 
Lack of this ability in relation to IB is impeding the flow 
of ideas from universities into commercial deals.” 
 
 
 
Synthetic Biology 
Enabling technology 
‘8 great’ technology 
High value manufacturing 
 
Synthetic biology is a technology area centred on the design and artificial creation of 
biological organisms. Classified as one of the ‘8 great technologies’, it is a field that is in its 
infancy, as well as having exceptional potential for future economic activity and growth. 
Conceptually, this field combines the disciplines of biology and engineering to move 
decisively beyond the creation of artificial molecules typical of chemical engineering, 
towards the creation of microorganisms. Existing uses of this technology in the UK include 
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creation of artificial microorganisms converting biomass such as crop residues into 
butanol, to convert carbon monoxide into fuels, and generally to enable more targeted, 
effective fermentation processes.277 The Technology Strategy Board notes that 
applications of synthetic biology include new ways of making high-value materials, such as 
fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals, renewable energy sources, processes for detecting 
and addressing environmental contamination, and increasing agricultural productivity, with 
projected global market opportunity figures cited in the region of $10bn by 2016.278 
The literature notes frequently that although this technology is relatively new and in large 
parts still at the experimental stage, the plethora of known potential uses outlined above 
has already triggered considerable commercial interest. Moreover, alongside the US and 
China, the UK is generally acknowledged to be a scientific leader in this field. Moreover, 
though there are some acknowledgements of a need to ensure there are more skilled 
researchers in the field, these are relatively rare and, despite the general concerns over a 
lack of STEM graduates and researchers, it does not amount to the severe skills shortages 
noted in some other sectors. A further frequently noted key advantage of this technology is 
that development is comparatively inexpensive and can be done in relatively small facilities 
without the need for the extensive supply chains characteristic of larger, heavy industrial 
equipment (e.g. civil aviation, robotics, satellites, etc.). 
However, despite all these key advantages, the literature highlights some important 
barriers to innovation in this field, which fall into the categories of institutional and network 
failure, as well as barriers relating to the character of the technology. However, rather than 
constituting completely separate and unconnected issues combining into a collected set of 
barriers, a large part of the problems identified all hinge on the wider implications of 
synthetic biology, and the regulations that are a place as a consequence of the 
controversy surrounding it. 
First, the notion of artificially creating life-forms has ethical implications and does not sit 
well especially with more religious sections of society, as well as those fearing dystopian 
futures, where life is reduced to mechanical building-blocks that can be assembled and re-
assembled at will. These implications have led to public doubts on synthetic biology, 
triggering considerable political caution and regulation of development in this field. 
Second, there is a much more immediate concern about dual use – the simple fact that 
synthetic biology could easily be misused for the development of devastating biological 
weapons and artificial varieties of disease (‘bioterrorism’). These concerns have already 
triggered extensive deliberation and research in the field of biosecurity, in conjunction with 
further regulation of research and development in the field. 
In addition to issues around biosecurity there are also issues around environmental 
biosafety: releasing artificial life-forms into the environment entails the risk of unintended 
consequence in terms of effect these life forms may have on the environment. The 
literature generally acknowledges that these risks are hypothetical, with no knowledge as 
                                            
277 Policy exchange, ‘8 great technologies’, available: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/eight%20great%20technologies.pdf  
278 TSB Synthetic Biology homepage: https://www.innovateuk.org/-/tools-and-services-for-synthetic-biology  
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to how long any unintended effects might take to be noticeable, but likewise, these 
concerns act as an additional driver of policy and regulation.279 
Governments have generally been swift to regulate this sector, with much regulation 
relying on the precautionary principle. This in itself restricts what R&D can be done, whilst 
the accompanying climate of public opinion leads to questions around whether there will 
actually be demand and acceptance of eventual resulting products and technologies. 
While technological start-up costs are relatively low, the need for extensive work to ensure 
compliance with existing regulations increases these costs considerably. There is a 
particular requirement for demonstration projects resulting from the uncertainties in this 
technology, where currently some information asymmetries exist in terms of both safety 
and efficacy of new developments. Across the literature, there are calls for better 
international networking in order to enable more large scale demonstrations, public 
education and transparent, internationally consistent standards leading to greater trust in 
and safety of synthetic biology. 
There are particular issues with IP, due to the multi-layered nature of synthetic biology. As 
noted, the field draws on the disciplines of biology and engineering; the latter becomes 
especially evident by the fact that each developed product consists of microbiological 
‘building blocks’, which are then put together in different ways to create different types of 
organisms. However, if each building block is already protected IP, the assembly of 
finished organisms can become arduous and costly. Clearer regulations are required 
detailing at what point the subcomponents of marketable microorganisms are significant 
enough to qualify for patents and IP.  
Table 32 Failures in the synthetic biology industry 
Failure Source Scale Description 
Character of 
Science and 
technology 
EC 
2010280; 
see also 
RCUK 
2010281; 
see also 
ESRC 
2012282 
Slowing 
down 
Synthetic biology comes with innovative 
promises of substantial benefits for health, 
the environment, resource management and 
the economy. Nevertheless, it is 
characterised by large uncertainties, potential 
risks and it raises ethical questions. 
                                            
279 For a detailed discussion and reference to wider literature on these issues, see IRGC (2009) Risk 
Governance of Synthetic Biology. International Risk Governance Council, Geneva. Available: 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_Concept_Note_Synthetic_Biology_191009_FINAL.pdf 
280 EC (2010) Synthetic Biology: From Science to Governance. A workshop organised by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Health & Consumers 18-19 March 2010, Brussels. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/dialogue_collaboration/docs/synbio_workshop_report_en.pdf 
281 RCUK (2010) Synthetic Biology Dialogue. BBSRC, EPSRC & Research Councils UK, June 2010, 
available: http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/web/FILES/Reviews/1006-synthetic-biology-dialogue.pdf  
282 ESRC (2012) Governing Synthetic Biology. Policy Brief, ESRC Innogen Centre, available: 
http://www.innogen.ac.uk/downloads/AGLS-11-Governing-Synthetic-Biology.pdf  
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Failure Source Scale Description 
TSB 
2012283; 
see also 
RCUK 
2010 
 
 
Since synthetic biology is a new field, there is 
much uncertainty surrounding both the risks 
and benefits of its research and applications. 
While stringent risk management is crucial for 
responsible research and innovation, 
inescapable uncertainty must be 
acknowledged and accounted for. 
Market power 
 
 
No 
evidence 
found 
 
Externalities 
 
 
No 
evidence 
found 
 
Information 
asymmetry 
IRGC 284 
2009 
Show-
stopper [in 
specific 
areas] 
In the medical field, for example, synthetic 
biology could aid the development of 
diagnostics, vaccines and cell-based or 
pharmacological therapeutics, but 
pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to 
invest in the technology without evidence of 
utility for human health. 
Capabilities 
TSB 2012 Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
There may now be a need to streamline the 
existing education and training programmes 
and, where appropriate, to introduce new 
courses to address the industrial translation 
process and, more generally, to meet the 
needs of industry. 
Network 
TSB 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
TSB 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[all:] 
Slowing 
down (a 
little) 
Most modern technological products and 
services exist in complex, and global, supply 
chains, and it takes time to introduce and 
have adopted radically different propositions. 
Each organization along the chain has to 
evaluate the impact a new technology may 
have on its operations, and has to satisfy 
itself that it can assure the quality and 
delivery of the commercial offering. 
 
The establishment of international markets 
and supply chains requires a number of 
                                            
283 TSB (2012) A Synthetic Biology Roadmap for the UK. UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap Coordination group; 
technology Strategy Board. Available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130221185318/www.innovateuk.org/_assets/tsb_syntheticbiologyroadmap.pdf 
284 IRGC (2009) Risk Governance of Synthetic Biology. International Risk Governance Council, Geneva. 
Available: http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_Concept_Note_Synthetic_Biology_191009_FINAL.pdf 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
components to be put in place. Depending on 
the nature of the project and whether or not it 
involves an SME, it will be necessary to seek 
industrial support, funding or partnership. If 
the project is university based, then a 
partnership with a large company with 
international links may be most appropriate. 
This can most effectively be done via some 
form of licensing or cooperative research 
agreement. However, large industries are well 
placed to identify appropriate research groups 
to partner with anywhere in the world, so 
ease of working together in addition to world-
class expertise will be important factors in 
their selection. Smaller companies may 
require more specific support to access 
international markets, for example by being 
assisted in developing some form of 
showcase programme that would in turn 
attract the required external investment or 
partnership. 
Institutional 
IRGC 
2009; see 
also EC 
2010; see 
also TSB 
2012; see 
also 
ESRC 
2012 
 
 
IRGC 
2009; see 
also EC 
2010; see 
also TSB 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRGC 
2009 
 
Slowing 
down 
 
 
Regulation and governance of synthetic 
biology are in the very early stages of 
development and the approaches currently 
under consideration relate mainly to the risks 
attached to the research itself rather than to 
the products and other innovations that might 
eventually emerge from that research. In 
governing the risks of new technologies, there 
is a history of decisions taken at the very 
earliest stages of development having 
unforeseen and often counter-productive 
outcomes which are difficult to change in later 
stages. 
 
Different IP cultures and world views are 
difficult to reconcile when stakeholder 
interests and incentives are not aligned. A 
key issue for risk governance is whether the 
synergies enabled by open sharing can 
create incentives for rapid diffusion more 
effectively than the patent system, and what 
impact the framing of the debate as ‘open 
source versus commercialisation’ could have 
on public perceptions of the technology. 
Worries about potentially restrictive patents in 
synthetic biology, and attempts to create an 
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Failure Source Scale Description 
open source ethos in synthetic biology 
research (if not the development of 
downstream products) are closely linked to 
concerns about the monopolisation of the 
field by commercial companies [ETC Group, 
2007]. 
The governance of new areas of development 
in life sciences has in the past led to an 
increasingly onerous and lengthy regulatory 
process which adds to the obstacles facing 
new market entrants, and can eventually 
stultify the entire innovation system. 
Biomedical technologies focus strongly on 
patents as a means to protect the very large 
amounts of financial investment needed to 
comply with regulatory regimes and bring a 
product to market [Maurer, 2006]. Patents 
that present overly-broad and ambitious 
claims, such as on foundational technologies 
and biological functions encoded by 
BioBricks, could inhibit research in synthetic 
biology. 
Infrastructural 
 
 
No 
evidence 
found 
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Summary of results 
Overall Results 
Before reviewing the overall results of this exercise, it is perhaps worth considering the 
implications of the method. The summary tables below reflect what we were able to find in 
the literature regarding the 24 innovation areas we identified. Table 33 presents a 
summary of the different types of failure across the analysed innovation areas. The 
literature had things to say about most categories of failure in most innovation areas. 
Table 33 Summary of failure types 
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Energy 
Nuclear Energy  **** *** * ** *** **** **** 
Renewable energy  ** **** **  *** **** **** 
Oil and Gas ***  ** ** * ** *** ** 
Energy storage ** **** **** ***  **** *** **** 
Built 
Environment 
Low impact buildings  *** **** ** ** ** ** ** 
Future cities   **  ** **  ** 
Food 
Agri-science  ** ** ** ** **** *** ** 
Farm-to-fork value chain  **** *** *  **** * *** 
Transport 
Low carbon vehicles ** ** **  ** ** ** **** 
Intelligent transport 
systems 
 **  **  *** ** **** 
Civil aviation ** **   *** ** ** **** 
Healthcare 
Regenerative medicine ** **  **** **   ** 
Assisted Living    **  *** ** **** 
Stratified Medicine  ** **** **  ** **  
Creative Industries   ** ***  *** ** **  
Financial services  **  ** ** **** ****  
Satellites and space  ** *** **  ****  ** 
Nanotechnology and Advanced Materials *** *** * * ****  ****  
ICT 
Big Data  * * * **** * * * 
Cyber security  ** *** ****   **  
Robotics and autonomous 
systems 
**  ** ** ** *** ** ** 
Electronics, Photonics and electrical 
systems 
*** *** **  ** ** **  
Biosciences 
Industrial biotechnology   *** *** *** *** *** **** 
Synthetic Biology **   **** * * **  
Note: *** Showstopper, ***Slowing-down (a lot), **Slowing down, *Slowing-down (a little), “blank” No evidence found 
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In order to identify patterns across the 24 innovation areas we apply a numeric scale to the 
different levels of failures. When no evidence was found we indicate ‘0’. Slowing down a 
little is given the weight ‘1’, slowing down is given the weight ‘2’ and slowing down a lot is 
given the weight ‘3’. Finally showstoppers are given the weight of ‘4’. Table 34 presents 
the summary of results using this numeric scale. The 24 innovation areas are sorted in 
descending order by the sum of scores of the different types of failures for each innovation 
area. The five ‘challenge-led areas’ – energy, food, transport, built environment and 
healthcare – are highlighted to help identify patterns. Aside from presenting the total 
scores for each of sectors, we also present the total frequency count of the types of 
failures by sector. 
There are several caveats associated with the implementation of such scales. We 
recognize that both the total score and frequency count are crude proxies to assess the 
role of failures across innovation areas and industry classification. Hence, before the 
results of this exercise are presented, it is worth pointing out a number of issues.  
 First, as already indicated in previous sections, there are several innovation areas 
where we find less frequent evidence of a given market or system failure, e.g. as is the 
case for assisted living and cyber security. However, not having identified a given type 
of failure does not provide a guarantee there are no failures in these sectors. This study, 
as well as the overall literature, may have failed to document certain failures.  
 Second, a lack of evidence of failures may also be an indication that some innovation 
areas are more dynamic and fast-growing than others and, as a result, we identify fewer 
failures (or vice versa).  
 Third, as evident in the analysis on robotics and autonomous systems, there are several 
failures in the market that currently slow-down innovation but, as a result of 
technological change, it is expected that some of these barriers to innovation will 
disappear within the next five years. The dynamic behaviour between technological 
development, innovation and failures is likewise an inherent part of other sectors. 
Basically, this also means that, as a result of structural changes in the economy 
associated with further technological development, some failures that we have identified 
as showstoppers will no longer manifest themselves as showstoppers in the short-run, 
or in the long-run for that matter. 
 Fourth, as already suggested in previous sections of this document, the ratings of the 
importance of different failures are subjective and the scale by which we propose to 
measure the failures is imperfect. The effect of the failure (show stopper or slowing 
down) does not reflect the degree to which a failure is critical to the innovative 
development of the industry. Specifically, failures that block the value chain of 
innovative processes that are key to further advancement in the industry can be 
considered more critical failures. 
Finally, in many of the innovation areas we found multiple failures within a single failure 
category. Both the total score and frequency count only reflect whether a type of failure 
was identified and does not reflect the (number of) way(s) by which one type failure 
restrains innovation. For example, as identified throughout the analysis, several aspects of 
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institutional failures play a role in the creative industries and the financial service 
industries: cultural aspects, and regulatory aspects. 
Despite these caveats associated with implementing a numeric scale we are still interested 
in learning whether this exercise will reveal any interesting patterns.  
We find that, in numerical terms, there is considerable variation in the effect of barriers on 
innovation across the different areas, with ‘future cities’, big data’, and ‘synthetic biology’ 
scoring the lowest and ‘energy storage’ scoring the highest. The last column of Table 34 
presents the frequency count of the failures for each of the innovation areas. To some 
extent the frequency count mirrors the pattern of the scores but there are also some 
discrepancies such as in the case of ‘big data’, which has a relatively low score but a 
frequency count of 7 – so all but one of the failures were present but in each case only to a 
modest extent.  
Table 34 Innovation areas scored by the effect of innovation failures 
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Energy storage 2 4 4 3 0 4 3 4 24 7 
Nuclear energy 0 4 3 1 2 3 4 4 21 7 
Industrial biotechnology 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 4 19 6 
Renewable energy 0 2 4 2 0 3 4 4 19 6 
Agri-science 0 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 17 7 
Farm-to-fork value chain 0 4 3 1 0 4 1 4 17 6 
Low impact buildings 0 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 17 7 
Low carbon vehicles 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 4 16 7 
Nanotechnology 3 3 1 1 4 0 4 0 16 6 
Oil and gas 3 0 2 2 1 2 3 2 15 7 
Civil aviation 2 2 0 0 3 2 2 4 15 6 
Robotics and autonomous 
systems 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 2 15 7 
Electronics, photonics and e-
systems 3 3 2 0 2 2 2 0 14 6 
Intelligent transport systems 0 2 0 2 0 3 2 4 13 6 
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Satellites and space 0 2 3 2 0 4 0 2 13 5 
Regenerative medicine 2 2 0 4 2 0 0 2 12 5 
Stratified medicine 0 2 4 2 0 2 2 0 12 5 
Creative industries 0 2 3 0 3 2 2 0 12 5 
Financial services 0 2 3 0 3 2 2 0 12 5 
Assisted living 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 4 11 4 
Cyber security 0 2 3 4 0 0 2 0 11 4 
Big data 0 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 10 7 
Synthetic biology 2 0 0 4 1 1 2 0 10 5 
Future cities 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 8 4 
Total score for the 24 innovation 
areas 21 44 51 40 38 54 50 51     
(Major sectors: Red=Energy; Green=Health and care; Blue=Built Environment; Grey=Transport; Yellow=Food) 
Table 35 presents the score and frequency count by innovation sector for each of the 
industry classifications: challenge led areas, enabling technologies, 8 great technologies, 
high value manufacturing and digital services. The one clearly identifiable trend from this 
analysis concerns the innovation areas falling into the category of ‘digital services’. All of 
these innovation areas score relatively low on the ranking, suggesting that barriers to 
innovation in the digital services are generally lower than elsewhere. Specifically, we found 
no evidence of failures of the character of science on digital services. 
Overall, for innovation areas that are classified as ‘high value manufacturing’ we see no 
clear pattern of there being systematically more or fewer failures than in other areas (even 
distribution across the rankings). The same is true for all the sub-sectors and sample-
technologies of the ‘challenge-led areas’, as well as for the ‘enabling technologies’ and the 
‘8 Great Technologies’.  
In addition to the categories of innovation areas that have structured this report so far, two 
other identifiers were considered: (i) significant high-street or consumer-goods orientation 
of an innovation area, and (ii) relative novelty of the innovation area. These additional 
markers to classify and conceptually divide the 24 innovation areas did not appear to be 
connected to either especially high or especially low barriers to innovation. However, there 
is one observation that is worth mentioning. Network failures are less frequently identified 
in sectors relying on newer technologies.  
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Table 35 Distribution of failures’ score and frequency count 
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Energy storage 24 7 x  x   x x   
Nuclear energy 21 7 x     x x   
Industrial 
biotechnology 
19 6  x  x     x 
Renewable energy 19 7 x   x  x  x x 
Farm to fork 17 6 x      x   
Agri-science 17 7 x  x    x   
Low impact 
buildings 
17 7 x   x    x x 
Nanotechnology 16 6  x x x     x 
Low carbon vehicles 16 7 x   x    x x 
Robotics and 
autonomous 
systems 
15 7  x x x    x  
Civil aviation 15 6 x   x      
Oil and gas 15 7 x      x   
Electronics, 
photonics and e-
systems 
14 6  x  x      
Satellites and space 13 5   x x x x    
Intelligent transport 
systems 
13 6 x    x x   x 
Financial services 12 5     x  x x  
Creative industries 12 5     x   x  
Stratified medicine 12 5 x   x   x  x 
Regenerative 
medicine 
12 5 x  x   x x  x 
Assisted living 11 4 x     x  x  
Cyber security 11 4  x   x   x x 
Synthetic biology 10 5  x x x   x  x 
Big data 10 7  x x  x   x x 
Future cities 8 4 x   x     x 
 
It is quite evident that the role of the State is more prominent in certain sectors than in 
others. It is also noteworthy that the role of the State in given sectors has changed 
substantially over the past decade. This generally means that, as certain sectors have 
become relatively more privatized, the rules of the game have changed. For example, as 
was detailed in previous sections, the energy sector was previously State-owned and 
today is governed under regulations, permits, contracts, etc. As a result of privatization, 
government failures have not disappeared. The most evident example of government 
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failures that we have accounted for are institutional failures and infrastructural failures. 
Several of the identified institutional failures are examples where regulations create 
barriers to innovations. Infrastructural failures are usually clear examples of government 
failure, e.g. where innovations are hindered by the lack of perceived regulatory/political 
stability. It is important to recognize that the State may have ‘solved’ a number of market 
failures (i.e. via policy and regulation). Additionally, based on the market failures that have 
been identified in this study, there may be substantial scope for the State to play a future 
role in overcoming failures. 
In our analysis we reviewed the degree to which there were more or less failures relative 
to sectors where there is: (i.) significant state involvement as a customer or user of 
innovation or (ii.) heavy regulation by the state for example due to public concerns, 
technological risk or particular moral hazard. We find that infrastructural failures play a 
prominent role in sectors with heavy state involvement and, for example, infrastructural 
failures do not play a prominent role in the 8 great technologies. Moreover, one interesting 
finding is that in sectors with heavy state involvement, we usually identify showstoppers or 
slowing-down innovation as a result of information asymmetry.  
Most and least significant failures 
For the most part, the various barriers identified through the literature review have a 
relatively narrow range of total scores, highlighting once again that all types of failure play 
a role across a broad range of innovation areas. The exception to this is ‘Character of 
science and technology’, which, though playing a slightly more prominent role in the ‘8 
great technologies’, is the only barrier never identified as a ‘showstopper’ and the one with 
the highest occurrence of ‘no evidence found’. The relatively low apparent significance of 
the character of the science and technology as a barrier to successful innovation is initially 
especially surprising, given that technological indivisibility – an important subset of this 
type of barrier – has been used as one of the fundamental arguments for public support of 
innovation throughout neoclassical literature and discourse. However, in the wider context 
of the analysis conducted here, two key explanations emerge for the noticeably low score 
of this barrier. 
Table 36 Overall severity of each innovation barrier 
Rank Overall score Barrier 
1 54 Network 
2 51 Externalities 
3 50 Institutional 
4 51 Infrastructure 
5 44 Market Power 
6 40 Info Asymmetry 
7 38 Capability 
8 21 Character of science & technology 
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First, the character of science and technology is an issue implicit throughout the 
discussions on most innovation areas. All areas considered in this report had at least 
some, if not all, of the following characteristics: 
 New or partially unchartered area of science and technology 
 Interdisciplinary character, requiring expertise from several different sources 
 Complexity at both research and development phase of innovation 
 Large or expansive facilities required for either demonstration, research or assembly 
Whilst these characteristics could be applied to most innovation areas considered here, 
they are generally not understood as barriers to innovation in and of themselves. Rather, 
the complex and multi-dimensional character of technology and science was implicitly or 
explicitly assumed in most innovation areas. Consequences of complexity and multi-
dimensionality then tended to fall into other types of barriers. ‘Technological character’ for 
instance frequently necessitated collaboration through large networks, or a particular type 
of skill-base, infrastructure or facility. Likewise, technological complexity was often a 
source of information asymmetries between researchers/ developers on one hand and 
customers on the other. Whilst the character of science and technology is therefore often a 
fundamental explanatory factor for the severity and/ or importance of network, capability, 
infrastructural or information failures, it is rarely identified by the literature as a barrier to 
innovation in and of itself. 
A second and related explanatory point concerns the more specific link between 
indivisibilities – a subset of ‘character of science and technology’ – and the overall highest 
scoring barrier, network failure. A surprising result is that even in those innovation areas 
characterised by especially large-scale projects, products and development, these 
characteristics were rarely pointed to as being significant barriers to innovation in and of 
themselves. This holds even for those industries, which, in the canonical literature on 
market failure, have been held up as prime examples of indivisibility, specifically space, 
civil aviation and energy. However, these large-scale, research-intensive sectors not only 
share a relatively low instance of barriers relating to the character, size and scope of the 
technology, but also an especially high level of serious network failures. Indeed, across the 
case studies of large-scale, research-intensive manufacturing – satellites and space, 
energy, civil aviation, robotics, food production and agri-science – there is frequent 
reference to the importance of supply-chains and coordination between manufacturers of 
various constituent parts and sub-components. There is therefore a strong suggestion that 
sectors where indivisibility might once have been problematic, specialisation and 
fragmentation have had a mitigating role, lowering the minimum scale required for 
successful innovation. Put simply, there is a sense in the analysis that in many cases the 
indivisible has become divisible, but at the expense of splitting up technologies into 
networks of sub-components, which may easily become fragmented or un-coordinated. 
The corollary may be a kind of ‘self-censorship’ via a focus on incremental innovation so 
that indivisibilities associated with the development of more radical forms of innovation are 
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simply not considered in the literature. Since our approach is based on that literature, of 
course, we cannot test that hypothesis in this study.  
Another failure that seems problematic is ‘capability failure’. This is conceptually different 
from other failures in the sense that it is a property of the individual firm rather than of the 
market or of research. In any industry, one might expect to see a mix of more and less 
capable firms. SME innovation support policy in general is built on the idea that the less 
capable are perfectible and that social investment in improving their capabilities will 
increase their innovation and business performance, generating a social return. Since the 
literature we have studied focuses on industries and technologies, it is not obvious that it 
would pay much attention to the range of capability possessed by the firms concerned. 
The main issue appearing under the heading of ‘capability failure’ is skill shortage, which 
needs to be carefully interpreted.  
We can think of this as having two components. One is a result of under-provision of 
relevant education and training by a combination of the state and industry itself. Because it 
is cheaper to ‘poach’ skilled labour from competitors than to train one’s own, firms have a 
disincentive to provide adequate training. This is an externalities-based market failure, for 
which the state compensates by itself providing education and training. If this fails to keep 
up with demand, a skill shortage results. The second is a firm-specific inability to identify, 
recruit or retain relevant skilled people. This can involve a ‘learning paradox’ where lack of 
internal skill prevents the acquisition of relevant skills from outside; or it can be as simple 
as the firm not wanting, or not being able, to pay the market rate for skilled labour. Without 
good information about the markets for very specific skills, it is difficult to tell these 
situations apart and they are probably conflated in at least some of the literature.  
Figure 10 Frequency of the different impacts of failures on innovation, by innovation 
area 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the frequency of the different impacts of failures by innovation area. In 
several innovation areas we identified no showstoppers to innovation (oil and gas, future 
cities, electronics, photonics and e-systems, creative industries, and robotics). In the 
energy market we did find substantial evidence that there are failures in the market that act 
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as showstoppers to innovation. In many innovation areas there is evidence that there are 
failures that slow innovation down a lot.  
Figure 11 illustrates the variation in frequency of the different impact (showstopper, 
slowing down at lot, etc.) across the types of failures. There is clear evidence that the 
showstopper effect of failures on innovation is identified both in the more neoclassical 
failures and for the innovation system failures. Likewise, we have found evidence that both 
the neoclassical failures and the innovation system failures can have a slowing-down 
effect on innovation. Usually, the number of showstoppers identified is lower than the 
number of identified failures that slow down innovation. The exception is infrastructural 
failures where we find more showstopper effects relative to slowing-down effects. No 
evidence has been found that there are showstopper effects for the character of science 
failure. As illustrated in Figure 10, Externality failures and network failures frequently slow 
down innovation a lot. 
Figure 11 Frequency of the different impact of failures on innovation, by market 
failure 
 
Relationships between different innovation areas 
Failures have effects not only on individual technologies or fields but – in cases where 
technologies are applied across fields – the failures can also be cumulative. In the 
enabling technologies and many of the ‘8 Great technologies’, the literature frequently 
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notes the various sectors in which general purpose technologies and innovations might be 
applied. For instance, photonics could find application in any substantive context from 
operating theatres to supermarkets. Conceptually separating sector-specific innovation 
areas from technology-specific areas therefore leads to the conclusion that many initial 
ideas and emerging research strengths must surmount both sector- and technology-
specific barriers before successful innovation is possible.  
Thus, innovation of photonics products for the health sector will be obstructed by the kinds 
of barriers noted here in the section on photonics, but will probably also encounter barriers 
similar to those pointed out in the sample technologies of ‘Health and Care’. 
Figure 12 Two sets of innovation barriers 
 
 
Aside from this additional observation of multiple sets of barriers, there are two additional 
points worth discussing in some detail, namely credit constraints and skills shortages. 
Though substantive barriers to innovation, both are problematic in the sense that they can 
result from several different possible circumstances and can be associated with several of 
the eight types of innovation barriers considered in this study.  
Credit constraints 
Two studies in 2013 have focused on analysing issues related to credit constraints for 
innovation in the UK. The study carried out by the Big Innovation centre285 consisted on a 
large-scale survey of SMEs in the UK. The conclusions of this work are that innovative 
                                            
285 Lee N, Sameen H and Martin L (2013) Credit after the crisis. Access to finance for innovative small firms 
since the recession. Working paper. Big Innovation Centre 
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firms are more likely to apply for finance for innovation activities and that the gap between 
SMEs and other firms has widened. However, innovative firms applying for finance are 
finding it harder to obtain now than before the recession. The study points out that this is 
due to the general worsening of credit conditions and not due to specific issues affecting 
the firms. 
The London School of Economics report on Growth286 points out that one of the main 
failures that causes difficulties for companies to access finance is a generalised short-
termism in the capital markets. This short-termism results in underinvestment, especially in 
long-duration projects and projects with high build or sunk costs, such as infrastructure 
and high-tech investments. This adds to the general over-reliance on bank finance to 
constrain growth, especially in innovative SMEs that want to develop long-term strategies 
or projects with higher private and social returns. The issues of maturity mismatch cut both 
ways, as bond and debt markets could potentially offer financing instruments with longer 
time repayment expectations. However, these instruments are skewed towards large 
businesses and are generally available only for companies with turnovers above £500m. 
Our study has covered many different sectors and has analysed the available literature on 
market and system failures. These failures provide different rationales for the public sector 
to invest in innovation. As part of the exercise we have also focused on picking up whether 
specific types of credit constraints were present in all these different areas. Credit 
constraints are pervasive across many of the sectors that we have analysed but the 
failures that generate such constraints can be very varied. For example, issues like a 
general lack of capital for some sectors and lack of access to available capital have 
fundamentally different sources. In the same way that uncertainty is not a market failure 
per se but a reason why markets fail, to investigate credit constraints we have to ask why 
they occur and what people are doing in the different sectors to minimise their impacts.  
Great technological challenges are usually affected by neoclassical market failures such 
as indivisibility and technological complexity. Enabling and general-purpose 
technologies, especially those related to industry, are highly capital-intensive and have 
long investment return cycles. In this study we have analysed areas such as advanced 
materials, nanotechnology, electronics, photonics and electrical systems. In such sectors, 
radical innovations can make the capitalisation on R&D investments more uncertain, which 
may decrease the amount of capital that is willing to invest. In addition and because of 
their novelty, these areas require higher-risk, early-stage innovation. The lack of capital 
makes it hard for entrepreneurs and innovators to develop their ideas to a level of 
technological readiness that can attract more market oriented funding. The lack of risk 
capital for stages such as prototyping, testing and scaling up to production volumes or 
facilities is one of the main reasons why recent policy response in this area is aimed at 
supporting companies (particularly SMEs) to bridge this ‘valley of death’ in their financing. 
Externalities are also one of the reasons why we find credit constraints in some of the 
areas, causing issues mainly with the availability of sufficient capital. We have observed 
that, in sectors where there is a large divergence between private and societal returns, 
                                            
286 Besley T, Coelho M and Van Reenen J (2013) Investing for Prosperity. Skills, Infrastructure and 
Innovation. Report of the LSE Growth Commission. London School of Economics 
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private investment levels are usually not optimal. Moreover, in sectors where there are 
substantial first-mover disadvantages -and thus second-mover advantages- there is also a 
lack of available capital for risky and disruptive innovations. 
According to our analysis, credit constraints in the satellites and space sector are mainly a 
result of first-mover disadvantage externalities. The returns on successful investments are 
endangered by competitors that are able to free-ride on technological and organisational 
solutions developed by the first-movers. Difficulty in protecting innovative products for this 
sector is also mentioned as a secondary failure that has an impact on the available capital. 
The literature points out that companies react by pooling resources in order to palliate 
most of these issues. This is interesting and aligns quite well with the fact that, historically, 
most of the largest space challenges have been addressed thanks to international 
consortia. Pooling resources is also mentioned as a solution to the excessive financial 
risks of innovation in the civil aviation sector. Pooled resources imply shared research and 
innovation projects and, consequently, shared risks and rewards. 
For civil aviation other significant barriers that make difficult the access to credit are the 
low profitability margins (that can be severely affected by oil prices), the heavy up-front 
investment costs and the long timescales to make a return on the investments. All these 
factors have been found to be showstoppers for finance providers outside the firms to 
decide whether the risks in providing finance are worthwhile. On top of that, lack of 
information on what the best sources of financing are is also mentioned as a secondary 
factor. 
Another one of the sectors that we have studied that is mature, with lower margins and 
with significant regulation is the food sector, from the agri-sciences to the production and 
retail of food products. In the case of agri-science, there is also a perceived lack of 
available funds for innovation, although the available literature does not ensure that there 
is really a general lack of investment capital. Taking a closer look we see that the main 
constraints in the agricultural sector come from the fact that farming has become another 
large-scale capital-intensive sector, although in this case the failures are not due to the 
size of the scientific or technological problems to tackle. In this case, research and 
innovation investments in agri-science can be locked into longer investment return cycles 
than the actors further down the supply chain are willing to tolerate (from the varying 
requirements of food manufacturers to the changing consumer preferences). These issues 
discourage private capital from investing in innovation in this sector. Proposed solutions 
identified in the literature seem to go in the direction of reducing market power failures 
across the supply chains and improving the public image and visibility of the sector. For 
the rest of the value chain, including manufacturers and retailers of food products, there is 
overall enough funding to finance current operations, although issues with access to 
finance have been pointed out. According to recent studies, these issues are mainly 
related to unrealistic expectations on the supply side (banks and other lenders) and a 
difficulty to finance capital expenditures for commercially available new technologies, 
including scaling up and turnkey solutions. Informational asymmetries have been 
mentioned as another secondary failure that makes difficult the access to capital in this 
sector. 
Going back to externalities there are other sectors where these have an effect on the 
availability and access to finance. For example, in the stratified medicine sector 
externalities prevent the full appropriation of investment returns. Pharmaceutical 
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companies may lack incentives to invest in diagnostics that could potentially reduce their 
markets. In addition, the traditional business model for drug manufacturers evolves from 
one of high-risk research with strong IP protection to a diagnostic research model with 
lower margins, platform based and with an assumption of high volumes. Another case of 
externalities is the built environment sector, which is affected by split incentives, where the 
investors pay upfront costs for the technology but are not the same actors keeping the 
benefits. Finally, financing difficulties due to externalities have been also found in the 
creative industries. Arts produce value that can be measured by economists, but their 
cultural value cannot usually be expressed in monetary units. Firms in the creative 
industries have difficulties raising capital due to the private sector failing to grasp the value 
of arts, including preservation of cultural heritage. In addition, valuation of intellectual 
property and content assets in this area is considered to be high-risk. 
Information asymmetries can cause issues regarding access to finance and, although 
the end problem is the same, the situation that originates it is different depending on 
whether the supply or demand side is the party with less/worse information. On the 
demand side, innovative companies may not know which actors are relevant to approach 
in order to obtain financing for innovation In addition, they may not know how to best 
communicate the potential value of their innovations to possible investors or lenders. On 
the supply side, banks and other business-lending actors (venture capital, business 
angels, etc.) may not know how to best calculate the potential return on investment of 
some innovations. In addition, credit suppliers can have an exaggerated risk-aversion due 
to not understanding some of the more complex technological developments. In many 
cases this does not outright impede access to capital but it can increase its cost to levels 
that are generally outside of the reach of innovative SMEs and start-ups. 
Credit constraints in the design industries are often caused by information asymmetries. In 
the case of design the supply side of capital usually does not have the necessary expertise 
to analyse business models in these sectors and as a result there is not an adequate 
valuation of their intangible assets. Compare that to the information failures noted in 
newer, more technological sectors like regenerative medicine. In this case, what hinders 
investment is a lack of track record and evidence of what kind of developments might be 
profitable. 
In other sectors such as stratified or personalised medicine there is a low level of 
investment derived from the fact that it is difficult to identify the combination of tests, IT and 
operational systems that can achieve cost efficiencies. There is also uncertainty about 
future revenue streams, which are compounded by the single pricing model for treatments. 
As a result, in this case the lack of financing is caused by an information asymmetry, which 
may in turn be created by a price fixing that impedes the market to transfer information 
between parties. 
Finally, in the area of robotics and autonomous systems, the available literature states a 
need for seed capital to adopt these solutions in the workplace although there is no 
indication as to the reason for this. Many of the solutions in this area are already well 
tested and in some cases it is a matter of adopting and tailoring solutions that are already 
in use in other higher technology sectors. As a result, one likely explanation for this lack of 
capital would be that of an information asymmetry whereby companies are not able to put 
forward the case for such investments and clearly communicate the productive benefits 
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that these improvements might bring to their processes. However, this should be further 
investigated as, were it be true, it could be a source of quick productivity gains for many 
companies. 
Network failures as a source of credit constraints have only been noticed in the assisted 
living sector and information on the possible causes is scarce. However, such network 
failures may also arise in other healthcare sub-areas, where the procurement processes 
are known to be complex. When the users of innovations are not the people paying for 
them and there are contradicting requirements or incentives these lock-in failures are 
bound to have a negative impact on the confidence of investors trying to enter the space. 
Finally we also observe institutional failures causing credit constraints for some other 
areas. These usually come about because rules and regulations are not conductive to a 
good investment climate for innovation in a specific sector. For example, in the oil and gas 
energy sector we find issues related to high decommissioning costs, required performance 
bonds and tax relief issues. On the other hand, for the renewable energy and the low-
carbon vehicle manufacturing sector, investor uncertainties are more related to policy 
uncertainties ahead of new announcements regarding climate change and emissions 
targets, which are an issue especially when there are long payback periods involved (and 
in the case of the automotive sector, to the tighter margins involved). Investment in 
technologies related to the built environment is also very sensitive to regulatory 
uncertainties. For a sector such as synthetic biology in the biosciences area, capital 
requirements to finance the start-up phase of companies from the point of view of the 
technology itself can be manageable. However, in this case the capital constraints are 
more likely to be found when trying to access finance to ensure compliance with 
regulations and to adequately protect intellectual property. According to our findings, 
capital to finance these added costs turns out to be more difficult to find than funding for 
the technological development itself. Finally, a sector that presents an interesting 
institutional failure hindering investment is the intelligent transport sector. In this case, we 
have noted that a need for clarification on matters of liability may be preventing enough 
capital of entering this space. 
So far, we have discussed how credit constraints manifest across the different areas but 
there are also interesting things to note at an overall level. When analysing all the sectors 
in aggregate we can observe how sectors are not isolated ‘islands’ of activity, but compete 
with each other for limited pools of available skills and capital for innovation. We have thus 
identified cases where one sector exerts its market power above another, less-favoured 
sector. This means that innovations that are key for some sectors may not be materialised 
due to capital going to other sectors that are overall more attractive because they either 
have higher margins (i.e. capital going to the biotech and pharma sectors instead of the 
food sector) or they have a more clear and favourable risk-return profile (i.e. clean tech, as 
opposed to nanotechnology or advanced materials). Finally, investment trends and “buzz 
topics” also play a part in contributing to a suboptimal allocation of capital for innovation 
across the different sectors.  
Skills shortages 
The costs of education and training, including the training of new scientists, are only 
partially captured by the private sector and public investment remains highly important. 
Many of the areas that we have considered exhibit capability failures that usually point to 
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skill shortages, especially of more technically oriented or STEM graduates. This recurring 
topic is worth of a closer look across the areas. As a result, this section aims to pick up 
whether these concerns are generally put forward in a vague form or whether there are 
essential differences in the way skills shortages manifest across the sectors and on 
whether specific issues are to blame for the skills shortages. 
In the credit constraints section we have commented on the fact that sectors compete 
amongst themselves for limited pools of capital and for skills this is even truer. On the 
skills side many well-worn stories are told about physics, maths and computer science 
PhDs going to work for the financial sector in order to make fortunes. Although these 
stories may look anecdotal, the fact is that this rerouting of skills in limited supply, result of 
macroeconomic conditions and relative performance of different sectors has an impact on 
the pace at which key (and often more traditional) sectors are able to hire and have access 
to the necessary skills to innovate. 
For example, in energy there is a more apparent lack of skills in the traditional sectors 
(such as oil, gas and nuclear) than in the renewable energy sector. In these traditional 
sectors the skilled workforce may require a longer time to reach maturity and is vulnerable 
to high turnover rates and obsolescence, requiring constant investment even when 
companies are finding it difficult to turn a profit. In the case of the oil and gas sector these 
skills shortages are reported to be more severe in project management, senior managerial 
and specialist engineering positions. 
For sectors such as the built environment (also concerning the development of future 
cities) the present lack of skills is not situated at the level of the people developing the 
technology. Skills shortages are on one hand in the lack of trained professionals to work 
with these new solutions (from builders to suppliers, these collectives bear the reputational 
risks of poor quality implementations) and on the other hand in the lack of knowledge of 
elected representatives tasked with legislating or making policy around these 
developments (i.e. mayors). 
In agri-science the lack of scientists in applied fields can be partly attributed to the 
competition for skills from other sectors and due to the lack of public visibility as an 
innovative sector. Agri-sciences are characterised by a severe breakdown of the link 
between basic research and appropriate development due to a breakdown in the level of 
expertise between scientists doing basic science and farmers. In the food sector, 
companies generally have access to sufficient skills for creative positions (sales, 
marketing), but struggle to find suitable candidates for engineering and science positions. 
Although we have found no definitive evidence, a likely explanation could be a loss to 
more competitive compensation in other sectors. In this case the lack of skills has also 
been attributed to the industry’s out-dated image, which discourages students to pursue 
careers in the food and drinks industry. 
For the civil aviation industry, the shortage is not only at the level of skilled engineers but 
also at the entry-level, which is attributed to the lack of traineeships in this sector and 
credit constraints that prevent companies to invest in training.  
An interesting issue with the shortage of skills in the creative industries (including design) 
is that the skills shortage refers mainly to the lack of entrepreneurial training, combined 
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with a lack of technical skills in Internet-related areas, more concretely in digital content 
creation tools. 
In the financial sector, access to skills is usually not a problem due to the average high 
compensation of this sector compared to the others. However, the financial sector has 
become highly specialised, which can limit the availability of some profiles. In addition, this 
deep specialism can make it difficult for non-specialists to challenge the experts and to 
source new talent with new ideas. This very high degree of needed specialisation is also 
mentioned in the automotive manufacturing sector. The maturity of the sector requires a 
very high degree of specialisation if one is to contribute in any way to the advancement of 
the current state of the art (e.g. combustion engines), which difficult the task of sourcing 
talent that can meet the expectations of companies. 
A generalised lack of skills has been noted in areas such as nanotechnology and 
advanced materials. In this case it not only affects expert engineers but also staff at the 
manufacturing level. One of the main reasons for this shortage has been attributed to 
industry outsourcing and offshoring and to the efforts of emerging economies to catch up 
with Western economies in education levels. The ability to train people with adequate 
profiles for these cross-disciplinary fields is an on-going challenge that also manifests itself 
in industrial biotechnology and sub-areas of ICT (such as big data and cyber security). In 
the big data field, we also find the issue of insufficient ‘practitioners’ within companies, in 
contrast to other sectors where the shortage is more prominent in the research and 
development of new solutions. A similar issue is pointed out for robotics and autonomous 
systems, where the skills shortage occurs mainly in SMEs without people that can adopt 
these solutions in the workplace. 
In regenerative medicine, a qualitative study for BIS highlighted shortages not only in 
engineers, but also in trained support staff, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) 
production staff and Qualified Persons (QPs) to deliver products effectively. Overall, it was 
felt that the number of staff (both clinical and non-clinical) with the necessary core skills 
and knowledge to deliver regenerative therapies was limited.  
Finally, for the remaining areas such as the synthetic biology and the satellites and space 
sectors we have unclear or contradicting statements regarding skills shortages. In the 
electronics, photonics and electrical systems these contradicting statements seem to be 
caused by a significant lack of coordination and communication between the academic 
sector and commercial research in this sector. As a result, these sectors should be 
investigated more deeply with a focus on skills shortages in order to be able to derive 
better conclusions about them. 
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Conclusions 
The main purpose of this report is to map the occurrence of market and innovation system 
failures across a number of technologies and business areas. To this end we have 
reviewed available literature about the sources of failure as well as about the 24 innovation 
areas selected for investigation. The literature review led us to differentiate among 8 types 
of failure, for which we then searched in literature about the innovation areas.  
 Market failure – the idea of market failure that focuses on research on the argument that 
indivisibility, complexity and uncertainty prevent the private sector from making the 
optimal level of investment in research 
 Market failure – market power, where this prevents potential innovators from making 
adequate return on investment and hence suppresses the rate of innovation 
 Market failure – externalities, where innovators’ inability to appropriate all the benefits of 
their innovations reduces returns and leads to under-investment 
 Market failure – information asymmetry, where actors optimise locally based on what 
they know rather than all the available information, leading to outcomes that are sub-
optimal compared with the theoretical model of perfect information 
 Systems failure – capability failure, where individual firms lack some of the capabilities 
they need to perform well or at the level of efficiency that economic theory would expect 
 Systems failure – network failure, where too tight links among actors tends to cause 
lock-in or where insufficient links lead to under-coordination among actors 
 Systems failure – institutional failure, where hard or soft institutions fail to meet the 
needs of innovators and therefore depress the rate of innovation; this includes some 
kinds of government failure 
 Systems failure – infrastructural, where needs for policy interventions in the innovation 
system are inadequately met 
We found most of the failures were present in most of the innovation areas we studied. 
The failure patterns appear to be rather specific to the individual innovation areas, so there 
were fewer trends than we expected. In many cases failures in technology and application 
areas risked exacerbating each other. Innovations had to ‘run the gauntlet’ of technology-
related failures only then to be confronted by a new set of failures in applications.  
Failures were less important in digital services than elsewhere, perhaps reflecting the facts 
that these operate within networks whose characteristics have been externally negotiated. 
(To take an extreme example, App writers can rely on a set of standards and an installed 
base of whatever ‘platform’ they choose to exploit. Within this ‘safe’ world, their 
imagination can then run free.)  
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Sectors where the state has been heavily involved are interesting because many of them 
involve large and complex technical systems (e.g. in transport). One would expect these to 
involve rigidities and they do indeed involve a large proportion of show stopping failures, 
but the variety of failure is still rather large. Only some of these are to do with scale.  
Infrastructural and network failures are more associated with industries than technologies, 
probably reflecting the social, multi-actor character of systems of innovation. Skill 
shortages are a particularly important type of infrastructural failure. In terms of the 
frequency with which they appear and the severity with which they manifest themselves, 
infrastructural and externalities failures need to have a fair degree of policy priority. 
Together with the market failure that leads to under-investment in research, these are in 
fact traditional areas of state intervention.  
Credit constraints did not strongly manifest themselves as failures, but rather as results of 
other failures. Bankers do not like uncertainty or even risk, so much of the difficulty firms 
(especially smaller firms) experience in borrowing money is ‘business as usual’. In bad 
times, bankers become even more averse to risk. While it can be argued that information 
asymmetry is a cause of credit constraint (because firms ought to know better than 
bankers what specific risks and uncertainties they face), it is of course also the case that 
firms’ views are liable to be as optimistic as those of the bankers are pessimistic.  
The major surprise from the study is the apparently low importance of traditional research-
related market failure and the correspondingly high importance of network and 
infrastructural failure. As discussed, the small role given to research-related failure may be 
an artefact of our method – focusing on markets makes ‘pre-market’ activities (related to 
more fundamental research or with infrequent, large changes in technological system) less 
visible than other failures. In the innovation systems view, network and infrastructural 
failures would be those that undermine the interconnectedness of the system – which is 
seen as one of the most important properties of innovation systems. There is a risk that 
the change of theoretical perspective also entails a shift in perception: if we use innovation 
system spectacles we see systemic kinds of failures. It may be that (through the 
pervasiveness of digital and other large technical systems) the world in which we innovate 
has objectively become more systemic. The cautious policy prescription would be to 
ensure that policy does indeed take account of the need for interconnectedness in the 
system, but not to treat this study as in any way undermining the need for research. 
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